The logic of collective action :public goods and the theory ofgroups
01 Jan 1971-
About: The article was published on 1971-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6455 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Public good & Collective action.
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01 Jan 1988
TL;DR: The functional source of innovation general patterns economic explanation shifting and predicting the sources of innovation innovation as a distributed process is discussed in this paper, where users as innovators are considered as the innovators.
Abstract: Chapter 1: The functional source of innovation general patterns economic explanation shifting and predicting the sources of innovation innovation as a distributed process. Chapter 2: Users as innovators. Chapter 3: Variations in the functional source of innovation. Chapter 4: Why does the functional source of innovation vary? How do innovators benefit from innovations? Do benefit expectations differ? Chapter 5: The hypothesis in testable form methods five empirical studies discussion. Chapter 6: Shifting the functional source of innovation. Chapter 7: Root of the problem: market research constrained by user experience Lead users as a solution testing the method discussion. Chapter 8: Innovation cooperation between competing firms applications for innovation management.
5,805Â citations
TL;DR: In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule as mentioned in this paper, where voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting.
Abstract: In a general equilibrium model of a labor economy, the size of government, measured by the share of income redistributed, is determined by majority rule. Voters rationally anticipate the disincentive effects of taxation on the labor-leisure choices of their fellow citizens and take the effect into account when voting. The share of earned income redistributed depends on the voting rule and on the distribution of productivity in the economy. Under majority rule, the equilibrium tax share balances the budget and pays for the voters' choices. The principal reasons for increased size of government implied by the model are extensions of the franchise that change the position of the decisive voter in the income distribution and changes in relative productivity. An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive voter increases the size of government.
4,696Â citations
Cites background from "The logic of collective action :pub..."
...There, taxpayers are portrayed as the prey sought by many predators who conspire to raise taxes relative to income by diffusing costs and concentrating benefits, or in other ways (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Olson 1965; Niskanen 1971; Hayek 1979)....
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...Of particular importance is the frequent failure to close many of the models by balancing the budget in real terms and considering the effect on voters of the taxes that pay for spending and redistribution (see, e.g., Olson 1965; Niskanen 1971; and Hayek 1979)....
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...Recent surveys by Mueller (1976) and Sahota (1978) summarize recent contributions by Downs (1957), Musgrave (1959), Olson (1965), Niskanen (1971), Buchanan and Tullock (1972), Riker and Ordeshook (1973), and others to such related topics as the determination of equilibrium collective decisions and…...
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Book•
01 Jan 2004TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe cities and regions as cauldrons of diversit...Cities and regions have long captured the imagination of sociologists, economists, and urbanists.
Abstract: Cities and regions have long captured the imagination of sociologists, economists, and urbanists. From Alfred Marshall to Robert Park and Jane Jacobs, cities have been seen as cauldrons of diversit...
3,270Â citations
TL;DR: The Logic of Collective Action (LCA) as mentioned in this paper was a seminal work in modern democratic thought that challenged the assumption that groups would tend to form and take collective action in democratic societies.
Abstract: With the publication of The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, Mancur Olson challenged a cherished foundation of modern democratic thought that groups would tend to form and take collective action...
3,231Â citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a theory that explains under what conditions network governance, rigorously defined, has comparative advantage and is therefore likely to emerge and thrive, and in broad strokes, they claim that the network form of governance is a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency.
Abstract: A phenomenon of the last 20 years has been the rapid rise of the network form of governance. This governance form has received significant scholarly attention, but. to date, no comprehensive theory for it has been advanced, and no sufficiently detailed and theoretically consistent definition has appeared. Our objective in this article is to provide a theory that explains under what conditions network governance, rigorously defined, has comparative advantage and is therefore likely to emerge and thrive. Our theory integrates transaction cost economics and social network theories, and, in broad strokes, asserts that the network form of governance is a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency. These exchange conditions drive firms toward structurally embedding their transactions, which enables firms to use social mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges. When all of these conditions are in place, the network governance form has adv...
2,551Â citations