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Journal ArticleDOI

The Long Summer of Turkey: The Gezi Uprising and Its Historical Roots

01 Apr 2014-South Atlantic Quarterly (Duke University Press)-Vol. 113, Iss: 2, pp 419-426
TL;DR: In this article, a small protest to prevent the demolition of a city park in central Istanbul was subjected to excessive police violence, and within days, the tiny protest bad become a countrywide civil revolt.
Abstract: In June 2013 a small protest to prevent tbe demolishing of a city park in central Istanbul was subjected to excessive police violence. Within days, tbe tiny protest bad become a countrywide civil revolt. Tbe Gezi uprising, named after tbe park, bas radically cbanged tbe dynamics of botb elite and grassroots politics in Turkey, creating an enduring spirit of resistance among the millions wbo had never been involved in street activism before, and undermining tbe belief tbat radical popular cballenges to tbe state emanate today primarily from the Kurdish, not tbe Turkisb, population. Millions took to the streets to cballenge tbe authoritarianism of Turkey's leader. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was widely regarded, at least by tbe international community, as a democratic figure, responsible for creating a \"Turkisb model\" that could potentially act as a beacon for tbe Arab world in tbe transition to democracy. Tbe Gezi uprising deconstructed tbis image outside Turkey wbile creating a deep political crisis witbin tbe power bloc inside Turkey. Tbis crisis, combined witb tbe newly vibrant wave of grassroots politics, is likely to alter irreversibly the trajectory of botb parliamentary and street politics in Turkey. In this article, I describe tbe bistory of tbe political and social conditions that structured tbe sudden and puzzling explosion of tbe nationwide Gezi revolt out of a small protest for an urban park in Istanbul. I first depict tbe macro-level political struggles tbat shaped tbe last decade and then portray tbe trajectory of grassroots political activism during the year preceding tbe Gezi uprising. Tbe bistorical analysis is combined witb my insigbts as a
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Ziya Öniş1
TL;DR: The loss of reform momentum and rising authoritarianism during the most recent phase of AKP government indicate that Turkish democracy is in crisis as mentioned in this paper, although the Gezi protests emerged as a movement.
Abstract: The loss of reform momentum and rising authoritarianism during the most recent phase of AKP government indicate that Turkish democracy is in crisis. Although the Gezi protests emerged as a movement...

95 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2015

48 citations


Cites background from "The Long Summer of Turkey: The Gezi..."

  • ...Uğur Yücel’s Yazı Tura/Toss Up (2004) is also noteworthy as an example of attempts by left-wing liberal Turkish filmmakers to address the Kurdish issue on screen, before the emergence of Kurdish filmmakers....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the key dynamics underlying the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) recent authoritarian consolidation efforts in Turkey from a critical political economy perspective are explained. But the authors do not discuss the role of economic factors.
Abstract: This paper aims to explain the key dynamics underlying the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) recent authoritarian consolidation efforts in Turkey from a critical political economy perspective c...

47 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In recent years, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) has troublingly reversed course as discussed by the authors, which was for many years believed to be paramount in ushering in a new era of moderate Islamism.
Abstract: Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, AKP, was for many years believed to be paramount in ushering in a new era of moderate Islamism. However, in recent years, AKP has troublingly reversed course...

34 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1852
TL;DR: The first issue of Die Revolution, 1852, New York; Online Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1995, 1999; Transcription/Markup: Zodiac and Brian Basgen Proofed: and corrected by Alek Blain, 2006 as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Written: December 1851 March 1852; Source: Chapters 1 & 7 are translated by Saul K. Padover from the German edition of 1869; Chapters 2 through 6 are based on the third edition, prepared by Engels (1885), as translated and published by Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1937; First Published: First issue of Die Revolution, 1852, New York; Online Version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org) 1995, 1999; Transcription/Markup: Zodiac and Brian Basgen Proofed: and corrected by Alek Blain, 2006.

2,802 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
25 Jun 2013-City
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the path of this social mobilization flowing from Gezi Park to larger geographical scales of the urban, the national, and beyond, situating the urban uprisings in Turkey in the conceptual background of the right to the city, coined by Henri Lefebvre at the time of Parisian upries in 1968, and argue in the end that if this revolutionary energy is to be channeled into a lasting social transformation, the Kurdish movement and the labor movement,historically...
Abstract: The spark that drew Istanbul into a fire of protest and uprising was initially set off by a modest ‘occupy style’ peaceful resistance, staged against the destruction of an historically public park, an urban commons, in order to make way for yet another shopping mall in Istanbul. Following explicit police violence against the protestors, who were openly discredited by the government for being a few looters, the urban centers of Turkey saw a full-fledged uprising, gathering considerable international steam as well. Analyzing the path of this social mobilization flowing from Gezi Park to larger geographical scales of the urban, the national, and beyond, this article situates the urban uprisings in Turkey in the conceptual background of the right to the city, coined by Henri Lefebvre at the time of Parisian uprisings in 1968. The article further argues in the end that, if this revolutionary energy is to be channeled into a lasting social transformation, the Kurdish movement and the labor movement—historically...

116 citations


"The Long Summer of Turkey: The Gezi..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Einally, despite differences in economic well-being, "reclaiming tbe rigbt to tbe city" was a common denominator for botb sectors of the middle classes in fighting to protect tbe city park and protest policies of commodification and privatization (Kuymulu 2013)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
Erdem Yörük1
TL;DR: In this article, a cross-sectional dataset generated by a 10,386-informant stratified random sampling survey and controls for possibly intervening socioeconomic factors and neighborhood-level fixed-effects was used to show that high ethnic disparity in social assistance is not due to higher poverty among Kurds.
Abstract: Can we argue that pressures generated from grassroots politics are responsible for the rapid expansion and ethnically/racially uneven distribution of social assistance programs in emerging economies? This article analyzes the Turkish case and shows that social assistance programs in Turkey are directed disproportionately to the Kurdish minority and to the Kurdish region of Turkey, especially to the internally displaced Kurds in urban and metropolitan areas. The article analyzes a cross-sectional dataset generated by a 10,386-informant stratified random sampling survey and controls for possibly intervening socioeconomic factors and neighborhood-level fixed-effects. The results show that high ethnic disparity in social assistance is not due to higher poverty among Kurds. Rather, Kurdish ethnic identity is the main determinant of the access to social assistance. This result yields substantive support to argue that the Turkish government uses social assistance to contain the Kurdish unrest in Turkey. The Turk...

97 citations

01 Dec 2009
TL;DR: Gur et al. as discussed by the authors provided a general analysis of the state of the contemporary Turkish political scene and suggested that the AKP, CHP, and MHP are likely to continue dominating the Turkish political landscape in the upcoming 2011 election cycle.
Abstract: Since the 2002 general elections, the Turkish political scene has been dominated by intense competition between the governing Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) and the two main opposition parties, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP).In the 2007 general elections, the incumbent AKP managed to win and increase its vote share significantly. Though it lost some ground, the AKP also did fairly well in the 2009 local elections. The AKP, CHP, and MHP are likely to continue dominating the Turkish political scene in the upcoming 2011 election cycle.This article provides a general analysis of the state of the contemporary Turkish political scene. A key question is whether AKP domination will continue for the long haul or whether the CHP and MHP can pose a serious enough challenge in order to take power.Rapid developments on the Turkish political scene have made for a political agenda that is changing on an almost monthly basis. Moreover, as new issues arise they seem to be increasingly controversial. For example, in August 2009, the governing AKP announced it was working on a major initiative to solve the long-running Kurdish issue. Although the initiative's details were not officially announced, a serious and intense debate erupted both at the mass and elite levels.The mounting tension on many fronts has generated increased talk of possible early elections in late 2010, a year earlier than scheduled. As political analyst Adil Gur suggests, there are four possible factors that could lead to early elections.3The first is the Kurdish initiative. By launching a debate on the issue, the AKP has raised expectations that would be difficult to meet without extensive reforms and even constitutional changes. Yet considering the harsh criticism from the CHP and MHP on the issue, and the pro-Kurdish DTP's constant demands, it is unlikely the AKP will undertake any radical changes-which could prove unpopular-before the elections.On the one hand, significant elements in the ethnic Turkish majority could view concessions to the Kurds as giving up more than they want and might shift to the CHP or MHP. On the other hand, Kurdish voters-who constitute an important part of the AKP majority-could view such reforms as insufficient and could opt to vote for the DTP instead. The AKP might thus prefer winning another election victory before moving forward with such reforms.A second possible factor is the economic situation. The AKP is well aware that the negative effects of global financial crisis have caused the party some loss in electoral support. Both the 2007 general elections and the 2009 local elections demonstrated that economic considerations are very powerful determinants of voting behavior in Turkey. If the economic situation were to deteriorate further by 2011, this could hurt the AKP's chance of reelection. Thus, early elections could be in the AKP's interests.The third possible factor that could lead to early elections is the lack of any new party or force entering the political competition. Although there have been small initiatives, such as the populist movement of Mustafa Sarigul (formerly of the CHP), they are far from being organized enough and having sufficient resources to pose any real threat. In this respect, it is in the AKP's interest to hold election before any new unity or strong opposition force arises.The fourth and final factor is the weakness of the opposition. While both the CHP and MHP hope to attract disappointed AKP voters, both parties, in particular the CHP, have failed to offer credible alternative policy options on major socioeconomic issues. Neither has thus succeeded to garner greater support. Early elections would then be to the AKP's advantage so as not to provide the opportunity for the MHP or CHP to become better organized, develop alternative policy options, and thus win over disillusioned AKP voters. …

2 citations