The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions
TL;DR: In this paper, the military role of nuclear weapons: Perceptions and misperceptions, and their role in the development and use of nuclear power. Survival: Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 261-271.
Abstract: (1983). The military role of nuclear weapons: Perceptions and misperceptions. Survival: Vol. 25, No. 6, pp. 261-271.
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22 Sep 2009TL;DR: Tannenwald as discussed by the authors traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence on US leaders, and analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991).
Abstract: Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.
258 citations
TL;DR: In the early years of the Cold War, Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as mentioned in this paper, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product or GDP) and defense burden has declined to insignificant levels.
Abstract: Mancur Olson's theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early years of the Cold War, but the association between economic size (gross domestic product, or GDP) and defense burden (the ratio of military expenditures to GDP) has declined to insignificant levels. Two influences are shown to be important in producing this change: the increased pursuit of private goods by Greece, Turkey, and Portugal and the growing cooperation among the other European allies. Since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the Europeans with credible means of self-defense, it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in Europe during the postwar period. NATO is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good. Accordingly, the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance.
110 citations
Book•
25 Nov 2010TL;DR: In this article, the methodological debate and the quest for custom have been discussed, and conditions of self-defence have been defined, and the future for the armed attack criterion has been discussed.
Abstract: Introduction 1 The methodological debate and the quest for custom 2 Conditions of self-defence 3 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Materiae 4 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Temporis 5 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Personae 6 What future for the armed attack criterion?
89 citations
83 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence and that they are neither useful tools of conquest nor low-cost tools of punishment.
Abstract: Do nuclear weapons offer coercive advantages in international crisis bargaining? Almost seventy years into the nuclear age, we still lack a complete answer to this question. While scholars have devoted significant attention to questions about nuclear deterrence, we know comparatively little about whether nuclear weapons can help compel states to change their behavior. This study argues that, despite their extraordinary power, nuclear weapons are uniquely poor instruments of compellence. Compellent threats are more likely to be effective under two conditions: first, if a challenger can credibly threaten to seize the item in dispute, and second, if enacting the threat would entail few costs to the challenger. Nuclear weapons, however, meet neither of these conditions. They are neither useful tools of conquest nor low-cost tools of punishment. Using a new dataset of more than 200 militarized compellent threats from 1918 to 2001, we find strong support for our theory: compellent threats from nuclear states are no more likely to succeed, even after accounting for possible selection effects in the data. While nuclear weapons may carry coercive weight as instruments of deterrence, it appears that these effects do not extend to compellence.
80 citations
Cites background from "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapon..."
...…more difficult than deterrence+ See, for example, Snyder and Diesing 1977; and Art 1980 and 2003+ 18+ See Tannenwald 2007; and Paul 2009+ 19+ See the joint statement in Time magazine by Rusk et al+ 1982+ See also McNamara 1983+ 20+ Halperin 1987, 46+ 21+ For example, Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001+...
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01 Sep 1977
TL;DR: In a recent interview, Paul Warnke, the newly appointed head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded as follows to the question of how the United States ought to react to indications that the Soviet leadership thinks it possible to fight and win a nuclear war.
Abstract: In a recent interview, Paul Warnke, the newly appointed head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, responded as follows to the question of how the United States ought to react to indications that the Soviet leadership thinks it possible to fight and win a nuclear war. He replied: In my view, this kind of thinking is on a level of abstraction which is unrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in those terms, which would indulge what I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate them into the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win.
118 citations