The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul.
About: This article is published in Psyccritiques.The article was published on 1982-01-01. It has received 133 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Soul.
Citations
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01 Jan 2002TL;DR: Wegner as mentioned in this paper argues that the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain and that it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality.
Abstract: Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious will, Wegner shows, helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion, it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines the issue from a variety of angles. He looks at illusions of the will -- those cases where people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing or, conversely, are not willing an act that they in fact are doing. He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. The result is a book that sidesteps endless debates to focus, more fruitfully, on the impact on our lives of the illusion of conscious will.
1,814 citations
TL;DR: The paper demonstrates the essential simplicity, paradoxical complexity, and methodological rigour that IPA can offer as a research tool in understanding healthcare and illness from the patient or service user perspective.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the teaching of the qualitative method, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), to healthcare professionals (HCPs). It introduces briefly the philosophical background of IPA and how it has been used within healthcare research, and then discusses the teaching of IPA to HCPs within received educational theory. Lastly, the paper describes how IPA has been taught to students/trainees in some specific healthcare professions (clinical psychology, medicine, nursing and related disciplines). In doing this, the paper demonstrates the essential simplicity, paradoxical complexity, and methodological rigour that IPA can offer as a research tool in understanding healthcare and illness from the patient or service user perspective.
738 citations
Cites background from "The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflect..."
...However, it is acknowledged that there is no such thing as “a D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ U n i v e r s i t y O f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a ] A t : 0 6 : 0 2 7 O c t o b e r 2 0 1 0 view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1974) and that the researcher plays an inescapably significant part in the process....
[...]
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention.
Abstract: Grounded theory's popularity persists after three decades of broad-ranging critique. In this article three problematic notions are discussed—‘theory,’ ‘ground’ and ‘discovery’—which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. It is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions—embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory—constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that ‘ground’ is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory.
563 citations
Book•
[...]
31 Dec 1993
TL;DR: The notion of qualia as mentioned in this paper is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us, the way things seem in the moment.
Abstract: "Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of (for you) will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them.
551 citations
Cites background from "The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflect..."
...This example first appeared in print in my Reflections on Smullyan in The Mind's I, Hofstadter and Dennett, 1981, pp.427-8....
[...]
TL;DR: In this article, the authors employ a new physics of objective reduction, which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline.
Abstract: What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that "qualia," or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being comprised of "occasions of experience." To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space-time--as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity--and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter--as described by quantum theory. This leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: " OR" which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose, 1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific "objective" criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event--the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental space-time--and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead "occasion" of experience. How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996). In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ("tubulins"), remain coherent and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that point, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR) abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ("quantum computing") phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a "stream" of consciousness. Microtubule-associated-proteins can "tune" the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or "orchestrated" ("Orch OR"). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signaling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own space-time geometries (Penrose, 1994; 1996). These geometries are also superposed, and in some way "separated," but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of space-time geometries becomes significantly unstable, and reduce to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the limits of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying space-time structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.
436 citations
References
More filters
Book•
01 Jan 2002TL;DR: Wegner as mentioned in this paper argues that the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain and that it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality.
Abstract: Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us? Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the issue. Like actions, he argues, the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain. Yet if psychological and neural mechanisms are responsible for all human behavior, how could we have conscious will? The feeling of conscious will, Wegner shows, helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion, it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines the issue from a variety of angles. He looks at illusions of the will -- those cases where people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing or, conversely, are not willing an act that they in fact are doing. He explores conscious will in hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, automatic writing, and facilitated communication, as well as in such phenomena as spirit possession, dissociative identity disorder, and trance channeling. The result is a book that sidesteps endless debates to focus, more fruitfully, on the impact on our lives of the illusion of conscious will.
1,814 citations
TL;DR: The paper demonstrates the essential simplicity, paradoxical complexity, and methodological rigour that IPA can offer as a research tool in understanding healthcare and illness from the patient or service user perspective.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the teaching of the qualitative method, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), to healthcare professionals (HCPs). It introduces briefly the philosophical background of IPA and how it has been used within healthcare research, and then discusses the teaching of IPA to HCPs within received educational theory. Lastly, the paper describes how IPA has been taught to students/trainees in some specific healthcare professions (clinical psychology, medicine, nursing and related disciplines). In doing this, the paper demonstrates the essential simplicity, paradoxical complexity, and methodological rigour that IPA can offer as a research tool in understanding healthcare and illness from the patient or service user perspective.
738 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention.
Abstract: Grounded theory's popularity persists after three decades of broad-ranging critique. In this article three problematic notions are discussed—‘theory,’ ‘ground’ and ‘discovery’—which linger in the continuing use and development of grounded theory procedures. It is argued that far from providing the epistemic security promised by grounded theory, these notions—embodied in continuing reinventions of grounded theory—constrain and distort qualitative inquiry, and that what is contrived is not in fact theory in any meaningful sense, that ‘ground’ is a misnomer when talking about interpretation and that what ultimately materializes following grounded theory procedures is less like discovery and more akin to invention. The procedures admittedly provide signposts for qualitative inquirers, but educational researchers should be wary, for the significance of interpretation, narrative and reflection can be undermined in the procedures of grounded theory.
563 citations
Book•
[...]
31 Dec 1993
TL;DR: The notion of qualia as mentioned in this paper is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us, the way things seem in the moment.
Abstract: "Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of (for you) will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them.
551 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors employ a new physics of objective reduction, which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline.
Abstract: What is consciousness? Some philosophers have contended that "qualia," or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being comprised of "occasions of experience." To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of space-time--as is described by Einstein's general theory of relativity--and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter--as described by quantum theory. This leads us to employ a new physics of objective reduction: " OR" which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline (Penrose, 1994; 1996). Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific "objective" criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness. OR is taken as an instantaneous event--the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental space-time--and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead "occasion" of experience. How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate an OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal microtubules within the brain's neurons (Penrose and Hameroff, 1995; Hameroff and Penrose, 1995; 1996). In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ("tubulins"), remain coherent and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that point, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR) abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ("quantum computing") phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a "stream" of consciousness. Microtubule-associated-proteins can "tune" the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or "orchestrated" ("Orch OR"). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signaling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own space-time geometries (Penrose, 1994; 1996). These geometries are also superposed, and in some way "separated," but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of space-time geometries becomes significantly unstable, and reduce to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the limits of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of space-time geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying space-time structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the hard problem of consciousness.
436 citations