The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas
TL;DR: This article found that those individuals who are least prone to moral errors also possess a set of psychological characteristics that many would consider prototypically immoral, such as Machiavellianism and Machiavelliism.
About: This article is published in Cognition.The article was published on 2011-10-01. It has received 332 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Moral development & Harm.
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TL;DR: There are now dozens of studies on the dark triad and, according to Google Scholar, over 350 citations as discussed by the authors The goal of this review is to update and critically evaluate this rapidly expanding literature.
Abstract: Ten years ago Paulhus and Williams (2002) called attention to the 'Dark Triad', a constellation of three conceptually distinct but empirically overlapping personality variables. The three members -- Machiavellianism, narcissism and subclinical psychopathy -- often show differential correlates but share a common core of callous-manipulation. There are now dozens of studies on the triad and, according to Google Scholar, over 350 citations. The goal of this review is to update and critically evaluate this rapidly expanding literature. The standard measures of each Dark Triad member are reviewed along with newer combination measures. The Dark Triad members are located in in mainstream structural models, namely, the interpersonal circumplex as well as Five- and Six-Factor Models. Key issues and controversies are addressed. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
976 citations
TL;DR: It is suggested that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient, and dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion, and moral typecasting.
Abstract: Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions of mind perception (agency and experience) map onto moral types (agents and patients), and deficits of mind perception correspond to difficulties with moral judgment. Second, not only are moral judgments sensitive to perceived agency and experience, but all moral transgressions are fundamentally understood as agency plus experienced suffering—that is, interpersonal harm—even ostensibly harmless acts such as purity violations. Third, dyadic morality uniquely accounts for the phenomena of dyadic completion (seeing agents in response to patients, and vice versa), and moral typecasting (characterizing others as either moral agents or moral patients). Discussion also explores how mind perception can unify morality across explanatory levels, how a dyadic template of morality may be developmentally acquired, and future directions.
605 citations
TL;DR: The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals, providing evidence for the independent contributions of de ontological andilitarian inclinations to moral judgments.
Abstract: Dual-process theories of moral judgment suggest that responses to moral dilemmas are guided by two moral principles: the principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on the intrinsic nature of the action (e.g., harming others is wrong regardless of its consequences); the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences (e.g., harming others is acceptable if it increases the well-being of a greater number of people). Despite the proposed independence of the moral inclinations reflecting these principles, previous work has relied on operationalizations in which stronger inclinations of one kind imply weaker inclinations of the other kind. The current research applied Jacoby's (1991) process dissociation procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Study 1 confirmed the usefulness of process dissociation for capturing individual differences in deontological and utilitarian inclinations, revealing positive correlations of both inclinations to moral identity. Moreover, deontological inclinations were uniquely related to empathic concern, perspective-taking, and religiosity, whereas utilitarian inclinations were uniquely related to need for cognition. Study 2 demonstrated that cognitive load selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, with deontological inclinations being unaffected. In Study 3, a manipulation designed to enhance empathy increased deontological inclinations, with utilitarian inclinations being unaffected. These findings provide evidence for the independent contributions of deontological and utilitarian inclinations to moral judgments, resolving many theoretical ambiguities implied by previous research.
452 citations
TL;DR: ‘Utilitarian’ judgments in moral dilemmas were associated with egocentric attitudes and less identification with humanity, and this lack of association remained even when antisocial tendencies were controlled for.
236 citations
TL;DR: This work offers a person-centered account of moral judgment, which focuses on individuals as the unit of analysis for moral evaluations rather than on acts, and can account for numerous empirical findings that are either not predicted by current theories of moral psychology or are simply categorized as biases or irrational quirks in the way individuals make moral judgments.
Abstract: Both normative theories of ethics in philosophy and contemporary models of moral judgment in psychology have focused almost exclusively on the permissibility of acts, in particular whether acts sho...
229 citations
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TL;DR: It is argued that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment.
Abstract: The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers.
3,618 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluated the Dark Triad of personality traits, namely Machiavellianism, subclinical narcissism, and subclinical psychopathy, in a sample of 245 students and concluded that they are overlapping but distinct constructs.
3,353 citations
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01 Jan 1983TL;DR: The animal rights movement is committed to a number of goals, including the total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; and the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: I regard myself as an advocate of animal rights—as part of the animal rights movement. That movement, as I conceive it, is committed to a number of goals, including:
the total abolition of the use of animals in science;
the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture;
the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping.
2,028 citations
1,769 citations