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Journal ArticleDOI

The “Operational Code” Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs*

01 Mar 1970-Canadian Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press)-Vol. 3, Iss: 1, pp 123-157
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an analysis of the croyances politiques of John Foster Dulles, in the context of code-comportement, a concept defined by National Archives of the US.
Abstract: On admet que les comportements sont largement tributaires de la perception du milieu physique et social ambiant. Celle-ci, en retour, est conditionnee par un ensemble de croyances sur ce qui a ete, ce qui est, ce qui sera et ce qui devrait etre. De la sorte, les croyances fournissent un « code » plus ou moins coherent, qui nous sert a comprendre et a interpreter les signaux captes par nos sens dans l'environnement. Si nous postulons une telle relation « code-comportement », les croyances touchant a la nature de l'histoire et de la politique s'averent etre un fonds particulierement significatif, pour comprendre la conduite des acteurs politiques.Nathan Leites, dans ses etudes sur le « code operationnel » bolchevique, poursuivit une telle voie d'approche des croyances politiques. Afin de rendre plus systematiques certains aspects des travaux de Leites, Alexander George proposa dix questions – cinq d'ordre philosophique et cinq d'ordre instrumental – qui, posees a un acteur donne, permettent de saisir l'essentiel de ses croyances politiques dans ses reponses. Cet article constitue une etude des croyances de John Foster Dulles a partir de ces dix questions.Nos donnees proviennent d'abord des nombreux ecrits de Dulles – il est d'ailleurs rare de trouver un materiel aussi considerable dans le cas d'un personnage politique contemporain, car nous n'avons qu'un acces limite aux documents d'Etat et meme prives en un tel cas. Des memoires du temps de l'administration Eisenhower, de meme que des monographies, des questionnaires et des lettres echangees avec les collegues de Dulles nous permirent de completer ce materiel de base. Nous avons aussi tente d'examiner de facon critique ses politiques, la ou c'etait possible, afin de deceler les points de coherence et de contradiction entre ses attitudes affirmees d'une part, et ses actes politiques concrets d'autre part. A l'exception des croyances de Dulles relatives a l'Union Sovietique, qui ont deja fait l'objet d'une etude quantitative, nous utiliserons ici des methodes qualitatives d'analyse.Nous presenterons les donnees recueillies par cette analyse sous forme d'une serie de quelque quarante croyances touchant a l'histoire et a la politique. Par exemple,CROYANCE 3. La presence d'ennemis a l'exterieur assure la cohesion de la societe.CROYANCE 7. La guerre froide est un jeu dont les operations se neutralisent mutuellement.CROYANCE 16. L'evolution ultime de l'histoire tend vers un ordre naiurel fonde sur la loi morale.CROYANCE 23. L'interet du monde libre tend a coīncider avec la loi morale.CROYANCE 25. La pire menace a la paix vient d'une possibilite de guerre due a une erreur de calcul.CROYANCE 30. Les leaders politiques auront davantage et un meilleur appui du public s'ils s'adressent a son sens moral, plutot qu'a ses interets.CROYANCE 33. Une fois qu'on a defini ses interets, la credibilite exige qu'on les defende tous.En conclusion, nous chercherons les origines de ces croyances chez Dulles: par exemple, dans son temperament personnel, dans ses roles et statuts, ou encore dans la configuration societale de son milieu; puis nous discuterons de l'utilite du concept de « code operationnel » comme instrument d'analyse.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a theory of perceived relationships and their associated images is developed, which is connected to a set of assumptions drawn from international relations theory that suggest perceived strategic relationships can be conceived of as a function of perceived relative power, perceived culture, and the perceived threat or perceived opportunity that a subject believes another actor represents.
Abstract: We build on the tradition of studying images in international relations by developing a theory of perceived relationships and their associated images. The psychological theory is connected to a set of assumptions drawn from international relations theory that suggest perceived strategic relationships can be conceived of as a function of perceived relative power, perceived culture, and the perceived threat or perceived opportunity that a subject believes another actor represents. We hypothesize that perceived relationships evoke both cognitive and affective processes that lead to at least four ideal typical images. We further hypothesize that enemy, ally, colony, and degenerate images have identifiable and interrelated components. We test to see if the component parts of these images are related to each other, if the overall image affects the processing and interpretation of new information, and if strategic foreign policy choices follow from the cognitive and affective aspects of the image. The findings indicate that three of the four images are unified schemata, used even by inexperienced analysts. We find further that affect in combination with cognition does predict policy choice in the case of the enemy image. We suggest that image theory is a promising means by which foreign policy and international relations may be fruitfully studied.

192 citations


Cites background from "The “Operational Code” Approach to ..."

  • ...Although early advocates of the operational code approach did not predict a direct causal nexus, subsequent scholars in this tradition have found behavioral effects of philosophical and instrumental ideas about world affairs (Holsti, 1970; McLellan, 1971; Walker, 1977; George, 1979; Starr, 1984)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter's operational code is introduced, based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches.
Abstract: In this article we introduce a new scoring system for doing operational code analysis and test its reliability and validity by measuring and modeling President Jimmy Carter's operational code. Using speeches from the public record, we construct indices for the elements of the operational code construct. Based upon the valences and scaled intensities of verbs uttered in the speeches, President Jimmy Carter's views of the political universe and approaches to political action in different issue areas are identified and compared. The results of the analysis provide reasonable support for the face, construct, and content validity of the operational code indices. We find that Carter's view of the political universe and approach to political action were consistent across issue areas during the first three years of his term as president. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan President Carter's support for human rights remained steadfast. Statistically significant shifts occurred in his views of the Soviet Union and others in the political universe and in his approach to political action regarding the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations and other issues.

150 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory was conducted to determine whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions, and it was shown that personality characteristics could predict the direction of disagreement in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations.
Abstract: Whether personality characteristics of American leaders crucially determine major American foreign policy decisions has been a matter of considerable disagreement. A test of two hypotheses drawn from interpersonal generalization theory shows such influences have probably been crucial in a number of cases in American foreign policy between 1898 and 1968. In 49 cases of intraelite disagreement on force-related issues and 13 cases of intraelite disagreement on inclusionary issues the direction of disagreement could be predicted in over 75 percent of the cases by knowledge of individual differences in interpersonal relations. A four-fold speculative typology suggests fundamental personality-based differences in orientation towards America's preferred operating style and role in the international system (e.g., introverts are drawn toward impersonal principles and mechanisms like balance of power–or in an earlier period to international law).The evidence implies that one source of war and hard-line foreign policy is the structure of self-selection and recruitment to high office in the American political system. As well, the systematic tendency to self-expressive personalization in major foreign policy decisions probably increases the rate of error of American elites.

124 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Operational code analysis has evolved from a classic work by Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (1953), in which he first analyzed the operational code of the Politburo as a mix of cognitive heuristics and characterological personality traits that influenced Soviet decision making as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Operational code analysis has evolved from a classic work by Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (1953), in which he first analyzed the operational code of the Politburo as a mix of cognitive heuristics and characterological personality traits that influenced Soviet decision making. Alexander George and Ole Holsti then isolated the cognitive aspects of the operational code construct and conceptualized them as a typology of political belief systems. Other scholars have applied this typology to explain the link between the beliefs and behavior of American foreign policymakers. The mixed results from these efforts have led to a revival of interest in the relationship between the cognitive and the characterological dimensions of operational code analysis. The aim of contemporary operational code analysis is a theoretical synthesis of the cognitive and affective influences upon foreign policy decisions identified by middle-range cognitive and motivational theories of political psychology.

112 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of work from four different research programs on cognition: operational code analysis, cognitive mapping, image theory, and conceptual complexity is presented, along with the possibility of synthesizing these four approaches and some unresolved issues in our understanding of cognition and its role in international phenomena.
Abstract: Cognition is central to the study of international affairs and underlies concepts such as power and interest. Yet, in spite of its importance, only recently have methodologies been developed to systematically analyze cognition. This essay begins by identifying the role that cognition plays in international politics; it then looks at some of the challenges faced in trying to assess cognition and how technology is assisting with these challenges. The heart of the article is a review of work from four different research programs on cognition: operational code analysis, cognitive mapping, image theory, and conceptual complexity. Each area is examined with regard to theoretical developments, methodological approaches, and the correspondence of its forecasts with observed behavior. The essay concludes by discussing the possibility of synthesizing these four approaches and by raising some unresolved issues in our understanding of cognition and its role in international phenomena.

107 citations

References
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Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered. It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the \"physiognomy of society,\" is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution. The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: \"Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries.\" [see endnote 1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. …

557 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A cursory survey of the relevant literature reveals that in recent years, particularly in the decade and a half since the end of World War II,students of international politics have taken a growing interest in psycho-attitudinal approaches to the study of the international system as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Even a cursory survey of the relevant literature reveals that in recent years-particularly in the decade and a half since the end of World War II-students of international politics have taken a growing interest in psycho-attitudinal approaches to the study of the international system. It has been proposed, in fact, that psychology belongs at the "core" of the discipline (Wright, 1955, p. 506). Two related problems within this area have become particular foci of attention. 1. A number of studies have shown that the relationship between "belief system," perceptions, and decision-making is a vital one (Rokeach, 1960; Smith et al., 1956; Snyder et al., 1954).2 A decision-maker acts upon his "image" of the situation rather than . The Belief System and National Images

312 citations

Book
01 Jan 1951

265 citations

Book
01 Jan 1964

125 citations

Book
01 Jan 1967

123 citations