Book•
The Political economy of foreign policy behavior
01 Jan 1981-
TL;DR: The SAGE International Yearbooks of Foreign Policy Studies examines the interplay of political and economic interdependence between nations in terms of what it means for foreign policy studies as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Volume six of the SAGE International Yearbooks of Foreign Policy Studies examines the interplay of political and economic interdependence between nations in terms of what it means for foreign policy studies. Topics include the impact of agrarianism on foreign policy; late capitalism; uneven development and foreign policy postures; and the impacts of compliance and dependence on Latin America and Eastern Europe.
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TL;DR: In this article, the effect of income inequality on political violence was found to hold in the context of a causal model that takes into account the repressiveness of the regime, governmental acts of coercion, intensity of separatism, and level of economic development.
Abstract: Maldistribution of land in agrarian societies is commonly thought to be an important precondition of mass political violence and revolution. Others argue that because of the difficulty of mobilizing rural populations for political protest, land maldistribution is irrelevant except as part of an inegalitarian distribution of income nationwide. These rival inequality hypotheses have significant implications with respect to the kinds of reforms likely to reduce the potential for insurgency in a society. They are tested using the most comprehensive cross-national compilation of data currently available on land inequality, landlessness, and income inequality. Support is found for the argument that attributes the greater causal import to income inequality. Moreover, the effect of income inequality on political violence is found to hold in the context of a causal model that takes into account the repressiveness of the regime, governmental acts of coercion, intensity of separatism, and level of economic development.
516 citations
TL;DR: The most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers.
Abstract: Contradictory findings, that economic inequality may have a positive, negative, or no impact on political conflict, are a puzzle for conflict studies. Three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the EI-PC (Economic Inequality-Political Conflict) nexus: statistical modeling, formal modeling, and theory building. Because analysts have tended to possess different research skills, these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another. Singly, however, all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the EI-PC puzzle. The most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers. Such an approach to the EI-PC puzzle produces a crucial test of the Deprived Actor and Rational Actor theories of conflict. The approach is also our best hope for solving the other long-standing puzzles in conflict studies.
332 citations
01 Feb 1993
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply Gramsci's concept of hegemony to inter-state relations to explain the rise and decline of world power and the evolution and supersession of the modern world system.
Abstract: THE CONCEPT OF WORLD HEGEMONY The decline of US world power in the 1970s and 1980s has occasioned a wave of studies on the rise and decline of ‘hegemonies’ (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1979; Bousquet, 1979; 1980; Wallerstein, 1984b), ‘world powers’ (Modelski, 1978; 1981; 1987), ‘cores’ (Gilpin, 1975), and ‘great powers’ (Kennedy, 1987/8). These studies differ considerably from one another in their object of study, methodology, and conclusions but they have two characteristics in common. First, if and when they use the term ‘hegemony’, they mean ‘dominance’, and secondly, their focus and emphasis is on an alleged basic invariance of the system within which the power of a state rises and declines. Most of these studies rely on some concept of ‘innovation’ and ‘leadership’ in defining the relative capabilities of states. In the case of Modelski, systemic innovations and leadership in carrying them out are assumed to be the main sources of ‘world power’. But in all these studies, including Modelski's, systemic innovations do not change the basic mechanisms through which power in the interstate system rises and declines. As a matter of fact, the invariance of these mechanisms is generally held to be one of the central features of the interstate system. In this paper I shall attempt to show that by applying Gramsci's concept of hegemony to inter-state relations we can tell a story of the rise and decline of world power that accounts, not just for the invariance, but also for the evolution and supersession of the modern world-system.
127 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a survey of the application of public choice theory to international political economy is presented, and the advantages and disadvantages of the public choice viewpoint compared with the traditional (political-science-based) view are evaluated.
Abstract: This paper surveys the applications of Public Choice theory (that is, the economic approach to politics) to international political economy. The central characteristics and the main theoretical concepts of this approach are discussed and its applications in various problem areas are described. The advantages and disadvantages of the Public Choice viewpoint compared with the traditional (political-science-based) view of international political economy are evaluated. It is concluded that the former approach represents an interesting and worthwhile complement to the latter.
114 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the logic of the bargaining model and find strong evidence for an explanation of foreign-policy change in both nations that centers on regime change, not on bargaining with an external actor.
Abstract: The foreign-policy behavior of weak states, conventional wisdom holds, is largely determined by a process of bargaining with a dominant state. Compliance with the dominant state's preferences is viewed as necessary to the maintenance of economic exchange relations that benefit the weak state. Evidence for such a theory has been found in cross-sectional correlations of aid and trade with UN voting. However, such empirical studies have ignored alternative explanations, overlooked elements of the statistical record, and failed to examine the logic of the bargaining model. The assumptions of the bargaining model are vulnerable to criticism; an alternative model emphasizes multiple constraints on the behavior of both the strong and the weak nation in an asymmetrical dyad. Reanalysis of the data uncovers strong evidence of an explanation for foreign-policy continuity rooted in dependency. Dependency permeates and transforms the political system of dependent nations, thus bringing about constrained consensus rather than compliance. Furthermore, the data provide strong evidence for an explanation of foreign-policy change in both nations that centers on regime change, not on bargaining with an external actor.
80 citations