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Journal Article

The Quasi War Cases - and Their Relevance to Whether "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" Constrain Presidential War Powers

22 Mar 2005-Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (Harvard Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.)-Vol. 28, Iss: 2, pp 465
TL;DR: The interpretation of the war clause in Section 8 of the United States Constitution has been studied extensively in the legal literature as discussed by the authors, with a focus on the legal interpretation of "capture on land and water".
Abstract: I. INTRODUCTION Constitutional scholars cite three Supreme Court decisions arising from the undeclared Quasi War with France in 1798-1800 as support for the proposition that Congress may authorize war of any magnitude, and that, except in case of sudden or imminent attack on the United States, this congressional authority displaces any right of the President to use military force of even modest magnitude without prior congressional authorization. The textual hook claimed by these scholars for so reading Bas v. Tingy, (1) Talbot v. Seeman, (2) and Little v. Barreme (3) is the phrase in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution that immediately follows the grant to Congress of the power "To declare War"--namely, the power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." (4) These additional words, it is argued, are placed in the War Clause because the Framers intended that Congress, and Congress alone, have the power to authorize not only "general" or "perfect" war through a formal declaration of war, but also "limited" or "imperfect" war. It is further argued that the temporal proximity of the three Quasi War decisions to the framing of the Constitution strongly implies that the Framers meant to constrain the President's ability to use military force in a manner short of full-scale war. The list of scholars subscribing to this interpretation of the War Clause is long and imposing. In a frequently cited article published during the Vietnam War, Charles Lofgren argued that the Framers' grant to Congress of the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal created a residual category of all forms of undeclared war. (5) The Constitution, in his view, grants to Congress alone the power to commence war, whether by formally declaring war or by authorizing reprisals. (6) Abraham Sofaer, later a federal judge and legal adviser to the State Department, offered a similar interpretation of the Quasi War cases several years after Lofgren. (7) With the notable exception of Eugene Rostow, (8) other scholars writing on this topic during and shortly after the Vietnam War uniformly embraced that interpretation, (9) as have the scholars writing thereafter on the war powers. Dean Harold Hongju Koh of Yale Law School, for example, reads Bas and Talbot to constitute a "delineation and delimitation of the executive's authority [to commence] limited hostilities by means other than formally declared war." (10) Similarly, John Hart Ely read these cases to support his conclusion that the original meaning of the War Clause was that "all wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many words or not ... had to be legislatively authorized." (11) The other contemporary scholars subscribing to this same interpretation are numerous. (12) Part II of this essay analyzes the original understanding of "letters of marque," "reprisal," and "captures on land and water." (13) As used by legal scholars when the Constitution was drafted, these words had meanings that were both well understood and not dependent upon the allocation of war-making power between the legislative and executive branches. Part III discusses the facts, holdings, and dicta of the Quasi War cases. Properly read, these cases concerning the legality of capturing ships belonging to or collaborating with France during the Quasi War do not illuminate how the war powers should be allocated between Congress and the President. Part IV shows that the Supreme Court has never read this trio of cases, or any one of them individually, to support the proposition for which today's scholars routinely cite them. To the contrary, in the twenty decades since the Quasi War took place, the Court has, with rare exception, cited these cases only for propositions concerning the legality of capturing ships at sea. Nonetheless, the contemporary misinterpretation by scholars of the Quasi War cases found a receptive audience in 2000 in the U. …
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Book
05 May 2008
TL;DR: This article examined how U.S. political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq from when President George W. Bush took office on January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, the day the invasion of Iraq began.
Abstract: This dissertation involves a content analysis of public discussion by government officials involved in the debate over the use of force against Iraq. Elite participants in government made public announcements to justify policy positions to constituents, educate interested participants inside government and external to the process, and persuade fellow decision-makers in government that the decision to use force against Iraq was the correct decision. Government officials' public statements regarding the potential use of force against Iraq comprise the "policy primeval soup" from which the policy of an invasion emerged. This analysis examines how U.S. political elites publicly discussed the use of force against Iraq from when President Bush took office on January 19, 2001 to March 19, 2003, the day the invasion of Iraq began. This research identifies aspects of the debate over which groups of officials most disagreed in the public discourse and how the degree of consensus or divergence changed over time.Results demonstrate that there was little consensus between parties and branches of government in how force was justified against Iraq. As the amount of discussion regarding Iraq increased in late 2002, this degree of consensus decreased. Though Congress authorized President Bush to use force against Iraq in October 2002, Republicans and Democrats in Congress differed significantly in how they discussed the use of force. These differences were smaller than the differences between Congress as a whole and the Executive branch. Nonetheless, the evidence collected here demonstrates that Congress was not acquiescent. While the prevailing interpretation in congressional-executive relations is that Congress passively supports the Executive branch in foreign military endeavors, this research demonstrates that Congress was involved in the debate about Iraq and increased that involvement as the time for the Iraq Resolution vote approached, increasingly growing more hawkish. At the same time, the story of the Iraq war debate was more nuanced than the typical argument would suggest, namely that Congress tends to follow the Executive branch's foreign policy. While the Executive branch exhorted war with Iraq more so than the Legislative branch, there may have been some enablement of this message from congressional Democrats.

35 citations

Book
13 Aug 2012
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a history of congressional declarations of war and congressional work-arounds to declare war, including the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and a congressional war powers resolution of 1973.
Abstract: 1. A constitutional tyranny and presidential dictatorship Part I. What Is the History?: 2. How the president declares war: the War of 1812 3. Why the Congress ought not declare war: the Spanish-American War, 1898 4. A plan for acquiescence: the War Powers Resolution of 1973 Part II. What Is a Declaration of War?: 5. Declaring and commanding: forms, functions, and relationships 6. Lawful and unlawful declarations of war: quantity over quality 7. Six possible structures Part III. What Are the Solutions?: 8. A constitutional amendment 9. A congressional work-around Part IV. What Is the Theory?: 10. Bellum justum et pium: the rule of law and roman piety 11. The rule of law: searching for ontology 12. Senator Malcolm Wallop Appendix I. Five congressional declarations of war and one appropriations act Appendix II. The federative powers in parliamentary governments.

8 citations

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: The leaders of both the American and the French revolutions drew heavily from the Enlightenment for inspiration in staging their revolutions and for the concepts of war and ideas for the new governments they created as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The leaders of both the American and the French Revolutions drew heavily from the Enlightenment for inspiration in staging their revolutions and for the concepts of war and ideas for the new governments they created. Enlightened philosophes were sharply critical of war as it had been fought through the ages. They regarded war as the greatest evil confronting mankind, but they had little hope it could be eliminated; thus, they combined proposals for permanent peace with a more realistic discussion of the means by which war might be limited or rendered more humane. The “civilizing of war” seemed to the philosophes a reasonable, worthwhile, and achievable undertaking, especially since it appeared to them that, as Vattel put it, “[A]t the present day the Nations of Europe almost always carry on war with great forbearance and generosity.”1 That certainly included the use of declarations of war.

1 citations