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Journal Article

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion

01 Oct 2013-Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (The Council for Social and Economic Studies)-Vol. 38, Iss: 3, pp 367
TL;DR: Haidt as mentioned in this paper argues that the visceral reaction to competing ideologies is a subconscious, rather than leaned, reaction that evolved over human evolution to innate senses of suffering, fairness, cheating and disease, and that moral foundations facilitated intra-group cooperation which in turn conferred survival advantages over other groups.
Abstract: The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion Jonathan Haidt Pantheon Books, 2012One has likely heard that, for the sake of decorum, religion and politics should never be topics of conversation with strangers. Even amongst friends or even when it is known that others hold opposing political or religious views, why is it that discussion of religion and politics leads to visceral-level acrimony and that one's views are right and the other's views are wrong? Professor Jonathan Haidt of the University of Virginia examines the psychological basis of our "righteous minds" without resorting to any of the pejorative labeling that is usually found in a book on politics and religion and eschews a purely comparative approach. Haidt proposes the intriguing hypothesis that our visceral reaction to competing ideologies is a subconscious, rather than leaned, reaction that evolved over human evolution to innate senses of suffering, fairness, cheating and disease, and that moral foundations facilitated intra-group cooperation which in turn conferred survival advantages over other groups. These psychological mechanisms are genetic in origin and not necessarily amenable to rational and voluntary control - this is in part the reason debating one's ideological opposite more often leads to frustration rather than understanding. Haidt also suggests that morality is based on six "psychological systems" or foundations (Moral Foundations Theory), similar to the hypothesized adaptive mental modules which evolved to solve specific problems of survival in the human ancestral environment.While decorum pleads for more civility, it would be better, as Haidt suggests, dragging the issue of partisan politics out into the open in order to understand it and work around our righteous minds. Haidt suggests a few methods by which the level of rhetoric in American politics can be reduced, such that the political parties can at least be cordial as they have been in the past and work together to solve truly pressing social problems.There are a number of fascinating points raised in the current book, but most intriguing is the one that morality, ideology and religion are products of group selection, as adaptations that increased individual cooperation and suppressed selfishness, thereby increasing individual loyalty to the group. That morality, political ideology and religion buttress group survival is probably highly intuitive. However, given the contemporary focus on the individual as the source of adaptations, to the exclusion of all else, to suggest that adaptations such as religion and political ideology arose to enhance survival of groups is heresy or, as Haidt recounts, "foolishness". While previous rejection of group selection itself was due in part to conceptual issues, one could also point out the prevailing individualist social sentiment, "selfish gene" mentality and unrelenting hostility against those who supported the view that group selection did indeed apply to humans and not just to insects. Haidt gives a lengthy and convincing defense of group selection, his main point being that humans can pursue self- interest at the same time they promote self-interest within a group setting - humans are "90 percent chimp, 10 percent bees". One can readily observe in the news and entertainment mediate that religion is a frequent target of derision, even within the scientific community - Haidt points to the strident contempt that the "New Atheists" hold for religion. They claim that religion is purely a by-product of an adaptive psychological trait and as a mere by-product religion serves no useful purpose. However, the religious "sense" has somehow managed to persist in the human psyche. One explanation by the New Atheists of how religion propagated itself is that it is a "parasite" or "virus" which latches onto a susceptible host and induces the host to "infect" others. As a "virus" or "parasite" that is merely interested in its own survival, religion causes people to perform behaviors that do not increase their own reproductive fitness and may even be detrimental to survival, but religion spreads nonetheless. …
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
24 Jun 2016-Science
TL;DR: Even though participants approve of autonomous vehicles that might sacrifice passengers to save others, respondents would prefer not to ride in such vehicles, and regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.
Abstract: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) should reduce traffic accidents, but they will sometimes have to choose between two evils, such as running over pedestrians or sacrificing themselves and their passenger to save the pedestrians. Defining the algorithms that will help AVs make these moral decisions is a formidable challenge. We found that participants in six Amazon Mechanical Turk studies approved of utilitarian AVs (that is, AVs that sacrifice their passengers for the greater good) and would like others to buy them, but they would themselves prefer to ride in AVs that protect their passengers at all costs. The study participants disapprove of enforcing utilitarian regulations for AVs and would be less willing to buy such an AV. Accordingly, regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.

994 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is suggested that in addition to motivating pathogen avoidance, disgust evolved to regulate decisions in the domains of mate choice and morality and is recast into a framework that can generate new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry.
Abstract: Interest in and research on disgust has surged over the past few decades. The field, however, still lacks a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the evolved function or functions of disgust. Here we present such a framework, emphasizing 2 levels of analysis: that of evolved function and that of information processing. Although there is widespread agreement that disgust evolved to motivate the avoidance of contact with disease-causing organisms, there is no consensus about the functions disgust serves when evoked by acts unrelated to pathogen avoidance. Here we suggest that in addition to motivating pathogen avoidance, disgust evolved to regulate decisions in the domains of mate choice and morality. For each proposed evolved function, we posit distinct information processing systems that integrate function-relevant information and account for the trade-offs required of each disgust system. By refocusing the discussion of disgust on computational mechanisms, we recast prior theorizing on disgust into a framework that can generate new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry.

565 citations


Cites background or result from "The Righteous Mind: Why Good People..."

  • ...…and by considering research and theory relating to pathogen avoidance (Curtis et al., 2011; Schaller & Park, 2011), sexual decision making (Buss, 1992; Gangestad & Simpson, 2000; Thornhill & Gangestad, 2008), and moral condemnation (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009, 2012; Haidt, 2007, 2012; Mikhail, 2008)....

    [...]

  • ...Indeed, according to moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), one basic moral foundation, purity/sanctity, “is based on the emotion of disgust in response to biological contaminants (e.g., feces or rotten food), and to various social contaminants like spiritual corruption, or the inability to control one’s base impulses” (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012, p. 185)....

    [...]

  • ...…disgust is one input into the computational systems governing moral judgment, as we argue, we might further observe cultural differences in the strength to which disgust intuitions shape moral rules based on local pathogen ecologies (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993)....

    [...]

  • ...Indeed, according to moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004), one basic moral foundation, purity/sanctity, “is based on the emotion of disgust in response to biological contaminants (e.g., feces or rotten food), and to various social contaminants…...

    [...]

  • ...…foundation, purity/sanctity, “is based on the emotion of disgust in response to biological contaminants (e.g., feces or rotten food), and to various social contaminants like spiritual corruption, or the inability to control one’s base impulses” (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012, p. 185)....

    [...]

Book
30 Sep 2013
TL;DR: In this article, Tisak et al. discuss the development of moral behavior and conscience from a socialization perspective, and discuss the social domain theory and social justice in children's moral development.
Abstract: Contents: Preface. Part I: Introduction. Part II: Structuralism and Moral Development Stages. E. Turiel, Thought, Emotions, and Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development. D.K. Lapsley, Moral Stage Theory. S.J. Thoma, Research on the Defining Issues Test. L.J. Walker, Gender and Morality. Part III: Social Domain Theory and Social Justice. J.G. Smetana, Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistencies and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgments. M. Killen, N.G. Margie, S. Sinno, Morality in the Context of Intergroup Relationships. C. Helwig, Rights, Civil Liberties, and Democracy Across Cultures. C. Wainryb, Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice. Part IV: Conscience and Internalization. J.E. Grusec, The Development of Moral Behavior and Conscience From a Socialization Perspective. R.A. Thompson, S. Meyer, M. McGinley, Understanding Values in Relationships: The Development of Conscience. L. Kuczynski, G.S. Navara, Sources of Innovation and Change in Socialization, Internalization, and Acculturation. Part V: Social Interactional, Sociocultural, and Comparative Approaches. J. Dunn, Moral Development in Early Childhood and Social Interaction in the Family. M.B. Tappan, Mediated Moralities: Sociocultural Approaches to Moral Development. J.G. Miller, Insights Into Moral Development From Cultural Psychology. D.P. Fry, Reciprocity: The Foundation Stone of Morality. P. Verbeek, Everyone's Monkey: Primate Moral Roots. P.H. Kahn, Jr., Nature and Moral Development. Part VI: Empathy, Emotions, and Aggression. P.D. Hastings, C. Zahn-Waxler, K. McShane, We Are, by Nature, Moral Creatures: Biological Bases of Concern for Others. N. Eisenberg, T. Spinrad, A. Sadovsky, Empathy-Related Responding in Children. G. Carlo, Care-Based and Altruistically Based Morality. W.F. Arsenio, J. Gold, E. Adams, Children's Conceptions and Displays of Moral Emotions. M.S. Tisak, J. Tisak, S.E. Goldstein, Aggression, Delinquency, and Morality: A Social-Cognitive Perspective. Part VII: Moral Education, Character Development, and Community Service. D. Hart, R. Atkins, T.M. Donnelly, Community Service and Moral Development. L. Nucci, Education for Moral Development. M.W. Berkowitz, S. Sherblom, M. Bier, V. Battistich, Educating for Positive Youth Development. D. Narvaez, Integrative Ethical Education.

519 citations


Cites background from "The Righteous Mind: Why Good People..."

  • ...This body of research indicates that notions of personal autonomy and rights are not tied to “Western” intellectual or cultural traditions (Haidt, 2012), but have relevance to people from diverse cultural backgrounds....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the use of theories of practice as a lens to magnify aspects of common social processes which generate observable patterns of consumption, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the theory-of-practice as an approach to consumption.
Abstract: Multi-disciplinary studies of consumption have proliferated in the last two decades. Heavily influenced by notions of ‘the consumer’ and tenets of ‘the cultural turn’, explanations have relied preponderantly upon models of voluntary action contextualised by webs of cultural meanings which constitute symbolic resources for individual choice. Arguably, the cultural turn has run its course and is beginning to unwind, a consequence of internal inconsistencies, misplaced emphases and the cycle of generational succession in theory development in the social sciences. Theories of practice provide a competing alternative approach which contests the colonisation of consumption by models of individual choice and cultural expressivism. To that end, this article explores the use of theories of practice as a lens to magnify aspects of common social processes which generate observable patterns of consumption. It is suggested that theories of practice might provide a general analytic framework for understanding consumption, one whose particular emphases capture important and relevant aspects overlooked by previously dominant approaches to consumption as culture. This article reviews reasons for the emergence of theories of practice and isolates some of their distinctive emphases. Strengths and weaknesses of the theory of practice as an approach to consumption are discussed.

446 citations


Cites background from "The Righteous Mind: Why Good People..."

  • ...…the extreme privileging of deliberation in accounts of everyday conduct (Cerulo, 2010; DiMaggio, 1997; Martin, 2010; Vaisey, 2008; Whitford, 2002).7 How to best conceptualise an alternative remains much disputed, with disciplines other than sociology doing better (e.g. Haidt, 2012; Kahneman, 2011)....

    [...]

  • ...…in behavioural economics, cognitive psychology and neuro-science have indicted the dominant models of rational action for their failure to accommodate the automatic, reactive and habitual aspects of most normal human conduct (e.g. Haidt, 2012; Kahneman, 2011; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
21 Aug 2012-PLOS ONE
TL;DR: Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences, adding to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.
Abstract: Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in U.S. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. Based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. Compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. As predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. Our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.

410 citations


Cites background or result from "The Righteous Mind: Why Good People..."

  • ...Finally, emotional reactions, and the moral principles that derive from them, serve interpersonal functions [17,29], such as navigating the social world [30] and forming groups with others [31]....

    [...]

  • ...We show how self-described libertarians differ from self-described liberals and conservatives not just on their moral beliefs, but on a variety of personality measures that, given previous research on the emotional [8,30] and social origins of moral reasoning [17,29,33], help us to understand why libertarians may hold their unique pattern of moral beliefs....

    [...]

  • ...This expectation is based upon previous research concerning the social function of moral judgment [17,29,33]....

    [...]

  • ...Our second goal was to provide further evidence for the dispositional origins of ideology [1,9], the role of intuition in moral attitudes [8], and the role that social functioning plays in moral thinking [17,29,33]....

    [...]

  • ...In the next section we explore how these value orientations may also have roots in specific patterns of (and attitudes about) social relationships, consistent with theories about the social function of moral reasoning [17,29,30,33]....

    [...]

References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
24 Jun 2016-Science
TL;DR: Even though participants approve of autonomous vehicles that might sacrifice passengers to save others, respondents would prefer not to ride in such vehicles, and regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.
Abstract: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) should reduce traffic accidents, but they will sometimes have to choose between two evils, such as running over pedestrians or sacrificing themselves and their passenger to save the pedestrians. Defining the algorithms that will help AVs make these moral decisions is a formidable challenge. We found that participants in six Amazon Mechanical Turk studies approved of utilitarian AVs (that is, AVs that sacrifice their passengers for the greater good) and would like others to buy them, but they would themselves prefer to ride in AVs that protect their passengers at all costs. The study participants disapprove of enforcing utilitarian regulations for AVs and would be less willing to buy such an AV. Accordingly, regulating for utilitarian algorithms may paradoxically increase casualties by postponing the adoption of a safer technology.

994 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is suggested that in addition to motivating pathogen avoidance, disgust evolved to regulate decisions in the domains of mate choice and morality and is recast into a framework that can generate new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry.
Abstract: Interest in and research on disgust has surged over the past few decades. The field, however, still lacks a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the evolved function or functions of disgust. Here we present such a framework, emphasizing 2 levels of analysis: that of evolved function and that of information processing. Although there is widespread agreement that disgust evolved to motivate the avoidance of contact with disease-causing organisms, there is no consensus about the functions disgust serves when evoked by acts unrelated to pathogen avoidance. Here we suggest that in addition to motivating pathogen avoidance, disgust evolved to regulate decisions in the domains of mate choice and morality. For each proposed evolved function, we posit distinct information processing systems that integrate function-relevant information and account for the trade-offs required of each disgust system. By refocusing the discussion of disgust on computational mechanisms, we recast prior theorizing on disgust into a framework that can generate new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry.

565 citations

Book
30 Sep 2013
TL;DR: In this article, Tisak et al. discuss the development of moral behavior and conscience from a socialization perspective, and discuss the social domain theory and social justice in children's moral development.
Abstract: Contents: Preface. Part I: Introduction. Part II: Structuralism and Moral Development Stages. E. Turiel, Thought, Emotions, and Social Interactional Processes in Moral Development. D.K. Lapsley, Moral Stage Theory. S.J. Thoma, Research on the Defining Issues Test. L.J. Walker, Gender and Morality. Part III: Social Domain Theory and Social Justice. J.G. Smetana, Social-Cognitive Domain Theory: Consistencies and Variations in Children's Moral and Social Judgments. M. Killen, N.G. Margie, S. Sinno, Morality in the Context of Intergroup Relationships. C. Helwig, Rights, Civil Liberties, and Democracy Across Cultures. C. Wainryb, Moral Development in Culture: Diversity, Tolerance, and Justice. Part IV: Conscience and Internalization. J.E. Grusec, The Development of Moral Behavior and Conscience From a Socialization Perspective. R.A. Thompson, S. Meyer, M. McGinley, Understanding Values in Relationships: The Development of Conscience. L. Kuczynski, G.S. Navara, Sources of Innovation and Change in Socialization, Internalization, and Acculturation. Part V: Social Interactional, Sociocultural, and Comparative Approaches. J. Dunn, Moral Development in Early Childhood and Social Interaction in the Family. M.B. Tappan, Mediated Moralities: Sociocultural Approaches to Moral Development. J.G. Miller, Insights Into Moral Development From Cultural Psychology. D.P. Fry, Reciprocity: The Foundation Stone of Morality. P. Verbeek, Everyone's Monkey: Primate Moral Roots. P.H. Kahn, Jr., Nature and Moral Development. Part VI: Empathy, Emotions, and Aggression. P.D. Hastings, C. Zahn-Waxler, K. McShane, We Are, by Nature, Moral Creatures: Biological Bases of Concern for Others. N. Eisenberg, T. Spinrad, A. Sadovsky, Empathy-Related Responding in Children. G. Carlo, Care-Based and Altruistically Based Morality. W.F. Arsenio, J. Gold, E. Adams, Children's Conceptions and Displays of Moral Emotions. M.S. Tisak, J. Tisak, S.E. Goldstein, Aggression, Delinquency, and Morality: A Social-Cognitive Perspective. Part VII: Moral Education, Character Development, and Community Service. D. Hart, R. Atkins, T.M. Donnelly, Community Service and Moral Development. L. Nucci, Education for Moral Development. M.W. Berkowitz, S. Sherblom, M. Bier, V. Battistich, Educating for Positive Youth Development. D. Narvaez, Integrative Ethical Education.

519 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the use of theories of practice as a lens to magnify aspects of common social processes which generate observable patterns of consumption, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the theory-of-practice as an approach to consumption.
Abstract: Multi-disciplinary studies of consumption have proliferated in the last two decades. Heavily influenced by notions of ‘the consumer’ and tenets of ‘the cultural turn’, explanations have relied preponderantly upon models of voluntary action contextualised by webs of cultural meanings which constitute symbolic resources for individual choice. Arguably, the cultural turn has run its course and is beginning to unwind, a consequence of internal inconsistencies, misplaced emphases and the cycle of generational succession in theory development in the social sciences. Theories of practice provide a competing alternative approach which contests the colonisation of consumption by models of individual choice and cultural expressivism. To that end, this article explores the use of theories of practice as a lens to magnify aspects of common social processes which generate observable patterns of consumption. It is suggested that theories of practice might provide a general analytic framework for understanding consumption, one whose particular emphases capture important and relevant aspects overlooked by previously dominant approaches to consumption as culture. This article reviews reasons for the emergence of theories of practice and isolates some of their distinctive emphases. Strengths and weaknesses of the theory of practice as an approach to consumption are discussed.

446 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
21 Aug 2012-PLOS ONE
TL;DR: Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences, adding to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.
Abstract: Libertarians are an increasingly prominent ideological group in U.S. politics, yet they have been largely unstudied. Across 16 measures in a large web-based sample that included 11,994 self-identified libertarians, we sought to understand the moral and psychological characteristics of self-described libertarians. Based on an intuitionist view of moral judgment, we focused on the underlying affective and cognitive dispositions that accompany this unique worldview. Compared to self-identified liberals and conservatives, libertarians showed 1) stronger endorsement of individual liberty as their foremost guiding principle, and weaker endorsement of all other moral principles; 2) a relatively cerebral as opposed to emotional cognitive style; and 3) lower interdependence and social relatedness. As predicted by intuitionist theories concerning the origins of moral reasoning, libertarian values showed convergent relationships with libertarian emotional dispositions and social preferences. Our findings add to a growing recognition of the role of personality differences in the organization of political attitudes.

410 citations