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Journal ArticleDOI

The Rise and Fall of Public-Private Partnerships in China: A Path-Dependent Approach

01 Jul 2011-Journal of Transport Geography (Pergamon)-Vol. 19, Iss: 4, pp 794-806
TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper analyzed and explained the processes of rise and fall of public-private partnership in China, and argued that the adoption of Public-Private Partnership in China is a path-dependent process rather than some economic optimum advocated by a variety of international organizations.
About: This article is published in Journal of Transport Geography.The article was published on 2011-07-01. It has received 93 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Private sector & General partnership.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical framework of PPP governance is developed, identifying the logics and interactions of the differentiating levels in the PPP system, and the institutional framework of China is presented with regard to its cultural, legal, and administrative characteristics, as the embeddedness of public-private partnership development.

170 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Dec 2013-Cities
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the impacts of factors on ridership within Metro stations' pedestrian catchment area (PCA) in Nanjing, China and developed a direct ridership model to explain the ridership at 55 metro stations using a Geographic Information System (GIS) and multiple regression analysis.

143 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined causality in a panel cointegration and a Granger causality framework using time series data throughout the 1978-2008 period, and found that in the long run, there is unidirectional Granger causal linkages from economic growth to transport infrastructure; at the regional level, there exists bidirectional causality.

106 citations


Cites background from "The Rise and Fall of Public-Private..."

  • ...Both the central and the local governments preferred to construct transport infrastructure in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and investment from national state-owned enterprises....

    [...]

  • ...Since the Chinese government has the decision-making power over public investment, it gives priority to develop transport infrastructure through public-financed projects and organizes construction projects through public–private participation and FDI (Mu et al., 2011)....

    [...]

  • ...For the whole nation, economic growth leads to a growing demand for transport services and fulfils this demand by increasing public investment directly or organizing the large transport projects indirectly (Mu et al., 2011)....

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the effective implementation of new, large-scale seaport infrastructure projects provides a stimulus to policy makers to engage on a path of continuous reflection on who and what matters in decision-making: the continuous updating of one's understanding of spatial differentiation of stakeholder views is critical in this respect, and involves the real inclusion of spatially proximate and spatially distant stakeholders.

106 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a large database of PPP projects in China was firstly built to explore the spatio-temporal evolution in terms of regional differentiation, sectors, investors and contract types.

80 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)

27,080 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)

26,011 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the dynamics of allocation under increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally: agents choosing between technologies competing for adoption, and examine how these influence selection of the outcome.
Abstract: This paper explores the dynamics of allocation under increasing returns in a context where increasing returns arise naturally: agents choosing between technologies competing for adoption. Modern, complex technologies often display increasing returns to adoption in that the more they are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved.1 When two or more increasing-return technologies 'compete' then, for a 'market' of potential adopters, insignificant events may by chance give one of them an initial advantage in adoptions. This technology may then improve more than the others, so it may appeal to a wider proportion of potential adopters. It may therefore become further adopted and further improved. Thus a technology that by chance gains an early lead in adoption may eventually 'corner the market' of potential adopters, with the other technologies becoming locked out. Of course, under different 'insignificant events' - unexpected successes in the performance of prototypes, whims of early developers, political circumstances - a different technology might achieve sufficient adoption and improvement to come to dominate. Competitions between technologies may have, multiple potential outcomes. It is well known that allocation problems with increasing returns tend to exhibit multiple equilibria, and so it is not surprising that multiple outcomes should appear here. Static analysis can typically locate these multiple equilibria, but usually it cannot tell us which one will be 'selected'. A dynamic approach might be able to say more. By allowing the possibility of 'random events' occurring during adoption, it might examine how these influence ' selection' of the outcome - how some sets of random 'historical events' might cumulate to drive the process towards one market-share outcome, others to drive it towards another. It might also reveal how the two familiar increasingreturns properties of non-predictability and potential inefficiency come about: how increasing returns act to magnify chance events as adoptions take place, so that

5,583 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The Mechanisms of Governance as discussed by the authors is an important work in the field of transaction cost economics, a branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated.
Abstract: This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.

4,106 citations

Book
01 Jan 1996
TL;DR: The Mechanisms of Governance as discussed by the authors is an important work in the field of transaction cost economics, a branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated.
Abstract: This book brings together in one place the work of one of our most respected economic theorists, on a field which he has played a large part in originating: the New Institutional Economics. Transaction cost economics, which studies the governance of contractual relations, is the branch of the New Institutional Economics with which Oliver Williamson is especially associated. Transaction cost economics takes issue with one of the fundamental building blocks in microeconomics: the theory of the firm. Whereas orthodox economics describes the firm in technological terms, as a production function, transaction cost economics describes the firm in organizational terms, as a governance structure. Alternative feasible forms of organization--firms, markets, hybrids, bureaus--are examined comparatively. The analytical action resides in the details of transactions and the mechanisms of governance. Transaction cost economics has had a pervasive influence on current economic thought about how and why institutions function as they do, and it has become a practical framework for research in organizations by representatives of a variety of disciplines. Through a transaction cost analysis, The Mechanisms of Governance shows how and why simple contracts give way to complex contracts and internal organization as the hazards of contracting build up. That complicates the study of economic organization, but a richer and more relevant theory of organization is the result. Many testable implications and lessons for public policy accrue to this framework. Applications of both kinds are numerous and growing. Written by one of the leading economic theorists of our time, The Mechanisms of Governance is sure to be an important work for years to come. It will be of interest to scholars and students of economics, organization, management, and law.

4,051 citations