The Science of "Muddling Through"
TL;DR: Lindblom, C.E. as mentioned in this paper discussed the science of "muddling through" in the context of monetary policy. But he did not consider monetary policy with respect to inflation.
Abstract: Originally published as Lindblom, C.E. (1959). "The science of "muddling" through," Public Administration Review, 19(2): 79-88. Reprinted with kind permission. For a critical analysis of this issue's Classic Paper "The Science of 'Muddling' Through" by Charles E. Lindblom, please refer to Ronald J. Scott, Jr.'s article "The Science of Muddling Through Revisited" on pages 5-18. SUPPOSE an administrator is given responsibility for formulating policy with respect to inflation. He might start by trying to list all related values in order of importance, e.g., full employment, reasonable business profit, protection of small savings, prevention of a stock market crash. Then all possible policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a maximum of these values. This would of course require a prodigious inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally prodigious set of calculations on how much of each value is equal to how much of each other value. He could then proceed to outline all possible policy alternatives. In a third step, he would undertake systematic comparison of his multitude of alternatives to determine which attains the greatest amount of values. In comparing policies, he would take advantage of any theory available that generalized about classes of policies. In considering inflation, for example, he would compare all policies in the light of the theory of prices. Since no alternatives are beyond his investigation, he would consider strict central control and the abolition of all prices and markets on the one hand and elimination of all public controls with reliance completely on the free market on the other, both in the light of whatever theoretical generalizations he could find on such hypothetical economies. Finally, he would try to make the choice that would in fact maximize his values. An alternative line of attack would be to set as his principal objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of keeping prices level. This objective might be compromised or complicated by only a few other goals, such as full employment. He would in fact disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not even attempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and many possible important consequences of his policies. As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them. In comparing his limited number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a comparison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future. Moreover, he would find that the policy alternatives combined objectives or values in different ways. For example, one policy might offer price level stability at the cost of some risk of unemployment; another might offer less price stability but also less risk of unemployment. Hence, the next step in his approach-the final selection- would combine into one the choice among values and the choice among instruments for reaching values. It would not, as in the first method of policymaking, approximate a more mechanical process of choosing the means that best satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked. Because practitioners of the second approach expect to achieve their goals only partially, they would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described, as conditions and aspirations changed and as accuracy of prediction improved. By Root or by Branch For complex problems, the first of these two approaches is of course impossible. …
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3,754 citations
Cites background from "The Science of "Muddling Through""
...Rather, they shifted to the noncomprehensive decision process many authors have described (e.g., Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Lindblom, 1959)....
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...Why do the results fail to support the view that consideration of multiple alternatives is time-consuming (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Lindblom, 1959)? One reason is that alternatives are difficult to assess in isolation....
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...A rational versus incremental paradigm has dominated the literature on strategic decision making, with the rational model often cast as a straw man (Anderson, 1983; Cyert & March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980)....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors define a strategy as a pattern in a stream of decisions, and study the interplay between intended and realized strategies in a complex organizational process, with leadership mediating between the two forces.
Abstract: The literature on strategy formation is in large part theoretical but not empirical, and the usual definition of “strategy” encourages the notion that strategies, as we recognize them ex post facto, are deliberate plans conceived in advance of the making of specific decisions. By defining a strategy as “a pattern in a stream of decisions,” we are able to research strategy formation in a broad descriptive context. Specifically, we can study both strategies that were intended and those that were, realized.despite intentions. A research program suggested by this definition is outlined, and two of the completed studies are then reviewed---the strategies of Volkswagenwerk from 1934 to 1974 and of the United States government in Vietnam from 1950 to 1973. Some general conclusions suggested by these studies are then presented in terms of three central themes: that strategy formation can fruitfully be viewed as the interplay between a dynamic environment and bureaucratic momentum, with leadership mediating between the two forces; that strategy formation over time appears to follow some important patterns in organizations, notably life cycles and distinct change-continuity cycles within these; and that the study of the interplay between intended and realized strategies may lead us to the heart of this, complex organizational process.
3,410 citations
Cites background from "The Science of "Muddling Through""
...In sharp contrast, the adaptive mode, popularized by writers such as Lindblom [4], [12], [13] in the public sector and Cyert and March [8] in the context of business, depicts the process as one in which many decision-makers with conflicting goals bargain among themselves to produce a stream of incremental, disjointed decisions....
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