Book•
The Selfish Gene
01 Jan 1976-
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors take up the concepts of altruistic and selfish behaviour; the genetical definition of selfish interest; the evolution of aggressive behaviour; kinship theory; sex ratio theory; reciprocal altruism; deceit; and the natural selection of sex differences.
Abstract: Science need not be dull and bogged down by jargon, as Richard Dawkins proves in this entertaining look at evolution. The themes he takes up are the concepts of altruistic and selfish behaviour; the genetical definition of selfish interest; the evolution of aggressive behaviour; kinship theory; sex ratio theory; reciprocal altruism; deceit; and the natural selection of sex differences. Readership: general; students of biology, zoology, animal behaviour, psychology.
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01 Apr 1984TL;DR: In this paper, a model based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game was developed for cooperation in organisms, and the results of a computer tournament showed how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.
Abstract: Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
17,720 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of stakeholder identification and saliency based on stakeholders possessing one or more of three relationship attributes (power, legitimacy, and urgency) is proposed, and a typology of stakeholders, propositions concerning their saliency to managers of the firm, and research and management implications.
Abstract: Stakeholder theory has been a popular heuristic for describing the management environment for years, but it has not attained full theoretical status. Our aim in this article is to contribute to a theory of stakeholder identification and salience based on stakeholders possessing one or more of three relationship attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. By combining these attributes, we generate a typology of stakeholders, propositions concerning their salience to managers of the firm, and research and management implications.
10,630 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century, distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance.
Abstract: This paper examines the progressive development of the new institutional economics over the past quarter century. It begins by distinguishing four levels of social analysis, with special emphasis on the institutional environment and the institutions of governance. It then turns to some of the good ideas out of which the NIE works: the description of human actors, feasibility, firms as governance structures, and operationalization. Applications, including privatization, are briefly discussed. Its empirical successes, public policy applications, and other accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a vast amount of unfinished business.
5,184 citations
TL;DR: Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation are discussed: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocities, network reciprocation, group selection, and group selection.
Abstract: Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
4,899 citations
TL;DR: The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.
2,548 citations
References
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TL;DR: A genetical mathematical model is described which allows for interactions between relatives on one another's fitness and a quantity is found which incorporates the maximizing property of Darwinian fitness, named “inclusive fitness”.
14,730 citations
Book•
01 Dec 1982TL;DR: A modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts, was proposed in this paper.
Abstract: I want in this article to trace the history of an idea. It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. The problems are diverse and include not only the behaviour of animals in contest situations but also some problems in the evolution of genetic mechanisms and in the evolution of ecosystems. It is not, however, sufficient to take over the theory as it has been developed in sociology and apply it to evolution. In sociology, and in economics, it is supposed that each contestant works out by reasoning the best strategy to adopt, assuming that his opponents are equally guided by reason. This leads to the concept of a ‘minimax’ strategy, in which a contestant behaves in such a way as to minimise his losses on the assumption that his opponent behaves so as to maximise them. Clearly, this would not be a valid approach to animal conflicts. A new concept has to be introduced, the concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’.
8,276 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1975TL;DR: Ressenya de l'obra d'E. O. Wilson apareguda el 1975, Sociobiology. The New Synthesis.The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Abstract: Ressenya de l'obra d'E. O. Wilson apareguda el 1975, Sociobiology. The New Synthesis .The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
6,126 citations
TL;DR: It is suggested that characters which develop through mate preference confer handicaps on the selected individuals in their survival, which are of use to the selecting sex since they test the quality of the mate.
4,744 citations