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The senses considered as perceptual systems

01 Jan 1966-
About: The article was published on 1966-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 6307 citations till now.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a method for finding the optical flow pattern is presented which assumes that the apparent velocity of the brightness pattern varies smoothly almost everywhere in the image, and an iterative implementation is shown which successfully computes the Optical Flow for a number of synthetic image sequences.

10,727 citations

01 Jan 2011
TL;DR: To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology the authors require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind.
Abstract: Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

4,670 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The kinetic-geometric model for visual vector analysis originally developed in the study of perception of motion combinations of the mechanical type was applied to biological motion patterns and the results turned out to be highly positive.
Abstract: This paper reports the first phase of a research program on visual perception of motion patterns characteristic of living organisms in locomotion. Such motion patterns in animals and men are termed here as biological motion. They are characterized by a far higher degree of complexity than the patterns of simple mechanical motions usually studied in our laboratories. In everyday perceptions, the visual information from biological motion and from the corresponding figurative contour patterns (the shape of the body) are intermingled. A method for studying information from the motion pattern per se without interference with the form aspect was devised. In short, the motion of the living body was represented by a few bright spots describing the motions of the main joints. It is found that 10–12 such elements in adequate motion combinations in proximal stimulus evoke a compelling impression of human walking, running, dancing, etc. The kinetic-geometric model for visual vector analysis originally developed in the study of perception of motion combinations of the mechanical type was applied to these biological motion patterns. The validity of this model in the present context was experimentally tested and the results turned out to be highly positive.

4,175 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
Abstract: This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.“Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.

4,111 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a variable-based definition of virtual reality is proposed, which can be used to classify virtual reality in relation to other media, such as TV, movies, etc.
Abstract: Virtual reality (VR) is typically defined in terms of technological hardware. This paper attempts to cast a new, variable-based definition of virtual reality that can be used to classify virtual reality in relation to other media. The defintion of virtual reality is based on concepts of "presence" and "telepresence," which refer to the sense of being in an environment, generated by natural or mediated means, respectively. Two technological dimensions that contribute to telepresence, vividness and interactivity, are discussed. A variety of media are classified according to these dimensions. Suggestions are made for the application of the new definition of virtual reality within the field of communication research.

4,051 citations