The social psychology of perception experiments: hills, backpacks, glucose, and the problem of generalizability.
19 Mar 2012-Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance (NIH Public Access)-Vol. 38, Iss: 6, pp 1582-1595
TL;DR: Three different assessments of experimental demand indicate that even when the physical environment is naturalistic, and the goal of the main experimental manipulation was primarily concealed, artificial aspects of the social environment may still be primarily responsible for altered judgments of hill orientation.
Abstract: Experiments take place in a physical environment but also a social environment. Generalizability from experimental manipulations to more typical contexts may be limited by violations of ecological validity with respect to either the physical or the social environment. A replication and extension of a recent study (a blood glucose manipulation) was conducted to investigate the effects of experimental demand (a social artifact) on participant behaviors judging the geographical slant of a large-scale outdoor hill. Three different assessments of experimental demand indicate that even when the physical environment is naturalistic, and the goal of the main experimental manipulation was primarily concealed, artificial aspects of the social environment (such as an explicit requirement to wear a heavy backpack while estimating the slant of a hill) may still be primarily responsible for altered judgments of hill orientation.
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TL;DR: This work suggests that none of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability,” and suggests that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls.
Abstract: What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional "modular" understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: none of these hundreds of studies - either individually or collectively - provide compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or "cognitive penetrability". In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: in each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions. Language: en
707 citations
Cites background from "The social psychology of perception..."
...When backpack-wearing subjects were given a compelling (but false) cover story to justify the backpack’s purpose (to hold heavy monitoring equipment during climbing), the effect of heavy backpacks on slant estimation completely disappeared (Durgin et al., 2009; see also Durgin et al., 2012)....
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...Similar explanations have subsequently been confirmed for other effects of action on perceptual reports, including effects of aperture “passability” on spatial perception (Firestone & Scholl, 2014) and energy on slant perception (Durgin et al., 2012; Shaffer et al., 2013)....
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TL;DR: This work exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception.
Abstract: A tidal wave of recent research purports to have discovered that higher-level states such as moods, action capabilities, and categorical knowledge can literally and directly affect how things look. Are these truly effects on perception, or might some instead reflect influences on judgment, memory, or response bias? Here, we exploited an infamous art-historical reasoning error (the so-called “El Greco fallacy”) to demonstrate that multiple alleged top-down effects (including effects of morality on lightness perception and effects of action capabilities on spatial perception) cannot truly be effects on perception. We suggest that this error may also contaminate several other varieties of top-down effects and that this discovery has implications for debates over the continuity (or lack thereof) of perception and cognition.
163 citations
TL;DR: After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic vision, this work exposes several unexplored defects in its theoretical framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that perceptual phenomenology belies the view’s claims.
Abstract: A chief goal of perception is to help us navigate our environment. According to a rich and ambitious theory of spatial perception, the visual system achieves this goal not by aiming to accurately depict the external world, but instead by actively distorting the environment's perceived spatial layout to bias action selection toward favorable outcomes. Scores of experimental results have supported this view-including, famously, a report that wearing a heavy backpack makes hills look steeper. This perspective portrays the visual system as unapologetically paternalistic: Backpacks make hills harder to climb, so vision steepens them to discourage ascent. The "paternalistic" theory of spatial perception has, understandably, attracted controversy; if true, it would radically revise our understanding of how and why we see. Here, this view is subjected to a kind and degree of scrutiny it has yet to face. After characterizing and motivating the case for paternalistic vision, I expose several unexplored defects in its theoretical framework, arguing that extant accounts of how and why spatial perception is ability-sensitive are deeply problematic and that perceptual phenomenology belies the view's claims. The paternalistic account of spatial perception not only isn't true-it couldn't be true, even if its empirical findings were accepted at face value.
130 citations
Cites background from "The social psychology of perception..."
...…a sugary beverage indeed lowers backpack-wearers’ slant estimates, instructing subjects to ignore the backpack eliminates the effect of sugar consumption on slant judgments (Durgin et al., 2012)—just as predicted by an alternative account appealing to compliance with backpack-induced demand....
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...For example, explicitly informing backpack-wearing subjects about compliance effects eliminates the backpack’s influence on slant estimates, even for real-world hills (Durgin et al., 2012)....
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...For in every case so far that such alternative interpretations have been tested (e.g., Cooper et al., 2012; Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin, Hajnal, Li, Tonge, & Stigliani, 2010; Durgin et al., 2012; Shaffer & Flint, 2011; Woods et al., 2009), they have been vindicated....
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...Although drinking a sugary beverage indeed lowers backpack-wearers’ slant estimates, instructing subjects to ignore the backpack eliminates the effect of sugar consumption on slant judgments (Durgin et al., 2012)—just as predicted by an alternative account appealing to compliance with backpack-induced demand....
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TL;DR: Compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit across all three domains an increased tendency to favor visual processing over bodily factors, leading to the conclusion that older adults are less embodied than young adults.
Abstract: Embodied cognition is a theoretical framework which posits that cognitive function is intimately intertwined with the body and physical actions. Although the field of psychology is increasingly accepting embodied cognition as a viable theory, it has rarely been employed in the gerontological literature. However, embodied cognition would appear to have explanatory power for aging research given that older adults typically manifest concurrent physical and mental changes, and that research has indicated a correlative relationship between such changes. The current paper reviews age-related changes in sensory processing, mental representation, and the action-perception relationship, exploring how each can be understood through the lens of embodied cognition. Compared to younger adults, older adults exhibit across all three domains an increased tendency to favor visual processing over bodily factors, leading to the conclusion that older adults are less embodied than young adults. We explore the significance of this finding in light of existing theoretical models of aging and argue that embodied cognition can benefit gerontological research by identifying further factors that can explain the cause of age-related declines.
120 citations
Cites background from "The social psychology of perception..."
...It is known that giving participants sugary drinks has been found to decrease judgments of hill steepness (Schnall et al., 2010), presumably due to altered energy levels (although cf., Durgin et al., 2012)....
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01 Dec 2011
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that the navigational problems in three dimensions are qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from those in two dimensions, and evidence suggests that, perhaps for this reason, horizontal and vertical space are processed separately in the vertebrate brain.
Abstract: A central theme in the study of animal navigation has been the extent to which such navigation requires the formation of an internal representation of space, the so-called " cognitive map." Although its properties remain disputed, it is now generally accepted that a map-like representation exists in the brain, and neurobiological studies, conducted in tandem with behavioral investigations, have done much to elucidate the neural substrate of the map as it operates in two dimensions. However, to date little is known about how the map encodes real-world, three-dimensional space. Using recent neurobiological and behavioral fi ndings, this issue is explored here. It is argued that the navigational problems in three dimensions are qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from those in two dimensions, and evidence suggests that, perhaps for this reason, horizontal and vertical space are processed separately in the vertebrate brain. The possible adaptive consequences of such an anisotropic. © 2011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies. All rights reserved.
105 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on some of the qualities peculiar to psychological experiments and point out that the demand characteristics perceived in any particular experiment will vary with the sophistication, intelligence, and previous experience of each experimental subject.
Abstract: Since the time of Galileo, scientists have employed the laboratory experiment as a method of understanding natural phenomena. This chapter focuses on some of the qualities peculiar to psychological experiments. The experimental situation is one which takes place within the context of an explicit agreement of the subject to participate in a special form of social interaction known as "taking part in an experiment". The demand characteristics perceived in any particular experiment will vary with the sophistication, intelligence, and previous experience of each experimental subject. It becomes an empirical issue to study under what circumstances, in what kind of experimental contexts, and with what kind of subject populations, demand characteristics become significant in determining the behavior of subjects in experimental situations. The most obvious technique for determining what demand characteristics are perceived is the use of post-experimental inquiry. In this regard, it is well to point out that considerable self-discipline is necessary for the experimenter to obtain a valid inquiry.
3,634 citations
"The social psychology of perception..." refers background in this paper
...There is existing evidence from laboratory experiments that participants elevate their slope estimates when asked to wear heavy backpacks in experiments because of what Orne (1962) has called experimental demand....
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TL;DR: In this article, a process dissociation procedure is proposed to separate the contributions of different types of processes to performance of a task, rather than equating processes with tasks, by separating automatic from intentional forms of processing.
3,557 citations
"The social psychology of perception..." refers methods in this paper
...However, our use of this kind of direct statement is analogous to the process-dissociation strategy used by Jacoby (1991)....
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TL;DR: It is suggested that self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source, and a single act of self- Control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent attempts at self- control.
Abstract: The present work suggests that self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source. Laboratory tests of self-control (i.e., the Stroop task, thought suppression, emotion regulation, attention control) and of social behaviors (i.e., helping behavior, coping with thoughts of death, stifling prejudice during an interracial interaction) showed that (a) acts of self-control reduced blood glucose levels, (b) low levels of blood glucose after an initial self-control task predicted poor performance on a subsequent self-control task, and (c) initial acts of self-control impaired performance on subsequent self-control tasks, but consuming a glucose drink eliminated these impairments. Self-control requires a certain amount of glucose to operate unimpaired. A single act of self-control causes glucose to drop below optimal levels, thereby impairing subsequent attempts at self-control.
1,162 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that such "generalizations" often are not intended and that a misplaced preoc-cupation with external validity can lead us to dismiss good research for which generalization to real life is not intended or meaningful.
Abstract: Many psychological investigations are accused of "failure to generalize to the real world" because of sample bias or artificiality of setting. It is argued in this article that such "generalizations" often are not intended. Rather than making predic- tions about the real world from the laboratory, we may test predictions that specify what ought to hap- pen in the lab. We may regard even "artificial" find- ings as interesting because they show what can occur, even if it rarely does. Or, where we do make gener- alizations, they may have added force because of artificiality of sample or setting. A misplaced preoc- cupation with external validity can lead us to dismiss good research for which generalization to real life is not intended or meaningful.
1,134 citations
"The social psychology of perception..." refers background in this paper
...Although it is perfectly clear that one can study principles of dark adaptation in the laboratory without concern for the ecological invalidity of the indoor environment (Mook, 1983), it remains rather controversial how best to study the perception of space....
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TL;DR: The results of two types of experiments are reported in this article, showing that the distortion in the mapping from physical to visual space evident in the visual matching task does not manifest itself in the visually open-loop motoric tasks.
Abstract: The results of two types of experiments are reported. In 1 type, Ss matched depth intervals on the ground plane that appeared equal to frontal intervals at the same distance. The depth intervals had to be made considerably larger than the frontal intervals to appear equal in length, with this physical inequality of equal-appearing intervals increasing with egocentric distance of the intervals (4 m-12 m). In the other type of experiment, Ss viewed targets lying on the ground plane and then, with eyes closed, attempted either to walk directly to their locations or to point continuously toward them while walking along paths that passed off to the side. Performance was quite accurate in both motoric tasks, indicating that the distortion in the mapping from physical to visual space evident in the visual matching task does not manifest itself in the visually open-loop motoric tasks. Language: en
610 citations