Book•
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
26 Feb 1993-
TL;DR: In this article, two leading scholars of the US Supreme Court and its policy making, systematically present and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making.
Abstract: This book, authored by two leading scholars of the Supreme Court and its policy making, systematically presents and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making. In the process, it critiques the two major alternative models of Supreme Court decision making and their major variants: the legal and rational choice. Using the US Supreme Court Data Base, the justices' private papers, and other sources of information, the book analyzes the appointment process, certiorari, the decision on the merits, opinion assignments, and the formation of opinion coalitions. The book will be the definitive presentation of the attitudinal model as well as an authoritative critique of the legal and rational choice models. The book thoroughly reflects research done since the 1993 publication of its predecessor, as well as decisions and developments in the Supreme Court, including the momentous decision of Bush v. Gore.
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09 Dec 2012
TL;DR: The Handbook of Organizational Economics as mentioned in this paper surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field of organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Abstract: In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. This landmark book assembles the leading figures in organizational economics to present the first comprehensive view of both the current state of research in this fast-emerging field and where it might be headed.
The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
The defining book on the subject, The Handbook of Organizational Economics is essential reading for researchers and students looking to understand this emerging field in economics.
Presents the first comprehensive treatment of organizational economics
Features contributions by leaders in the field
Unifies and extends existing literatures
Describes theoretical and empirical methods used today
451 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a measurement strategy for placing judges of lower courts and justices of higher courts in the same policy space, and provide a descriptive look at the results of their approach.
Abstract: To say that positive political theory (PPT) scholarship on the hierarchy of justice is theory rich and data poor is to make a rather uncontroversial claim For over a decade now, scholars have offered intriguing theoretical accounts aimed at understanding why lower courts defy (comply with) higher courts But only rarely do they subject the accounts to rigorous empirical interrogation The chief obstacle, it seems, is the lack of a reliable and valid measurement strategy for placing judges of lower courts and justices of higher courts in the same policy space Without such a strategy, we can systematically test few, if any, hypotheses flowing from PPT models of the judicial hierarchy With such an approach not only can we investigate the implications of these models, we can assess many others flowing from the larger PPT program on judging, as well It is to the challenge of scaling judges and justices (as well as legislatures and executives) that we turn in this article We begin by explicating our measurement strategy, and then by explaining its advantages over previous efforts Next we explore the results of our approach and provide a descriptive look at data it yields: a “Judicial Common Space” (JCS) score for all justices and judges appointed since 1953 The last section offers three applications designed to shore up the suitability and adaptability of the JCS for a range of positive projects on the courts
391 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes, and they find that the joint probability of being ratified under the Convention Against Torture and violating its terms decreases in the effectiveness of a state's judiciary.
Abstract: Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically study this phenomenon by focusing on ratification or compliance behavior separately. In our view, these behaviors are inherently linked, and our analysis should address the link explicitly. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and states' torture practices, we find that the joint probability of being ratified under the CAT and violating its terms decreases in the effectiveness of a state's judiciary; and that the joint probability of not being ratified and engaging in behavior proscribed by the CAT increases in the effectiveness of a state's judiciary. The paper suggests that while effective judiciaries offer the promise of an enhanced international human rights law, it is in part a false one. Where judiciaries constrain, states are more likely to avoid these regimes and violate human rights anyway. Where judiciaries do not constrain, states are likely to join and ignore their obligations.
295 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes and examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.
Abstract: Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically link ratification and compliance behavior theoretically but test their models separately; however, if the behaviors are jointly determined then we should treat them that way empirically. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), states’ torture practices, and a series of measures of judicial effectiveness, we examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.
270 citations
Book•
27 Dec 2004TL;DR: In this paper, a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy is proposed, and a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.
Abstract: This study offers a theoretical framework for understanding how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy. In stark contrast to conventional wisdom, the central findings of the book contradict some assumptions that only independent judges rule against the government of the day. Set in the context of Argentina, the study uses the tools of positive political theory to explore the conditions under which courts rule against the government. In addition to shedding light on the dynamics of court-executive relations in Argentina, the study provides general lessons about institutions, instability, and the rule of law. In the process, the study builds a set of connections among diverse bodies of scholarship, including US judicial politics, comparative institutional analysis, positive political theory, and Latin American politics.
236 citations