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The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees, and they argue that parts of the existing empirical literature are better explained through this lens than with the standard model.
Abstract: Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had much success. Indeed, the data seem to suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives, rather than the posited negative tradeoff. I argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees. When workers operate in certain settings, the activities that they should engage in are well known, and firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs. By contrast, when the situation is more uncertain, firms know less about how workers should be spending their time. As a result, the delegate responsibility to workers but, to constraint heir discretion, base compensation on observed output. Hence, uncertainty and output-based pay are positively related. I argue that parts of the existing empirical literature are better explained through this lens than with the standard model.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay and found that a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm.
Abstract: This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO’s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, offering a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance. The sixfold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold increase in market capitalization of large US companies during that period. We find a very small dispersion in CEO talent, which nonetheless justifies large pay differences. The data broadly support the model. The size of large fi rms explains many of the patterns in CEO pay, across firms, over time, and between countries. (JEL D2, D3, G34, J3)
1,959 citations
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TL;DR: An interdisciplinary review of privacy-related research is provided in order to enable a more cohesive treatment and recommends that researchers be alert to an overarching macro model that is referred to as APCO (Antecedents → Privacy Concerns → Outcomes).
Abstract: To date, many important threads of information privacy research have developed, but these threads have not been woven together into a cohesive fabric. This paper provides an interdisciplinary review of privacy-related research in order to enable a more cohesive treatment. With a sample of 320 privacy articles and 128 books and book sections, we classify previous literature in two ways: (1) using an ethics-based nomenclature of normative, purely descriptive, and empirically descriptive, and (2) based on their level of analysis: individual, group, organizational, and societal.
Based upon our analyses via these two classification approaches, we identify three major areas in which previous research contributions reside: the conceptualization of information privacy, the relationship between information privacy and other constructs, and the contextual nature of these relationships.
As we consider these major areas, we draw three overarching conclusions. First, there are many theoretical developments in the body of normative and purely descriptive studies that have not been addressed in empirical research on privacy. Rigorous studies that either trace processes associated with, or test implied assertions from, these value-laden arguments could add great value. Second, some of the levels of analysis have received less attention in certain contexts than have others in the research to date. Future empirical studies-both positivist and interpretive--could profitably be targeted to these under-researched levels of analysis. Third, positivist empirical studies will add the greatest value if they focus on antecedents to privacy concerns and on actual outcomes. In that light, we recommend that researchers be alert to an overarching macro model that we term APCO (Antecedents → Privacy Concerns → Outcomes).
1,595 citations
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TL;DR: This article found that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees.
Abstract: We show that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. In a sample of US firms, we find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems the more gender-diverse the board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that gender-diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Accordingly, we find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to stock performance and directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more gender-diverse boards. However, the average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. This negative effect is driven by companies with fewer takeover defenses. Our results suggest that mandating gender quotas for directors can reduce firm value for well-governed firms.
1,574 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital firms were studied and the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms was analyzed. But the analysis was limited to the use of financial contracting theories.
Abstract: We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. We interpret these results in relation to financial contracting theories.
886 citations
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TL;DR: The authors found that U.S. CEOs are significantly more optimistic and risk-tolerant than the rest of the population, and that their behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies.
Abstract: We administer psychometric tests to senior executives to obtain evidence on their underlying psychological traits and attitudes. We find U.S. CEOs differ significantly from non-U.S. CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. In addition, we find that CEOs are significantly more optimistic and risk-tolerant than the lay population. We provide evidence that CEO’s behavioral traits such as optimism and managerial risk-aversion are related to corporate financial policies. Further, we provide new empirical evidence that CEO traits such as risk aversion and time preference are related to their compensation.
789 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, a principal-agent model that can explain why employment is sometimes superior to independent contracting even when there are no productive advantages to specific physical or human capital and no financial market imperfections to limit the agent's borrowings is presented.
Abstract: Introduction In the standard economic treatment of the principal–agent problem, compensation systems serve the dual function of allocating risks and rewarding productive work. A tension between these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse, for providing the agent with effective work incentives often forces him to bear unwanted risk. Existing formal models that have analyzed this tension, however, have produced only limited results. It remains a puzzle for this theory that employment contracts so often specify fixed wages and more generally that incentives within firms appear to be so muted, especially compared to those of the market. Also, the models have remained too intractable to effectively address broader organizational issues such as asset ownership, job design, and allocation of authority. In this article, we will analyze a principal–agent model that (i) can account for paying fixed wages even when good, objective output measures are available and agents are highly responsive to incentive pay; (ii) can make recommendations and predictions about ownership patterns even when contracts can take full account of all observable variables and court enforcement is perfect; (iii) can explain why employment is sometimes superior to independent contracting even when there are no productive advantages to specific physical or human capital and no financial market imperfections to limit the agent's borrowings; (iv) can explain bureaucratic constraints; and (v) can shed light on how tasks get allocated to different jobs.
5,678 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a review of existing work on the provision of incentives for workers is presented, and the authors evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation from two perspectives: first, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance.
Abstract: I NCENTIVES ARE the essence of economics. Despite many wide-ranging claims about their supposed importance, there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers. The purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives. Since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned, a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm's interest. This literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers. These include piece rates, options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and so on. My objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation. Where possible, I will address the literature from two perspectives. First, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance. Accordingly, I consider whether agents behave in this way, and whether these responses are always in the firm's interest. Second, I address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind. In other words, do contracts look like the predictions of the theory? Incentives are provided to workers
3,455 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a theory of the allocation of formal authority and real authority within organizations, and illustrated how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration.
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.
2,959 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the optimal way of implementing an action by an agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem, and they use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem.
Abstract: Most analyses of the principal-agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent’s utility being at a stationary point. An important paper of Mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid. We present an alternative procedure. If the agent’s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action, we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem. We use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem.
2,743 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors predict that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives, and use the residuals from this model to measure deviations between CEOs’ holdings of equity incentive and optimal levels.
Abstract: We predict and find that firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives. We model optimal equity incentive levels for CEOs, and use the residuals from this model to measure deviations between CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives and optimal levels. We find that grants of new incentives from options and restricted stock are negatively related to these deviations. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms set optimal equity incentive levels and grant new equity incentives in a manner that is consistent with economic theory.
1,209 citations