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The Transposition of European Law in EU Member States: Between Process and Politics
TL;DR: In this paper, an approach that views transposition as a process taking place largely within ministerial agencies rather than across government systems is presented. But it is not yet clear how such an approach can help to explain the way in which member states transpose EU directives.
Abstract: This paper illuminates a critical stage of the implementation of European law: the transposition of European Union (EU) directives. Directives must be transposed into national policies in order to give effect to European law, yet most national authorities experience considerable transposition difficulties. For this reason, the study of transposition has become a focal point within the broader research agenda on noncompliance in the European Union. Highlighting several popular explanatory variables but noting the sometimes contradictory results that follow from empirical testing, this paper outlines an approach that views transposition as a process taking place largely within ministerial agencies rather than across government systems. By using variables related to these domestic processes in our empirical analysis, the paper shows how such an approach can help to explain the way in which member states transpose EU directives.
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TL;DR: The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades as discussed by the authors, and the EU’s deepening and widening and widening is the main driving force for environmental policies.
Abstract: The European Union (EU) has become the main driver for environmental policy output for its member states whose number has more than tripled over the past four decades. The EU’s deepening and wideni...
70 citations
Additional excerpts
...Many studies use quantitative data on the transposition of EU directives as a compliance measure (e.g. Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010)....
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TL;DR: The authors argue that political parties do respond to voters' Euroskeptic attitudeto European integration in elections to the European Parliament, and argue that they do not ignore voters' preferences on European integration.
Abstract: Do parties respond to voters’ preferences on European integration in elections to the European Parliament? In this article, we argue that political parties do respond to voters’ Euroskeptic attitud...
46 citations
Cites background from "The Transposition of European Law i..."
...We follow other research that measures public opinion as the percentage of respondents who believe that integration is ‘a good thing’ for their country (see Kaeding, 2006; Mbaye, 2001; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010) by only focusing on negative assessments...
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...We follow other research that measures public opinion as the percentage of respondents who believe that integration is ‘a good thing’ for their country (see Kaeding, 2006; Mbaye, 2001; Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2010) by only focusing on negative assessments toward the EU....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers and argue that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU intrusion into core states powers, and present evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter.
Abstract: The literature suggests that legislative politics among European Union Member States is characterised by economic exchanges, and constrained by the social norms of a European community of legislators. Both views draw a clear line between the legislative process and the conflicts over sovereignty that have left their mark on treaty making and European public opinion since the 1990s. This article suggests revisiting this view, based on an analysis of why Member States have opted out of legislation from the 1970s to today. It argues that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU's intrusion into core state powers. The article presents evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter. The results indicate greater European-level legislative responsiveness towards national sovereignty demands than previously recognised. They underline that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers.
44 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a formal model to address the question: are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped?
Abstract: States often violate international agreements, both accidentally and intentionally. To process complaints efficiently, states can create formal, pretrial procedures in which governments can negotiate with litigants before a case ever goes to court. If disputes are resolved during pretrial negotiations, it can be very difficult to tell what has happened. Are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped? This paper presents a formal model to address these questions. We develop our theory in the context of the European Union (EU). To test our model, we collect a new dataset of over 13,000 Commission infringement cases against EU member states (2003–2013). Our results suggest that accidental and intentional noncompliance both occur, but that intentional noncompliance is more common in the EU. We find that the Commission is an effective, if imperfect, monitor and enforcer of international law. The Commission can correct intentional noncompliance, but not always. It strategically drops cases that it believes it is unlikely to win.
35 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors apply the perspective of bounded rationality to explain irregularities in the timely and correct transposition of EU directives, which may affect the commonly employed explanatory factors of administrative capacities, misfit and the heterogeneity of preferences among veto players.
Abstract: Studies explaining the timeliness and correctness of the transposition of EU directives into national legislation have provided rather inconclusive findings. They do not offer a clear-cut prediction concerning the transposition of the patients’ rights directive, which is one of the first that concerns the organisation and financing of national healthcare systems. This article applies the perspective of bounded rationality to explain (irregularities in) the timely and correct transposition of EU directives. The cognitive and organisational constraints long posited by the bounded rationality perspective may affect the commonly employed explanatory factors of administrative capacities, misfit and the heterogeneity of preferences among veto players. To prevent retrospective rationalisation of the transposition process, this paper traces this process as it unfolded in Denmark and the Netherlands. As bounded rationality is apparent in the transposition processes in these relatively well-organised countries, fut...
23 citations
Cites background or result from "The Transposition of European Law i..."
...…opposition seem to be influential factors, but transposition studies continue to struggle with ‘inconclusive’, ‘contradictory’ or ‘inconsistent’ findings concerning the factors explaining timely and correct transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010; Toshkov 2010; Toshkov et al. 2010; Treib 2008)....
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...A lack of experience with transposition has already been identified as an explanatory factor for delayed and incorrect transposition (Berglund et al. 2006; Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010)....
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...Sensitivity to contextual specificities can provide firmer conclusions regarding timely and correct transposition (Steunenberg and Rhinard 2010)....
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References
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Book•
29 Mar 2004TL;DR: The Cox Proportional Hazards model is used for event history analysis as a guide to modeling strategies for unobserved heterogeneity in political analysis and event history.
Abstract: Event History Modeling, first published in 2004, provides an accessible guide to event history analysis for researchers and advanced students in the social sciences. The substantive focus of many social science research problems leads directly to the consideration of duration models, and many problems would be better analyzed by using these longitudinal methods to take into account not only whether the event happened, but when. The foundational principles of event history analysis are discussed and ample examples are estimated and interpreted using standard statistical packages, such as STATA and S-Plus. Critical innovations in diagnostics are discussed, including testing the proportional hazards assumption, identifying outliers, and assessing model fit. The treatment of complicated events includes coverage of unobserved heterogeneity, repeated events, and competing risks models. The authors point out common problems in the analysis of time-to-event data in the social sciences and make recommendations regarding the implementation of duration modeling methods.
1,448 citations
"The Transposition of European Law i..." refers background or methods in this paper
...A misspecification of this hazard rate, however, has severe consequences for the estimates of the covariates (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 47–48)....
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...A further examination based on Harrell’s rho for each covariate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 135) confirms that there is no reason to expect that the assumption of proportionality is not satisfied....
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...A shared frailty model (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004: 146–148) was used to test whether such effects occur....
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TL;DR: Mackenzie and Hafken as discussed by the authors argue that public employees were more prone to corruption or less committed to the public interest and make policy before tangible problems are unambiguously demonstrated by agreed upon evidence and before they are widely acknowledged by the public.
Abstract: erative response to evidence that public employees were more prone to corruption or less committed to the public interest. Instead, such changes constituted a “peculiar form of policymaking: announcing solutions before experiencing or studying the problems—and before understanding the consequences” (52). This goes only a little way towards assessing levels of public integrity and readers will want to consult the literature in public policy on the role of symbolic appeals in agenda setting, the political nature of problem definition and policy evaluation, and the institutional dynamics of policy change. Making policy before tangible problems are unambiguously demonstrated by agreed upon evidence and before they are widely acknowledged by the public may be peculiar, but it is certainly not unique to anticorruption and ethics policy. Of course, the authors do not have to demonstrate convincingly the integrity of public employees (for which there is other evidence worth taking seriously) in order to provide a solid description of the modern ethics regime and to call attention to some of its more important and troubling consequences. The strengths of the book, however, are different from those promised by the title. Many of their specific remedies for the problems they identify seem reasonable, even if they are unlikely. They propose, for example, campaign finance reform to cure “the real ethics sewer in the federal government” (170). Others, like curtailing the use of FBI background checks, are especially important in light of the authors’ revealing and valuable account of the way such checks put a great deal of uncorroborated and irrelevant information into the hands of partisan combatants. Other recommendations, such as the elimination of financial disclosure requirements for career employees and confidential disclosure for all but a handful of appointees, will no doubt help the authors meet their goal of provoking very spirited debate. Finally, while Mackenzie and Hafken are right to despair of the costly and often counterproductive reliance on formal and criminal investigations and the culture of mistrust that pervades our politics, it is important to note that curtailing such activity will not automatically result in the rejuvenation of political accountability that the authors seek. It is not at all clear that the public or political leaders have the information or the interest in holding those who violate the public trust accountable. Placing more faith in Presidents to fire employees who engage in wrongdoing and in the public to “exercise their vote as a swift sword of accountability” (175) seems, unfortunately, to be a risky proposition.
1,024 citations
"The Transposition of European Law i..." refers background or methods in this paper
...Empirical work, however, shows that neither distinct domestic norms nor resistance from institutional ‘veto players’, as inspired the work of Tsebelis (2002), provide sufficient explanation for transposition delays....
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...Based on Tsebelis’ (2002) veto player theory, the number of ‘formal’ or legislative veto players has been used in several studies....
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...Those players are not limited to actors occupying ‘formal’ positions in national legislative processes, such as lawmakers or political parties, however (Tsebelis, 2002: 19)....
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...This perspective should give pause for thought as to the appropriateness of one widely used approach to explaining transposition: veto player theory (Tsebelis, 2002)....
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05 Jun 2003
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the domestic impact of the European Union on environmental policies and discuss the limits and paradoxes of Europeanisation in the context of media markets in the EU.
Abstract: THEORISING EUROPEANIZATION 1. Introduction: In the name of Europe 2. The Europeanization of public policy 3. Conceptualising the domestic impact of Europe COMPARING INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS 4. Meeting the demands of EU membership: The Europeanization of national administrative systems 5. Variable geometry, multi-level governance: European integration and sub-national government in the new Millenium 6. Europeanization in comparative perspective: Institutional fit and national adaptation EUROPEANISATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 7. Europeanization as interpretation, trnslation, and editing of public policies 8. Europeanization as Convergence: the regulation of media markets in the European Union 9. The impact of the European Union on environmental policies INTEREST GROUPS AND EUROPEANISATION 10. Europeanization and organisational change in national trade associations 11. Differential Europeanization: large and small firms in the EU policy process UNDERSTANDING 'EUROPE' AS A POLICY MODEL 12. The idea of the European social model: Limits and paradoxes of Europeanisation 13. Europeanisation goes east: power and uncertainty in the EU accession process CONCLUSIONS 14. Conclusions: A conversant research agenda
861 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy in democratic nations and suggest that the extent to which parties influence public policy is to a significant extent contingent upon the type of democracy and counter-majoritarian institutional constraints of central state government.
Abstract: This essay explores the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy in democratic nations. It will be pointed out, that differences in party composition of govern- ment, in general, matter in public policy in constitutional democracy. However, the extent to which parties influence public policy is to a significant extent contingent upon the type of democracy and countermajoritarian institutional constraints of central state government. Large partisan effects typify majoritarian democracies and states, in which the legislature and the executive are 'sovereign'. More complex and more difficult to identify is the partisan influence on public policy in consensus democracies and in states, in which the political-institutional circumstances allow for co-governance of the opposition party. Narrowly circumscribed is the room to manoeuvre available to incumbent parties above all in political systems which have been marked by countermajoritarian institutional pluralism or institutional 'semi-sovereignty'. The article suggests, that it would be valuable if direct effects and interaction effects of the party composition of government and state structures featured more prominently in future research on comparative public policy.
740 citations
"The Transposition of European Law i..." refers background in this paper
...Existing indices, such as the veto player index proposed by Schmidt (1996) and Tsebelis (2005), focus only on the legislative stage.5 The decision-making processes within ministries and cabinets work differently....
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