Book•
Theory of International Politics
01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7932 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Global politics & International relations.
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance and showed that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants for nuclear assistance to non-nuclear weapon states.
Abstract: Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.
108 citations
TL;DR: The financial crisis of the late 1990s marked an intellectual watershed for the global economy, and also for regionalism as the Janus face of globalization as mentioned in this paper. And at the beginning of the twenty-first cen...
Abstract: The financial crises of the late 1990s marked an intellectual watershed for the global economy, and also for regionalism as the Janus face of globalization. At the beginning of the twenty-first cen...
108 citations
Cites methods from "Theory of International Politics"
...We have chosen to downplay determinist arguments of a structural realist type ( pace Kenneth Waltz, 1979) from which we would assume conflict of a destabilizing nature at a later stage....
[...]
07 Nov 2002
TL;DR: Examples showing that the group in a long-term study of a group cooperating in electronic work failed to develop normative convention behavior are presented, calling for aspecific set of awareness information requirements to promote active learning about the group activity in order to support the articulation of conventions.
Abstract: Conventions are necessary to establish in any recurrent cooperative arrangement. In electronic work, they are important so as to regulate the use of shared objects. Based on empirical results from a long-term study of a group cooperating in electronic work, I present examples showing that the group failed to develop normative convention behavior. These difficulties in forming conventions can be attributed to a long list of factors: the lack of clear precedents, different perspectives among group members, a flexible cooperation media, limited communication, the design process, and discontinuous cooperation. Further, I argue that commitments to the conventions were difficult, due to the conventions not reaching an acceptance threshold, uneven payoffs, and weak social influences. The empirical results call for a specific set of awareness information requirements to promote active learning about the group activity in order to support the articulation of conventions. The requirements focus on the role of feedback as a powerful mechanism for shaping and learning about group behavior.
108 citations
Cites background from "Theory of International Politics"
...Yet despite this implementation, the users did not follow the convention, but rather typed in a fantasy code....
[...]
...Waltz (1979) describes such influences on convention use as emulation, praising conforming behavior, and punishment for deviating from the norm....
[...]
TL;DR: The most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are (1) whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and (2) how many states' interests will be affected by the outcome as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics: war is least likely if power is distributed equally, war is least likely if power is distributed unequally, and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war. I try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation. I argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation. The most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are (1) whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and (2) how many states' interests will be affected by the outcome.
107 citations
01 Dec 2004
TL;DR: The functionalist treatment of IOs reduces them to technical accomplishments, slighting their political character and the political work they do, making it difficult to see the power they exercise in global governance.
Abstract: International organizations are at the hub of most theoretical and historical discussions of global governance. Politicians, publics, and theorists alike believe that a globalizing world requires mechanisms to manage the growing complexity of crossnational interactions, and international organizations are the mechanism of choice. As a result of this vision, states have established more and more international organizations (IOs) to perform an increasingly varied array of tasks. IOs now manage conflicts, both international and civil. They promote economic growth and free trade, they work to avert environmental disasters, and they are actively involved in protecting human rights around the globe. The reasons states turn to IOs and delegate critical tasks to them are not mysterious or controversial in most of the scholarly literature. The conventional wisdom is that states create and delegate to IOs because they provide essential functions. They provide public goods, collect information, establish credible commitments, monitor agreements, and generally help states overcome problems associated with collective action and enhance individual and collective welfare. This perspective generates important insights, but the statism and functionalism of this view also obscures important features of IOs, making it difficult to see the power they exercise in global governance. First, the functionalist treatment of IOs reduces them to technical accomplishments, slighting their political character and the political work they do. It also presumes that the only interesting or important functions that IOs might perform are those that facilitate cooperation and resolve problems of interdependent choice. However, IOs do much more.
107 citations
References
More filters
5,295 citations
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2
4,969 citations
4,163 citations
17 Feb 1966
TL;DR: This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, Theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theoryof image recognition, etc.
Abstract: : This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theory of image recognition, etc. Discussions are given of the fundamentals of the theory of boolean functions, algorithm theory, principles of the design of electronic digital computers and universal algorithmical languages, fundamentals of perceptron theory, some theoretical questions of the theory of self-organizing systems. Many fundamental results in mathematical logic and algorithm theory are presented in summary form, without detailed proofs, and in some cases without any proof. The book is intended for a broad audience of mathematicians and scientists of many specialties who wish to acquaint themselves with the problems of modern cybernetics.
2,922 citations