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Theory of International Politics

01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7932 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Global politics & International relations.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors pointed out that the Church of Realism can be a bit more catholic than Legro and Moravcsik claim, and corrected their mistake pointing in the direction of a fruitful research agenda for scholars.
Abstract: In “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik craft a curiously rigid doctrine for realism and then puzzle over why the aeld is crowded with apostates.1 The answer, I propose, is that the church of realism can be a bit more catholic than Legro and Moravcsik claim. Legro and Moravcsik have written out of the book of realism a crucial insight that informs most realist theories (at least implicitly) and have thereby inadvertently excommunicated too many of the faithful. But they are wrong in a productive way, and correcting their mistake points in the direction of a fruitful research agenda for scholars—realists and antirealists alike.

104 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
David C. Kang1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make two major arguments: 1) European-derived theories in general and realist theories in particular frequently have difaculty explaining Asian international relations and 2) international relations scholars need to be as careful about issues of empirical testing and theoretical rigor when studying Asia as they are when studying Europe.
Abstract: In my article entitled “Getting Asia Wrong,” I make two major arguments.1 First, European-derived theories in general and realist theories in particular frequently have difaculty explaining Asian international relations. Second, international relations scholars need to be as careful about issues of empirical testing and theoretical rigor when studying Asia as they are when studying Europe. In a reply to my article, Amitav Acharya agrees with both of these claims while also critiquing my essay in arguing that shared norms and institutional linkages mitigate rivalry in Asia and that I am a historical determinist. Acharya, however, has misunderstood both international relations theory and the role of history. His response to my article provides me with an opportunity to clarify and brieoy expand on the major themes in “Getting Asia Wrong.” As Acharya’s reply exempliaes, most scholars not only dismiss the notion that the Asian experience might force a rethinking or modiacation of European-derived theories, but they also pay little attention to the historical Asian international system. Acharya writes, “Contrary to Kang’s argument, Asia’s future will not resemble its past” (p. 150). Acharya, however, has misunderstood my argument: To study the role of history is hardly to predict that it will replicate itself in the future. My main point is that there are good reasons to think that Asian states may not function like European states and that the study of Asia must begin with a discussion of some of Asia’s empirical anomalies and what might explain them. Acharya seems to argue that the only goal to which scholars who study Asia can aspire is to unquestioningly apply existing theory. In contrast, my goal is to expand international relations theory so that scholars can better identify factors that help to explain regional and temporal differences in how states think about and achieve security and how they conduct their international relations. Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles

104 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that if we give the state a transcendental status, it disappears from the world; if we see it merely as a set of empirical attributes, then it disappears in the world, and the way out of this dilemma is to stop talking about what states really are and start instead to talk about what things they resemble.
Abstract: In which sense can we say that a state `exists'? According to the realist school, the state is an a priori given; according to the pluralist school, it is nothing but a collection of various sub-state actors. As I argue, however, neither solution is satisfactory. If we give the state a transcendental status, it disappears from the world; if we see it merely as a set of empirical attributes, it disappears in the world. The way out of this dilemma is to stop talking about what states really are, and start instead to talk about what things they resemble. We make sense of our collective selves in the same way as we make sense of our individual selves — with the help of metaphors that are expanded into narratives. A question of `being' is consequently always a question of `being as', and states are constructed through the stories told about them.

104 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict.
Abstract: We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war. We also show that while uncertainty about the other side’s cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations, uncertainty about the other side’s strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes. Along the way, we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well-known relationship between uncertainty, the incentive to misrepresent, and costly war. We find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions, whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important.

103 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present and test a theory of learning in international politics, drawing primarily from social psychology and organization theory, which proposes that lessons tend to be drawn only from high-impact events in world politics, such as large wars and economic depressions.
Abstract: This article presents and tests a theory of learning in international politics. Drawing primarily from social psychology and organization theory, the learning theory proposes that lessons tend to be drawn only from high-impact events in world politics, such as large wars and economic depressions. Lessons drawn tend to be simple and are oriented around the question of which policies are likely to be successful and which policies are likely to fail. This learning theory is tested on the alliance choices of small powers in the twentieth century. The predictions of two learning hypotheses are compared with those of a leading realist explanation of alliance choices, balance of threat theory. Quantitative analysis of small powers' alliance choices reveals that a small power's experience in the previous world war is a very powerful explanation of its peacetime alliance choices after that war, whereas the level of threat in the international environment has only marginal effects on the small power's alliance choices. Further, these threat effects may be in the opposite direction of that predicted by balance of threat theory.

103 citations

References
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Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2

4,969 citations

ReportDOI
17 Feb 1966
TL;DR: This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, Theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theoryof image recognition, etc.
Abstract: : This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theory of image recognition, etc. Discussions are given of the fundamentals of the theory of boolean functions, algorithm theory, principles of the design of electronic digital computers and universal algorithmical languages, fundamentals of perceptron theory, some theoretical questions of the theory of self-organizing systems. Many fundamental results in mathematical logic and algorithm theory are presented in summary form, without detailed proofs, and in some cases without any proof. The book is intended for a broad audience of mathematicians and scientists of many specialties who wish to acquaint themselves with the problems of modern cybernetics.

2,922 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

2,873 citations