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Theory of International Politics
01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7932 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Global politics & International relations.
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TL;DR: This paper showed that regime changes that were either externally imposed, internal revolution, or nonviolent but occurred in the context of an internal political crisis, all had significant effects on a state's restructuring of its alliances, even when other variables, such as changes in the distribution of power and the state's power status, are held constant.
Abstract: Morrow (1991) claims that alliances can shift because of changes in the policy preferences of the regimes that control states. This is counter to the central theoretical position of neorealist theory that sees alliances as the outgrowth of particular distributions of power in an anarchic international system. Drawing on regime changes in Europe between 1816 and 1965, we evaluate the relative merits of these contradictory claims. Our data support the conclusion that regime changes that were (1) externally imposed, (2) the result of internal revolution, or (3) nonviolent, but occurred in the context of an internal political crisis, all had significant effects on a state's restructuring of its alliances, even when other variables, such as changes in the distribution of power and the state's power status, are held constant.
79 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a general theoretical framework for weighing the importance of norms and interests is developed and tested in the case of US asylum enforcement with respect to 42 countries of origin during and after the Cold War.
Abstract: What happens when the normative goal of granting asylum to applicants in need conflicts with US strategic interests? Asylum represents a critical case for the norms-versus-interests debate, because the protection of vulnerable individuals is a quintessential humanitarian project, but may entail strategic costs. In this article, a general theoretical framework for weighing the importance of norms and interests is developed and tested in the case of US asylum enforcement with respect to 42 countries of origin during and after the Cold War. Both norms and interests influence asylum decisions, and when they prescribe similar actions in regard to asylum cases, state agents face no difficulty in making choices. When human rights norms and state interests prescribe contradictory actions, however, analysts know little about the relative importance of each factor. The findings in this article suggest that the ways in which norms and interests affect asylum enforcement have changed over time. Normative admissions were primarily a function of procedural democracy during the 1980s, and substantive human rights have been increasingly influential since then. Second, enforcement reflected security and diplomatic considerations during the 1980s, but these concerns gave way during the 1990s to goals of maintaining good relations with trade partners and preventing undocumented migration. Finally, there is no evidence that the importance of norms relative to interests has increased over time, contrary to the predictions of some constructivists.
79 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the formation of multilateral treaties is a byproduct of state interest, transaction costs, and distribution of power, and argue that multilateral agreements are a by-product of bilateral agreements on multilateral basins.
Abstract: Despite warnings of interstate conflict over shared water resources, states are reaching hundreds of treaties and agreements over their international rivers. We have extensive knowledge about the negotiations process of individual treaties, but there is a paucity of systematic analysis of the forces influencing treaty formation. In addition, the few quantitative studies examining the formation of agreements fail to consider the different factors influencing the rise of bilateral versus multilateral agreements on multilateral basins. Correcting this omission is important because scholars have discovered that states frequently sign bilateral agreements over multilateral rivers, which contradicts the integrated river basin management approach advocated by environmentalists, engineers, and water experts. This study seeks to fill this vacuum within the existing literature by distinguishing between the formation of bilateral treaties on bilateral and multilateral basins and comparing these bilateral forms of cooperation to the formation of multilateral treaties on multilateral basins. Through quantitative analysis, we argue that treaty type is a by-product of state interest, transaction costs, and distribution of power.
79 citations
TL;DR: The Evolution of Cooperation as mentioned in this paper is not a timid book; its objective is ambitious; its approach bold; its scope broad; and it addresses an issue of central importance to scholars, political leaders, and ordinary mortals alike: how can cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?
Abstract: The Evolution of Cooperation is not a timid book. Its objective is ambitious; its approach bold; its scope broad. It addresses an issue of central importance to scholars, political leaders, and ordinary mortals alike: how can "cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority?" (p. 3). Its argument, based upon an analysis of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, turns conventional wisdom on its head: it rejects the Golden Rule as a guide to behavior and recommends instead something much closer to Hammurabi's Code as a means of eliciting and sustaining cooperation in an anarchic setting. That the recommendation is compelling is a tribute to the power of the argument and to the elegance with which it is presented. This review evaluates Robert Axelrod's claim that ". . . the requirements for the emergence of cooperation have relevance to many of the central issues of international politics" (p. 4). Given the broad sweep of his analysis, Axelrod is necessarily unable to scrutinize critically his belief in the significance of his work for international politics. I propose to examine more deeply than Axelrod is able the applicability of his analysis to the specific situation of nation-states within the world polity. It appears axiomatic that the problem of cooperation among egoists in an anarchic setting would be a central concern of students of international relations. Yet international politics is not populated by as many egoists, strictly defined, as Axelrod's statement of the problem assumes. Nor does the international system, though formally anarchic, lack close substitutes for central authority in at least some critically important subsystems. Because neither
79 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply different international relations theories to identify potential benefits in one defined issue area, territorial conflict, and then weigh these benefits against the likely costs, finding that the potential benefits of territorial expansion are limited.
Abstract: Whether China’s rise as a great power will be peaceful or violent is a question that animates scholars and policymakers alike. Power transition theory and offensive realism reach pessimistic conclusions about China’s potential for armed conflict because of the benefits of aggression. Nevertheless, applications of these theories to China’s rise fail to examine the size and scope of these benefits and to compare them systematically to the costs of conflict that other scholars have identified. To fill this gap, this article applies different international relations theories to identify potential benefits in one defined issue area, territorial conflict, and then weighs these benefits against the likely costs. The potential benefits of territorial expansion are limited, a finding that weakens confidence in the predictions of power transition theory and offensive realism but increases confidence in more optimistic arguments about China’s rise based on economic interdependence. Whether China’s rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that animates scholars and statesmen alike. Within the study of international relations, however, competing theoretical perspectives offer different answers to this important question. Scholars who examine the consequences of China’s rise through the lens of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a future of conflict. According to variants of power transition theory, conflict is most likely when a rising power, dissatisfied with the status quo, approaches parity with the dominant state in a region or the system and is willing to use force to reshape the system’s rules and institutions (Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1987; Kugler and Lemke 1996; Thompson 2000; Lemke 2002). When power transition theory has been applied to contemporary China, many scholars predict that China will become more belligerent as it accumulates material capabilities (Tammen, Kugler, Lemke, Stam, Abdollahian, Alsharabati, Efird, and Organski 2000; Efird, Kugler, and Genna 2003; Rapkin and Thompson 2003, 2006; Kugler 2006; Tammen and Kugler 2006; Goldstein 2007). 1 Likewise, the theory of offensive realism asserts that states will pursue expansion as they grow stronger, when statesmen perceive a relative increase in power (Labs 1997; Zakaria 1998; Mearsheimer 2001; Elman 2004). As power is held to be the ultimate source of security in an anarchic world, states pursue expansion to achieve
78 citations
Cites background from "Theory of International Politics"
...These arguments are consistent with structural theories such as neorealism (Waltz 1979) and offensive realism (Mearsheimer 2001)....
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5,295 citations
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2
4,969 citations
4,163 citations
17 Feb 1966
TL;DR: This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, Theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theoryof image recognition, etc.
Abstract: : This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theory of image recognition, etc. Discussions are given of the fundamentals of the theory of boolean functions, algorithm theory, principles of the design of electronic digital computers and universal algorithmical languages, fundamentals of perceptron theory, some theoretical questions of the theory of self-organizing systems. Many fundamental results in mathematical logic and algorithm theory are presented in summary form, without detailed proofs, and in some cases without any proof. The book is intended for a broad audience of mathematicians and scientists of many specialties who wish to acquaint themselves with the problems of modern cybernetics.
2,922 citations