scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Book

Theory of International Politics

01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7932 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Global politics & International relations.
Citations
More filters
Book Chapter
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this paper, an international relations perspective on boundaries, territory and postmodernity is presented, with a focus on boundaries and post-modernity, and an international relation perspective is presented.
Abstract: (1998). On boundaries, territory and postmodernity: An international relations perspective. Geopolitics: Vol. 3, Boundaries Territory and Postmodernity, pp. 53-68.

68 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyzes the organizational culture at the World Bank and finds that such bureaucratic obstacles as the internal incentive system and a clash of expertise among the staff, especially differences between lawyers and economists on defining human rights and justifying their relevance to the Bank's mission, have impeded the internalization of human rights norms.
Abstract: Despite internal and external pressure, the World Bank has not adopted ahuman rights policy or agenda. On the basis of ethnographic fieldwork at the Bank, this article analyzes its organizational culture and finds that such bureaucratic obstacles as the internal incentive system and a clash of expertise among the staff, especially differences between lawyers and economists on defining human rights and justifying their relevance to the Bank's mission, have impeded the internalization of human rights norms.

68 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Paul Poast1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors used matching techniques to find that offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement in failed alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, and showed that the benefits of trade linkages can explain the high compliance rate of alliance compliance.
Abstract: Though scholars widely claim that issue linkage—the simultaneous negotiation of multiple issues for joint settlement—can help states conclude international agreements, there exist some notable skeptics. Resolving this debate requires empirical evidence. However, beyond a few case studies, there exists no direct and systematic evidence that issue linkages actually increase the probability of agreement. I address this lack of direct and systematic evidence by combing original data on failed alliance negotiations with data from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) database. Using matching techniques, I find that, for alliance negotiations between 1860 to 1945, offers of trade linkage did substantially increase the probability of agreement. Besides confirming issue linkage's ability to help clinch an agreement, this article's research design and evidence have far-reaching implications for the study of negotiations and alliances. The research design illustrates the value of considering the “dogs that didn't bark” as it identifies both successful and failed negotiations. The article's evidence explains the high rate of alliance compliance identified by previous scholars and highlights a need to rethink the alliance formation process.

68 citations


Cites background from "Theory of International Politics"

  • ...…the 1700s, between Russia and Germany during the 1920s, and between the Soviet Union and Western Europe during the Cold 73+ See Morgenthau 1973; Waltz 1979; and Walt 1987+ 74+ Morrow 1991+ 75+ Poast 2010+ For more on the “weakest link” rationale, see Oneal and Russett 1997+ 76+ Military…...

    [...]

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The question of whether or not conquest pays in the modern world has been studied extensively in the literature as mentioned in this paper, and it has been argued that the unprofitable nature of modern industrial societies is a major barrier to economic expansion.
Abstract: Does conquest pay in the modern era? Are industrial economies "cumulative resources" that can be mobilized by foreign conquerors? This question lies at the root of important international relations debates. Realists have claimed that conquest pays, especially the conquest of modern industrial societies, but liberals argue that the conquest of modern societies is economically futile. These opposing viewpoints represent different theories about the way the world works, and support divergent foreign policies. Since conquest pays, according to the realist view, the more you conquer, the more wealthy and powerful you become. Rulers have economic and security incentives to expand. Status-quo states must rely more heavily. on threats of war to contain expansionists, and on war itself if threats fail to deter. Unless they are contained, imperial rulers will swallow up weaker nations, growing stronger and more invincible with each new conquest. Realists conclude that only the vigilance of defensive coalitions stands in the way of an Orwellian nightmare of huge clashing despotisms, or even a single world empire. In the liberal view, we live in a more benign world. Since conquest is unprofitable, rulers have no economic incentive to expand and are thus less covetous of neighboring real estate. Expansionists would only weaken themselves by blundering into costly quagmires, falling behind more economically dynamic nation-states, and eventually collapsing from imperial deficits and rebellion. Since aggressors are rare and less dangerous, status-quo states can more safely afford disarmament and isolation. According to liberals, the unprofitability of conquest strengthens the harmony of interests among states, and thus strengthens international peace and cooperation.

68 citations

Book
23 Jan 2014
TL;DR: The Global Shell Games as discussed by the authors is a game-theoretic approach to uncovering the sordid world of anonymous shell corporations, where the authors approached nearly 4,000 services in over 180 countries to discover just how easy it is to form an untraceable company.
Abstract: Every year a staggering number of unidentified shell corporations succeed in hiding perpetrators of terrorist financing, corruption and illegal arms trades, but the degree to which firms flout global identification standards remains unknown. Adopting a unique, experimental methodology, Global Shell Games attempts to unveil the sordid world of anonymous shell corporations. Posing as twenty-one different international consultants, the authors approached nearly 4,000 services in over 180 countries to discover just how easy it is to form an untraceable company. Combining rigorous quantitative analysis, qualitative investigation of responses and lurid news reports, this book makes a significant research contribution to compliance with international law and international crime and terrorism whilst offering a novel, new approach to the field of political science research. Global Shell Games is an invaluable resource for scholars of international relations, and a fascinating, accessible read for anyone interested in learning about worldwide criminal practice in corporate finance.

68 citations

References
More filters
Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2

4,969 citations

ReportDOI
17 Feb 1966
TL;DR: This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, Theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theoryof image recognition, etc.
Abstract: : This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theory of image recognition, etc. Discussions are given of the fundamentals of the theory of boolean functions, algorithm theory, principles of the design of electronic digital computers and universal algorithmical languages, fundamentals of perceptron theory, some theoretical questions of the theory of self-organizing systems. Many fundamental results in mathematical logic and algorithm theory are presented in summary form, without detailed proofs, and in some cases without any proof. The book is intended for a broad audience of mathematicians and scientists of many specialties who wish to acquaint themselves with the problems of modern cybernetics.

2,922 citations

Journal ArticleDOI

2,873 citations