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Theory of International Politics
01 Jan 1979-
About: The article was published on 1979-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 7932 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Global politics & International relations.
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TL;DR: In this article, a review essay maintains that social scientists have made considerable progress in this field since 1977, when a landmark book by David Le Marquand on the politics of international river management was published.
Abstract: When and why are international efforts to solve transboundary river management problems successful? When and why do such efforts fail, and what does success or failure mean? With more than 260 international river basins covering 45% of the Earth's land surface, and with freshwater being humanity's most valuable natural resource, these questions are hardly trivial. Natural scientists and engineers have provided some answers, but they remain far from complete without major input from the social sciences. While technical know-how and innovation are also crucial to successful international river management, success in this context hinges primarily on political processes in which institutional arrangements are designed and implemented. This review essay maintains that social scientists have made considerable progress in this field since 1977, when a landmark book by David Le Marquand on the politics of international river management was published. This progress includes the development of theoretically better informed explanatory models and their evaluation against an increasing amount of empirical information. It provides a solid foundation for proceeding to a larger-scale research effort that involves the analysis of a larger set of empirical cases on the basis of a single explanatory model.
178 citations
Cites background from "Theory of International Politics"
...…empirical illustrations, or (often the case in work 3 There is an ongoing debate among theorists of international politics on the differences between international and national political systems, and the implications for resolving conflicts at the two levels (see Waltz, 1979; Keohane/Ostrom, 1995)....
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...At the international level, solutions thus have to be found through consensus-oriented negotiations among riparian countries under conditions that, in many parts of the world, resemble what Realist theorists of international politics have called an anarchical self-help system ( Waltz, 1979 )....
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...3 There is an ongoing debate among theorists of international politics on the differences between international and national political systems, and the implications for resolving conflicts at the two levels (see Waltz, 1979; Keohane/Ostrom, 1995)....
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...…conditions that, in many parts of the world, resemble what Realist theorists of international politics have called an anarchical self-help system (Waltz, 1979).3 Wolf (1997: 334) observes, “Water is the only scarce resource for which there is no substitute, over which there is poorly developed…...
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TL;DR: A n apparent contradiction lies at the center of our understandings about nuclear weapons and deterrence and it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Abstract: A n apparent contradiction lies at the center of our understandings about nuclear weapons and deterrence. On the one hand, it is widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the ”long peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The two superpowers avoided war despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises, and a prolonged arms race. On the other hand, it is also widely believed that the continuing spread of nuclear weapons will greatly increase the risks of nuclear war. New nuclear powers, with similar characteristics of rivalry, are considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence. A prominent group of political scientists have pointed to the apparent contradiction between a peaceful nuclear past and a fearful nuclear future and argue that the further spread of nuclear weapons will be a stabilizing factor in international relations. Kenneth Waltz’s 1981 monograph-The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better-presented the first detailed and forceful set of arguments in favor of proliferation.’ Since that time, however, a significant number of rational choice and neorealist political scientists have jumped onto the pro-proliferation bandwagon. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker advocate spreading nuclear weapons into areas where non-nuclear states face nuclear-armed adversaries since ”the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear . . . decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed. ‘ ’2 John Mearsheimer believes that ”nuclear weapons are
177 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Desch, Charles Glaser, Stanley Hoffmann, Andrew Kydd, John Mearsheimer, Daniel Philpott, Bradley Thayer, Karen Turato, Stephen Van Evera, Celeste Wallander, participants in a seminar at the Center for International Relations, University of California at Los Angeles, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article.
Abstract: The author thanks Michael Desch, Charles Glaser, Stanley Hoffmann, Andrew Kydd, John Mearsheimer, Daniel Philpott, Bradley Thayer, Karen Turato, Stephen Van Evera, Celeste Wallander, participants in a seminar at the Center for International Relations, University of California at Los Angeles, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. An earlier version of this article was delivered at the 1995 Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, 21–25 February 1995.
177 citations
TL;DR: The authors advocate a foreign policy of restraint-the disengagement of America's military forces from the rest of the world, which is a modern form of isolationism: we adopt its military policy of withdrawal, but reject its traditional economic protectionism.
Abstract: T h e Cold War lasted SO long and grew to be such a comfortable part of everyday life that it is now very difficult to chart a new foreign policy course for the nation. U.S. national strategy is a confusing mix of grand rhetoric, false starts, and well-advised caution. U.S. troops remain forward deployed, but in smaller numbers than they were during the Cold War. The United States intervenes often in the conflicts of others, but without a consistent rationale, without a clear sense of how to advance U.S. interests, and sometimes with unintended and expensive consequences. It is time to choose a new course. Here we advocate a foreign policy of restraint-the disengagement of America’s military forces from the rest of the world. Restraint is a modern form of isolationism: we adopt its military policy of withdrawal, but reject its traditional economic protectionism. The Cold War was worth fighting and winning. Soviet expansionism threatened vital US. interests; it seemed ready to swallow America’s allies in Europe and Asia, who were exhausted by World War I1 and racked by national selfdoubt. After victory over the monumental insanity of Nazism and Japanese militarism, the United States sought the prosperity interrupted by depression and a long war. But full enjoyment of its national wealth was postponed by the need to ward off the Soviet Union. Despite the collapse of the Soviet threat, American interests have not changed. The United States still seeks peace and prosperity. But now this preferred state is best obtained by restraining America’s great power, a power unmatched by any rival and unchallenged in any important dimension. Rather than lead a new crusade, America should absorb itself in the somewhat delayed task of addressing imperfections in its own society. The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed as a total withdrawal from the world. On the contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other
177 citations
TL;DR: The authors argues that it is not all that likely that the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) will become a durable, dominant, unifying idea that would enable Washington to reassert and legitimize both its special claims as the sole superpower and US leadership of global security.
Abstract: The Bush administration is trying to persuade itself and everyone else that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWoT) will, like the Cold War, be a ‘long war’ requiring sustained mobilization against an implacable foe. It has had some success in projecting this idea, and if it takes root the GWoT could indeed become a durable, dominant, unifying idea that would enable Washington to reassert and legitimize both its special claims as the sole superpower and US leadership of global security. The question is: how likely is this to happen? By looking at the surrounding events and contexts that could support or undermine the elevation of the GWoT to the status of the new Cold War, the author argues that it is not all that likely. Many factors could undermine it, not least that most of the strategies on off er corrode the liberal values that they are supposed to defend.
177 citations
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5,295 citations
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2
4,969 citations
4,163 citations
17 Feb 1966
TL;DR: This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, Theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theoryof image recognition, etc.
Abstract: : This book contains the collected and unified material necessary for the presentation of such branches of modern cybernetics as the theory of electronic digital computers, theory of discrete automata, theory of discrete self-organizing systems, automation of thought processes, theory of image recognition, etc. Discussions are given of the fundamentals of the theory of boolean functions, algorithm theory, principles of the design of electronic digital computers and universal algorithmical languages, fundamentals of perceptron theory, some theoretical questions of the theory of self-organizing systems. Many fundamental results in mathematical logic and algorithm theory are presented in summary form, without detailed proofs, and in some cases without any proof. The book is intended for a broad audience of mathematicians and scientists of many specialties who wish to acquaint themselves with the problems of modern cybernetics.
2,922 citations