PNNL-13599
TID Environmental Performance
Testing In Support of the Mayak
Fissile Material Storage Facility
J. E. Tanner
H. A. Undem
B. A. Roberts
J. R. Griggs
S. L. Pratt
M. H. Smith
March 2002
Prepared for and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency as Work for Others under U.S. Department of Energy
Contract DE-AC06-76RL01830
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operated by
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for the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
under Contract DE-AC06-76RL01830
This document was printed on recycled paper.
(8/00)
PNNL-13599
TID Environmental Performance Testing In Support
of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility
J. E. Tanner
H. A. Undem
B. A. Roberts
J. R. Griggs
S. L. Pratt
M. H. Smith
March 2002
Prepared for and sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency as Work
for Others under U.S. Department of Energy Contract DE-AC06-76RL01830
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
Richland, Washington 99352
iii
Executive Summary
The purpose of the test and evaluation of tamper indicating devices (TIDs) described in this report is
to examine existing and commercially available TID technologies for specific use at the Mayak Fissile
Material Storage Facility (FMSF). In this respect, TIDs that have been used under best international
safeguards practices form a natural testing baseline. TID candidacy is based on TID performance with
respect to mutually agreed functional, operational, and security requirements for the FMSF, taking into
account both the United States and the Russian Federation views, as well as specific FMSF environments.
Although some Russian views have been documented, very little information at the level required for
formal test planning was received prior to the start of the testing campaign. Consequently, this report
documents the environmental performance results of testing conducted only in the United States on TID
candidates for a transparency and/or safeguards-and-security regime at the Mayak FMSF. Acceptance of
these test results, any additional testing, and recommendations by those Russian Federation entities
responsible for the Mayak FMSF will be required before implementing any Mayak FMSF TID program.
The work documented here does not include results of a parallel vulnerability assessment of TIDs
conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The TIDs tested for potential use at the Mayak FMSF include 1) the Cobra seal, fiber optic cable, and
reader, 2) the 3M Confirm Tamper Tape, 3) E-Type Cup metal seal (with International Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA] scribing procedure), and 4) E-Tag Mechanical seal. In addition, four promising
alternates to the 3M Confirm Tamper Tape were tested, based on new test and evaluation information
provided by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Of the previously mentioned TIDs, the E-
Cup, the Cobra Seal, and the Confirm Tamper Tape have been extensively tested by Sandia National
Laboratory and other testing entities.
The tests encompassed a representative set of environmental conditions and external influences that
included temperature and humidity (normal, variable, and extreme conditions), as well as radio frequency,
microwave, and magnetic fields. The radio frequency, microwave, and magnetic-field tests were only
performed on devices with built-in electronics, such as the E-Tags and several of the readers. Radiation
exposure testing was performed on all candidate TIDs. Finally, a variety of mechanical tests were
performed to evaluate the ruggedness of each type of TID. A sample population of 70 units was used
with the entire sample subjected to each test consecutively, except in the case of several of the adhesive
seal tests.
All TIDs tested performed without failure during the planned ionizing radiation testing. A special
radiation exposure-to-failure test for the Cobra seals showed that they are useable at more than 200 times
the expected 50-year lifetime radiation dose at the Mayak FMSF. Temperature and humidity testing,
appropriate to the conditions at Mayak FMSF, also resulted in no significant issues for any of the TIDs
tested.
The mechanical test program resulted in significant failures of the wire loop seals, primarily because
of the type of grommet used to secure the wire. Three Cobra seals also failed in this test phase. The
adhesive seals performed well as a group, with minor exceptions, and should be useable wherever they
are not subjected to severe mechanical abrasion or shearing stress. Electromagnetic testing showed that
iv
the E-Tags were quite susceptible to failure when exposed to static discharges; however, this may or may
not be an issue at the storage facility.
Based on the results of the TID tests and evaluations performed, the following conclusions are
provided for each of the TID roles at the Mayak FMSF:
1) The Fissile Material Containers – The possible options for sealing the lid of the AT-400R are
adhesive seals and the two wire-loop seals, the E-Type Cup Metal Seal, and the E-Tag Mechanical
Seal. We recommend the E-Type Cup Metal seal with the internal scribing over adhesive seals and
the E-Tag. Adhesive seals are not expected to be robust enough against container-handling hazard,
and the E-Tag’s associated electronic reader and software may well become obsolete during the
Mayak 50-year lifecycle.
2) The Storage Nest Covers – Significant operational issues with regard to TIDs on the storage nest
covers were encountered. A mockup of the nest top and cover clearly showed that none of the tested
loop seals could be effectively used for this application, given the initial nest cover and mating
assembly design. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory research staff proposed design-modification
recommendations that could provide for the secure use of IAEA standard loop-type seals on the nest
cover. However, it is our understanding that these modifications cannot be made because of
significant cost and schedule impacts with respect to the entire FMSF construction. It is our
judgment at this time that no IAEA or internationally accepted TID will adequately work on the
storage nest cover. This puts an additional burden on the entire facility-monitoring scheme. Because
there is still a Mayak Transparency Protocol requirement for a TID on the storage nest cover, we
believe this issue needs to be resolved by bringing together a DTRA and multi-laboratory team to
explore all possible options, such as modifications of existing technologies or combining two or more
technologies, or even evaluating non-standard technologies.
3) Monitoring Equipment – Monitoring and inspection equipment, such as recording devices, video
cameras, and associated data-storage media that can be stored in containers, is easily protected using
the tested TID technologies. We recommend the use of Cobra seals for securing containers used to
store sensitive monitoring equipment between inspections. Adhesive seals may be used during
inspections for short-term applications, such as securing equipment during lunch breaks, and for the
storage of less sensitive items. We recommend the 3M Confirm Tamper Tape for an adhesive seal
due to its additional security features. The 3M Confirm Tamper Tape also turned out to be very
resistant to abrasion and mechanical shock.
