Towards a revised theory of collective learning processes: Argumentation, narrative and the making of the social bond:

TL;DR: A revised theory of collective learning processes, a conceptual framework for collective learning, was proposed in this paper, where the authors propose a revised theory for the collective learning process in the context of sociology.

Abstract: Societies change; and sociology has, since its inception, described and evaluated these changes. This article proposes a revised theory of collective learning processes, a conceptual framework whic...

Summary

Summary

• Mindset theory of action phases is based on the distinction between motivation and volition as proposed by the Rubicon model which claims that prior to crossing the Rubicon (i.e., making a goal decision) motivational principles apply whereas thereafter volitional principles set in.
• Mindset theory of action phases proposes that different cognitive procedures are activated when people tackle the task of choosing goals versus implementing them.
• The hypothesis that the deliberative mindset creates cognitive tuning toward information relevant to making goal decisions (information on feasibility and desirability), whereas the implemental mindset tunes a person's cognitions to implementation-related information (information on where, when, and how to act), was tested most critically by Gollwitzer et al. (1990).
• In a deliberative mi nd set, information related to desirability should be analyzed impartially; in an implemental mindset, an analysis partial to the chosen goal is expected.
• In a second study, they measured the commitment participants had to their relationship and found that high-commitment but not low-commitment partlclpants defended against the threat of a deliberative mindset by increasing their positive views of their partner.
• A set of 40 trials was offered, and participants were then asked to judgc how much control they cOLlld exert over the target light onset.
• Rather, they should go one step further and equip people with those goal setting (e.g., mental contrasting) and goal implementation strategies (e.g., 1'orming implementation intentions) that are known to be most effective in promoting appropriate goal commitments and success1'ul goal attainment, respectively.

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Figure 1. A schematic representation of the link between narrative genres and collective learning processes.

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Article
Towards a revised theory
of collective learning
processes: Argumentation,
narrative and the making
of the social bond
Bernhard Forchtner
University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
Marcos Engelken Jorge
University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU), Spain
Klaus Eder
Humboldt-Universita
¨
t zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Abstract
Societies change; and sociology has, since its inception, described and evaluated these
changes. This article proposes a revised theory of collective learning processes, a con-
ceptual framework which addresses ways in which people make sense of and cope with
change. Drawing on Habermas’ classic proposal, but shifting the focus from argu-
mentation towards storytelling, it explains how certain articulations allow for collective
learning processes (imagining more inclusive orders), while others block learning pro-
cesses (imagining more exclusive orders). More specifically, the article points to nar-
rative genres (romance, tragedy, comedy and irony) which organize feelings and shape
the social bond, proposing that ironic and tragic stories have the potential to trigger
collective learning processes, while romantic and comic stories tend to block them.
Keywords
blocked learning, communicative action, Habermas, populism, public sphere
Corresponding author:
Bernhard Forchtner, School of Media, Communication and Sociology, University of Leicester, Bankfield House,
132 New Walk, Leicester, LE1 7JA, UK.
Email: bf79@le.ac.uk
European Journal of Social Theory
2020, Vol. 23(2) 200–218
ª The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1368431018814348
journals.sagepub.com/home/est

The beginning of the story
Societies change; and sociology has, since its inception, described and evaluated these
changes. In this article, we propose a revised theory of collective learning processes, a
conceptual framework that addresses the ways in which people make sense of and cope
with change. We do so by drawing on Habermas’ classic proposal while introducing the
narrative form and its relevance for constituting the social bond.
1
We use this revised
framework to understand why people react to events in the form of collective learning or
collective non-learning, i.e. by reacting to such change through imagining either more
inclusive or more exclusive social relations.
We agree with Habermas’ basic idea that communication follows counterfactual,
often broken, rules (openness, freedom, equality and sincerity in the raising of claims),
which, if approximated, lead to the revision of knowledge (both factual and moral),
enabling a broadening of the speaker’s horizon and the overcoming of deception
(Habermas, 1984: 22). More importantly, from a sociological perspective, we also
draw on the argument that communication not only affects cognitive structures, but
also social relations. People involved in communication based on these counterfactuals
engage, first, in practices of mutual recognition as free, equal and competent speakers.
Second, they simultaneously participate in practices of cognitive decentring that lead
to the expansion and interpenetration of their social worlds – hence, they learn ‘to
include one another in a world they construct together’ (Habermas, 2003: 105).
2
In line
with existing studies, we conceptualize the process of social relations being imagined
as more inclusive in terms of collective learning,
3
and relations evolving towards
exclusion as blocked learning processes.
4
As social change is a permanent condition, we focus on how people make sense of it,
and control it, through how they imagine their relations. In doing so, we take aim at
Habermas’ focus on rationality as unfolding in and through argumentation only; instead,
we claim that this rule-governed activity occurs within social situations and interactions
in which more than argumentation is at stake. In other words, we argue that Habermas’
concept of discourse, i.e. the implicit rules of communicative action, needs to be
embedded in a more sociologically robust theory of social interaction.
We do this by carving out a specific role for stories, for the narrative form. Stories are
fundamental to the human condition (Barthes, 1977; Fisher, 1987; Ricoeur, 1984); and it
is the networks in which they circulate, and thus provide the basis of everyday interac-
tion, from which Habermasian discourse
5
arises whenever people disagree with these
stories. Narratives are selective arrangements of events, arrangements which are, how-
ever, not simply chronologically ordered, but causally connected. They are thus event-
driven structures through which humans make sense of time, as one event ‘naturally’
leads to the next. As such, events, relentlessly rearranged and reconstructed (for an
exploration of the ‘nature’ of events, see Wagner-Pacifici, 2017), are key within struc-
tures. However, ‘what happens’ outside narratives might also have effects, i.e. real,
imagined and mediated events can irritate existing stories, which thus need to be
extended, and sometimes substantively transformed, in order to incorporate these new
events into the plot.
6
This is what we refer to as the event-driven dynamic of narrative.
Due to a narrative’s emplotment, certain story elements can be isolated from criticism,
Forchtner et al 201

e.g. by naturalizing certain ones or pre-emptively discrediting possible criticisms (e.g.
concepts such as ‘false consciousness’ can have this effect). This, in turn, can also have
consequences in terms of excluding some actors from discourse or elevating others to
the status of unquestionable authorities. As we will outline below, the consequences of
these features influence whether the learning potential of communication is triggered
or blocked.
Indeed, as people tell stories to each other, they create shared cognitive structures
(Strydom, 2011; see also O’Mahony, 2013, who develops this in the context of the public
sphere) with the qualification that ‘telling’ should be understood here in a broad sense,
encompassing written, spoken, visual etc. performances. These stories can be replaced
by alternative stories (i.e. the aforesaid event-driven dynamic). One of the factors that
change and might even transform narratives is arguments – which are themselves
embedded in narratives and can only be understood as such.
7
By engaging in argumenta-
tion, people can learn collectively and thus tell new stories. Our contention is that
whether or not people are willing to engage in argumentation depends (partly) on the
narratives they take for granted and through which they convey their positions. Stories
create different subjectivities, which, in turn, account for why some people are more
open than others to counter-arguments and counter-stories.
To spell out the dynamics underlying collective learning more specifically, we pro-
pose a lens through which the effect of performing narratives on collective learning
processes can be identified: narrative genres. That is, stories have a plot (or a number of
interconnected plots) that link characters, events and objects to each other. From the
emplotted nature of narrative it follows that stories can be classified into different
narrative genres: the archetypical ones being romance, tragedy, comedy and irony/satire
(Frye, 1957). More specifically, we analytically differentiate narrative emplotment along
the two key dimensions characterizing stories: the axis of hero/ine (the main character
projecting a positive self-image or not) and resolution (how the narrative ends, i.e. a
happy ending is present/promised or not; is the story reassuring or irritating?). Romance
features a heroic, self-assured protagonist whose actions fulfil wishes and result in
triumph. Comedy – not to be reduced to the cultural artefacts disseminated by Holly-
wood – features a happy ending, though the protagonists are characterized by a slightly
more ambivalent status, as these stories feature internal conflict which, however, is
ultimately overcome. Tragedy depicts the fall of the hero/ine and thus offers no happy
ending. While this fall does contain the possibility of resignation, it also includes the
potential for reflexivity and agency. Finally, irony points to ambivalent and non-heroic
actors and states.
Our contention is that whereas comedy (to a certain extent) and romance (espe-
cially) allow for the blocking of collective learning, tragedy (to a certain extent) and
irony (especially) allow for such processes. In the following, we will develop such a
model schematically; though, as we note below and seek to explore separately
(Engelken-Jorge et al., in preparation), ‘real-world’ stories can be, for example, comic
to various degrees and contain elements of different genres – the effect of which
remains an empirical question.
From an empirical perspective, the concept of collective learning opens new research
avenues aiming to understand the processes of change (or lack thereof) of shared
202 European Journal of Social Theory 23(2)

cognitive structures, allowing for the intermingling of argumentative and non-
argumentative elements. Of course, it is one thing to define a theoretical perspective
that can guide empirical research towards answering such questions; it is another to
apply such a framework systematically in the context of an empirical research project.
While we are not able to offer such a project here, we will briefly refer to examples that
are subsumed under the notion of ‘populism’, from both the left and the right, in this
article. Why is it that stories, e.g. in the context of political communication by populists
in present-day Europe, enjoy steady support, even though their ‘alternative facts’ have
been proven wrong? The current prevalence of the diversity of populisms, the different
ways in which left- and right-wing populism rearticulate social relations, make it an ideal
case to illustrate the empirical application of our theoretical project. To do so, we will
draw on brief examples from both left-wing populists, the case of the Spanish party
Podemos, and far-right populists, the case of the German Alternative fu
¨
r Deutschland
(AfD, Alternative for Germany). While our intuition is that a revised theory of collective
learning processes will be a useful tool in such a research endeavour, we will conduct a
detailed application in a second paper (Engelken-Jorge et al., in preparation).
In the following, first, we review existing literature on (collective) learning processes
and their distortion. Second, we present our revised theory of collective learning pro-
cesses and their blocking, starting with a discussion of the narrative form. Against this
background, we identify and focus on narrative genres. After a discussion of these genres
and their role in our conceptualization, we close with a summary of the main ideas and
hypotheses derived from these sections.
(Collective) learning processes and their distortion: the story
so far
8
A normative, sociological notion of (collective) learning processes, and their blockage,
can be traced back to the 1970s and, in particular, to the 1980s (Strydom, 1987).
Habermas’ initial theory of learning processes was basically individualistic, drawing
on the cognitive psychology of Piaget (and Kohlberg) and its concern for develop-
mental processes. In Communication and the Evolution of Society, Habermas (1979:
121) situates learning mechanisms at the psychological level. This learning might
then find its ‘way into a society’s collectively accessible store of knowledge ...It is
only in a derivative sense that societies “learn”.’ Following criticism, including from
within (Strydom, 1992), this research programme developed into a more ‘collective’
direction. Before going into more detail, let us, however, introduce Habermas’
general take on communication so as to better understand the working (and block-
ade) of learning processes.
Habermas’ reformulation of Critical Theory attempts to lay the foundations of this
research programme at a deeper level by identifying implicit rules in the act of every
language game, i.e. rationality based on the presuppositions of argumentation (inclu-
siveness, equal communicative rights, sincerity and freedom from repression and manip-
ulation). Participants implicitly have to assume that they are contributing freely and
equally, that they are participating in a cooperative search for truth and/or rightness,
and that the interlocutor is raising claims that s/he considers to be true, right and/or
Forchtner et al 203

truthful. Without such presuppositions, communicative acts such as lying, manipulation
or cheating could not be identified as something deviating from our implicit assumptions
about appropriate behaviour in communicative situations (Habermas, 2008: 26f). They
offer theoretically justified implicit criteria through which communication processes can
be evaluated, not only by the observer, but also by actors in the respective communica-
tive situations. These assumptions thus constitute unavoidable idealizations that exert an
influence – usually a weak one – over communicative interaction.
The concept of collective learning assumes that communication perceived in this way
is a conflict-ridden process of permanently evaluating claims and counter-claims made
by actors in a communicative situation. This does not necessarily mean that actors are
‘driven’ by the goal of reaching a mutual understanding. By arguing with each other,
putting forward new perspectives and assessing them, social actors construct, challenge
and modify their common cognitive structures. They might consequently enable more
inclusive worlds – or not.
The collective nature of learning processes, as well as their blocking, have been
especially elaborated by Eder and Miller. The latter (Miller, 1986; 2006) has extensively
worked on actual interaction as the source of new (moral) insights by observing how
children’s argumentative abilities develop in the face of dissent. Thus, this notion of
learning refers neither to the accumulation of knowledge, nor to the recovery of what
actually happened, but to the changing quality of social relations (becoming more or less
open); the possibility of transcending existing beliefs by realizing the potential of the
quasi-transcendental conditions of intersubjectivity. Eder (1985; 1996; 1999; 2007)
offers a related criticism of individualist notions of learning, pointing to collective
learning processes as processes of circulating cognitive claims through networks of
social relations.
People can learn by communicating with each other (and can certainly learn different
things), but they do not necessarily do so. By communicating with each other, actors are
sometimes forced to decentre their initial perspectives in order to understand other
actors’ claims. Irrespective of whether or not these claims are finally accepted, cognitive
decentring implies distancing oneself from particular points of view – hence, the inclu-
sion of other actors’ perspectives. Besides, cognitive decentring rests upon the prior
recognition of the other as a competent speaker, i.e. upon his or her prior inclusion in
the linguistic community. It is against this background that we understand collective
learning as referring, among other things, to the changing structure of social relations, be
it in an inclusive or an exclusive way.
Elaborating on collective learning processes, both authors have also explored the
distortion of the potential inherent in communication, i.e. the blocking of collective
learning processes (Miller, 1986: 207–443; 2006: 227–57; see also Eder, 1985: 422–
69). Miller initially proposed a model closely linked to the three validity claims in
Habermas’ work. Here, blocked learning processes were seen in terms of rational
exchange being distorted by limiting the generalizability of knowledge by an authority
(authoritarian learning), by limiting the objectivity of knowledge due to a reliance on
ideologies, traditions or beliefs (ideological learning), or by limiting the truth/consis-
tency of statements (regressive learning). Recently, Miller (2006: 241; for an applica-
tion, see Forchtner and Schneickert, 2016) distinguishes between two mechanisms of
204 European Journal of Social Theory 23(2)

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What have the authors contributed in "Towards a revised theory" ?

This article proposes a revised theory of collective learning processes, a conceptual framework which addresses ways in which people make sense of and cope with change. More specifically, the article points to narrative genres ( romance, tragedy, comedy and irony ) which organize feelings and shape the social bond, proposing that ironic and tragic stories have the potential to trigger collective learning processes, while romantic and comic stories tend to block them. 

Q2. What is the argument that the narrative form does influence?

Their argument is that the narrative form does influence whether people are willing to ‘open up’ their horizons to each other, more specifically, that romance and comedy are better at blocking learning processes than tragedy and, in particular, irony, which has the potential to allow for collective learning processes. 

Q3. What is the way to illustrate the empirical application of their theoretical project?

The current prevalence of the diversity of populisms, the different ways in which left- and right-wing populism rearticulate social relations, make it an ideal case to illustrate the empirical application of their theoretical project. 

Q4. What is the concept of collective learning?

The concept of collective learning assumes that communication perceived in this way is a conflict-ridden process of permanently evaluating claims and counter-claims made by actors in a communicative situation. 

Q5. What is the meaning of blocked learning?

blocked learning processes were seen in terms of rational exchange being distorted by limiting the generalizability of knowledge by an authority (authoritarian learning), by limiting the objectivity of knowledge due to a reliance on ideologies, traditions or beliefs (ideological learning), or by limiting the truth/consistency of statements (regressive learning). 

Q6. What is the meaning of the term ‘learning blockages’?

As Miller’s (2006) concept of learning blockages suggests, ideas too can be ‘protected’ and excluded from discourse, such as the belief in the existence of a nation or class antagonism. 

Q7. What is the example of the manifesto of the left-wing populist party Podemos?

An example is the foundational manifesto of the Spanish left-wing populist party Podemos, Making a Move: Turning Indignation into Political Change (Monedero et al., 2014), which was built upon the interpretation and interconnection of two major events – one in the past, the other one in the future – and led to the appropriation by Podemos of the narrative constructed by the 15-M movement. 

Q8. What is the axis of the hero/ine?

The hero/ine-axis depicts the extent to which the main protagonist of a story offers a positive self-image that invites uncritical identification. 

Q9. What can be corrected for in a narrative perspective?

A narrative perspective can correct for this since narratives also organize feelings, thus producing different subjectivities that can facilitate or block collective learning. 

Q10. What can contribute to the eroding of narrative fidelity of specific stories?

It can contribute to eroding the narrative fidelity of specific stories, which are expected to resonate with familiar ideas and narratives, as well as to fit unfolding events (Gamson, 2006). 

Q11. Why does the Holocaust have a path?

No path leads beyond tragedy in this narrative of the Holocaust, among other things because this historical episode attests to the ‘dark and sinister forces that are also inside of ourselves’ 

Q12. What is the main argument for emplotted narratives?

Their contention is that whether or not people are willing to engage in argumentation depends (partly) on the narratives they take for granted and through which they convey their positions.