Towards the assessment of potential impact of unmanned vessels on maritime transportation safety
TL;DR: The main line of argument supporting their introduction pertains to the increase in navigational safety, which is expected to be achieved by reducing the frequency of human-related accidents on board ships, by removing the crews.
About: This article is published in Reliability Engineering & System Safety.The article was published on 2017-09-01 and is currently open access. It has received 209 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Bridge (nautical).
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TL;DR: In this article, a modified model of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for collision accidents between a ship and an icebreaker in ice-covered waters is proposed, which helps to analyze ship collision reports.
150 citations
TL;DR: The results of statistical analyses of maritime accidents data and AIS data from Norwegian waters are presented, to identify conditions that are associated with navigation related accidents (groundings and collisions) and could be used as risk indicators.
124 citations
TL;DR: A framework for the identification of factors that influence the navigational risk of remotely controlled MASS without crews on board is proposed and may assist the processes of design and operational planning of maritime transportation systems accommodating MASS and its remote-control center, e.g., the shore control center.
104 citations
TL;DR: A System-Theoretic Process Analysis is applied to develop a model suitable for safety analysis and design recommendations’ elaboration for future autonomous vessels and results indicate that the system-theoretic safety analysis’ outcome can be affected by manageable uncertainties despite the fact the system in question is yet to be implemented.
97 citations
Cites background from "Towards the assessment of potential..."
...The main source of potential problems is the performance of control algorithms and, as within a remote control mode, inability to manually operate any of the vessel's equipment [11]....
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...Therefore, the issue of ensuring such vessels’ safety remains open, as argued in [8,10,11]....
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...For such circumstances, a fail-to-safe mechanism shall be built-in to the system in order to prevent failure propagation [5,11] and allow for damage control with the assistance of other assets, salvage companies for instance....
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...Hazards Recent research reveals that some accident causal categories can have a greater impact on potentially reducing the safety of autonomous vessels than others, [11,124]....
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TL;DR: The results show that ‘interaction with manned vessels and detection of objects’ contributes the most to the overall risk of MASS operations, followed by ‘cyber-attacks’, ‘human error’ and ‘equipment failure’.
93 citations
References
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Book•
28 Feb 2006
TL;DR: This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur.
Abstract: For Resilience Engineering, 'failure' is the result of the adaptations necessary to cope with the complexity of the real world, rather than a breakdown or malfunction. The performance of individuals and organizations must continually adjust to current conditions and, because resources and time are finite, such adjustments are always approximate. This definitive new book explores this groundbreaking new development in safety and risk management, where 'success' is based on the ability of organizations, groups and individuals to anticipate the changing shape of risk before failures and harm occur. Featuring contributions from many of the worlds leading figures in the fields of human factors and safety, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts provides thought-provoking insights into system safety as an aggregate of its various components, subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviours, and the way in which they interact. The book provides an introduction to Resilience Engineering of systems, covering both the theoretical and practical aspects. It is written for those responsible for system safety on managerial or operational levels alike, including safety managers and engineers (line and maintenance), security experts, risk and safety consultants, human factors professionals and accident investigators.
1,610 citations
Book•
13 Jan 2012
TL;DR: A new approach to safety, based on systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques was proposed by Leveson et al. as discussed by the authors, which is more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world.
Abstract: A new approach to safety, based on systems thinking, that is more effective, less costly, and easier to use than current techniques.Engineering has experienced a technological revolution, but the basic engineering techniques applied in safety and reliability engineering, created in a simpler, analog world, have changed very little over the years. In this groundbreaking book, Nancy Leveson proposes a new approach to safety?more suited to today's complex, sociotechnical, software-intensive world?based on modern systems thinking and systems theory. Revisiting and updating ideas pioneered by 1950s aerospace engineers in their System Safety concept, and testing her new model extensively on real-world examples, Leveson has created a new approach to safety that is more effective, less expensive, and easier to use than current techniques.Arguing that traditional models of causality are inadequate, Leveson presents a new, extended model of causation (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes, or STAMP), then shows how the new model can be used to create techniques for system safety engineering, including accident analysis, hazard analysis, system design, safety in operations, and management of safety-critical systems. She applies the new techniques to real-world events including the friendly-fire loss of a U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in the first Gulf War; the Vioxx recall; the U.S. Navy SUBSAFE program; and the bacterial contamination of a public water supply in a Canadian town. Leveson's approach is relevant even beyond safety engineering, offering techniques for ?reengineering? any large sociotechnical system to improve safety and manage risk.
1,448 citations
"Towards the assessment of potential..." refers background in this paper
...This highlights the importance of applying a systemic approach to the design of unmanned ship and the operational environment she is anticipated to work within [52]....
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...One may be surrounded by numerous displays yet still be unable to make proper decisions due to information overflow, bad prioritization of tasks or lack of actual perception of the situation [52,61,62]....
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...Unmanned vessels might minimize chances of such occurrences provided that the system as a whole is properly designed and operated, and the systemic approach to safety is applied [52]....
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TL;DR: This book illustrates the depth of the divide between modern safety science and much of what passes for thinking about safety in health care.
Abstract: Edited by E Hollnagel, D Woods, N Leveson. UK: Aldershot, 2006, pp 397. ISBN 0754646416
In the patient safety world there is much talk of importing ideas and techniques from other disciplines; unfortunately it remains largely a “do-it-yourself” field where few active participants have become deeply educated about the nature of hazard, risk, success, and failure in clinical work. This book illustrates the depth of the divide between modern safety science and much of what passes for thinking about safety in health care. Because of that, it should be required reading for anyone interested in reducing the burden of injury in clinical systems.
The authors and editors are longstanding participants in a vibrant multidisciplinary stream of research concerned with understanding human performance, accidents, and recovery in complex systems dating back to Three Mile Island, …
816 citations
Book•
18 Jul 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, a comprehensive book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, as well as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.
Abstract: This comprehensive book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents. Serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.
753 citations
TL;DR: This paper distinguishes between active and latent human failures and proposes a general framework for understanding the dynamics of accident causation, suggests ways in which current methods of protection may be enhanced, and concludes by discussing the unusual structural features of 'high-reliability' organizations.
Abstract: Several recent accidents in complex high-risk technologies had their primary origins in a variety of delayed-action human failures committed long before an emergency state could be recognized. These disasters were due to the adverse conjunction of a large number of causal factors, each one necessary but singly insufficient to achieve the catastrophic outcome. Although the errors and violations of those at the immediate human-system interface often feature large in the post-accident investigations, it is evident that these 'front-line' operators are rarely the principal instigators of system breakdown. Their part is often to provide just those local triggering conditions necessary to manifest systemic weaknesses created by fallible decisions made earlier in the organizational and managerial spheres. The challenge facing the human reliability community is to find ways of identifying and neutralizing these latent failures before they combine with local triggering events to breach the system's defences. New methods of risk assessment and risk management are needed if we are to achieve any significant improvements in the safety of complex, well-defended, socio-technical systems. This paper distinguishes between active and latent human failures and proposes a general framework for understanding the dynamics of accident causation. It also suggests ways in which current methods of protection may be enhanced, and concludes by discussing the unusual structural features of 'high-reliability' organizations.
631 citations
"Towards the assessment of potential..." refers methods in this paper
...Generic HFACS is based on Reason's Swiss Cheese theory [32] and was initially developed for studying the contribution of human elements to military aviation accidents but was further developed by various scholars to include other causal factors....
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