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Journal ArticleDOI

Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations

01 Jan 1983-Technology and Culture-Vol. 24, Iss: 1, pp 138
TL;DR: In this article, a new book about trade and technology in soviet western relations to read is presented, which can be found in the library of the University of Warsaw in the Czech Republic.
Abstract: Let's read! We will often find out this sentence everywhere. When still being a kid, mom used to order us to always read, so did the teacher. Some books are fully read in a week and we need the obligation to support reading. What about now? Do you still love reading? Is reading only for you who have obligation? Absolutely not! We here offer you a new book enPDFd trade and technology in soviet western relations to read.
Citations
More filters
Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard), who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved productivities, and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal, causing a ratchet effect to arise.
Abstract: Hierarchical organizations often perform poorly in inducing the adoption of innovations. The authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard); who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved productivities (yielding adverse selection); and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal (causing a ratchet effect to arise). Increasing the rate of adoption of an innovation in such an organization causes the incentive costs of adoption to increase at an increasing rate. Relatively low rates of adoption may then be a response to the prohibitive incentive costs of higher adoption rates. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

60 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that rapid innovation and dynamism are not a random phenomenon that may or may not occur, but a deeply rooted system-specific property of capitalism.
Abstract: The essence of post-socialist transformation can be easily summarized in a few words—a large set of countries moved from socialism to capitalism. This shift itself is the strongest historical evidence of the superiority of capitalism over socialism. Nevertheless, it is our obligation to continue the impartial and unbiased comparison of the two systems. All the more so since we are living in difficult times, and nostalgia for the failed old regime can be felt by a significant portion of the population. We must convince our fellow citizens that we are heading in the right direction. There are several arguments to support this optimistic belief. I would like to spell out only one virtue of capitalism: its innovative and dynamic nature. In the first part of this study, I argue that rapid innovation and dynamism are not a random phenomenon that may or may not occur, but a deeply rooted system-specific property of capitalism. The same can be said about its opposite, the socialist system. Its inability to create great revolutionary new products and delay in other dimensions of technical progress are not due to some errors in policy but are a deeply rooted system-specific property of socialism. Unfortunately, this highly visible great virtue of capitalism does not get the appreciation it deserves. It is completely ignored by most people and even by most professional students of alternative systems, and I feel angry and frustrated watching that neglect, motivating me to choose the theme of this study.

38 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A consensus exists in the literature on international economic sanctions, it is that attempts to use economic instruments to achieve political objectives are likely to fail as mentioned in this paper, and this widely shared conclusion has been based on the analysis of a number of highly visible but unsuccessful attempts, including the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935-1936, the Arab boycott of Israel, U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and most recently, U
Abstract: If a consensus exists in the literature on international economic sanctions, it is that attempts to use economic instruments to achieve political objectives are likely to fail.1 This widely shared conclusion has been based on the analysis of a number of highly visible but unsuccessful attempts, including the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935–1936, the Arab boycott of Israel, U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and most recently, U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

33 citations

Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the question of "how much value is produced?" in the context of a critique of the value theory of labour and present a quantitative definition of the amount of labour that is necessary to produce a given product.
Abstract: labour and value. And hence, as long as we bear in mind that the labour we are discussing is wage-labour, abstract labour, we might equally well describe the critique as being focused around a value theory of labour. As Rubin puts it, value is not a property of things but a social form acquired by things due to the fact that people enter into determined production relations with each other through things. (1928. p.69). Such a brief summary has the merit of emphasising the essentially qualitative nature of our method, by pointing up the nature of abstract labour as labour which produces value. There now arises the quantitative question: how much value is produced? More to the point, what does ‘how much value?’ actually mean? Given that we know that only a single component is present in all commodities, namely labour, this reduces to the question: what does ‘how much labour?’ actually mean? We might, of course, seek to answer this question by formulating a definition according to which an hour of skilled labour counts for more than an hour of unskilled labour: the labour of a watchmaker for more than the labour of an office cleaner. This is undoubtedly how things actually seem from the point of view of the individual controllers of capital, regardless of the form taken by the capital under their control: a project, an enterprise, a shareholding, a nationalised firm, or whatever. But in fact CHAP.3 SOVIET CAPITALISM: A NEW THEORY 92 to take this road is to take our eye off the ball, for the category of value depends on the generalisation of exchange and on the category of abstract labour (labour in the abstract), and neither of these two categories appear to be of any weight at all in any answer based on the idea that some types of labour are ‘intrinsically’ more valuable than others. We can only conclude that the question of ‘how much value?’ should be answered in terms which are much more simple, and we thus arrive at the view that the quantity of value can only be determined by the total number of hours worked, regardless of the specific type and characteristics of the labour expended. No sooner have we reached this point, however, than objections immediately present themselves. What if a worker twiddles his thumbs all afternoon — surely we do not mean to suggest that hours spent like this can actually contribute to the value of the product? Indeed we do not, and we must therefore introduce the qualification that the labour-time referred to is in fact the average labour-time. Clearly what is ‘average’ in this sense is determined by the class struggle, not only within the workplace but also in the wider society. But for the moment, since we are endeavouring to consider capitalist production as an ‘objective’ system, this does not stand in the way of the development of the critique. Another objection rests on the fact that technological change can and does bring about circumstances where the amount of commodities of a given type produced by a given amount of labour-time increases. Of course the new technology is itself a product of abstract labour and therefore injects its own value into the product, but the point of the objection is that the labour-time necessary for the production of a commodity is liable to change. If one firm employs new technology and another employs old technology, our critique would thus seem to lead us to the conclusion that two commodities could have identical exchange-values and use-values but nonetheless contain different quantities of value. This is not, however, the case; and as the individual controller of capital would be likely to agree, what really happens is that the value of the commodities still being produced with the old technology decreases. (Marx 1867, p.318). Thus although the value of the product does not cease to be determined by the average quantity of labour-time, we must make the clarification that what we are referring to is the quantity of labour-time which is necessary. Since the context is precisely that of socialised production and socialised labour in their capitalist forms, we can further define this labour-time as that which is ‘socially necessary’ from the point of view of capital.6 Thus what happens in the plants using the old technology is that the quantity of socially necessary time worked, considered per individual commodity, falls. And of course the means of social ‘necessitation’ — and once again we exclude considerations of class struggle — is the same as the means of ‘averaging’: namely, the generalisation of exchange. In the second place, generalised exchange can only dominate production if value is able to take a form which is abstracted from specific products: namely, on one hand, from specific exchange-values, including those of specific forces of production, and on the other, from use-value in general. To understand why this is so it is useful to try to imagine a system based on generalised exchange where money was unknown: that is, a system of generalised barter. Clearly in such a system “a mass of swaps would be necessary before one obtained the 6 It should be remembered here that since capital is an ‘inhuman’ relation, socially necessary labour-time is equally well described as labour-time which is technologically necessary. CHAP.3 SOVIET CAPITALISM: A NEW THEORY 93 desired article in exchange.” (Marx 1885, p.215). Someone wanting a swimsuit, for example, might first find themselves constrained to exchange a table for a sack of potatoes. The point now is that for all sorts of possible reasons — delay in organising a new swap, for example — she might eventually decide to cook the potatoes and eat them, thereby destroying their exchangeability. Since she would have known all along that she might find reason to do this, the initial act of exchange would have been determined not simply by considerations of exchange-value but also by those of use-value. More generally, the strength of the ties which bonded an object’s exchangeability to its use-value would make the process of obtaining the ‘desired article’ extremely cumbersome; and whilst one might posit exchange relations as striving to dominate the entire process of circulation, they would in actual fact find themselves restricted by cords of use-value at every step of the way. In practice such a system — which has not been actualised — would be insufficient to allow exchange to achieve full generalisation.7 We therefore see that the generalisation of exchange depends upon the functional existence of a general equivalent.8 In an early stage of the development of exchange this can, of course, take the form of cattle or shells or any specially chosen material commodity, but historically the commodity owners experience a growing need for the spread of a simpler form. This form, the money-form, is general insofar as it represents pure exchangeability: in itself it has no use-value.9 The principle — although later we shall see it to be modified in practice — is simple: anything can be exchanged for money, and anything else can be bought with the money acquired. Money is the form which enables commodities to compete with each other in a generalised way; it mediates their exchange; and it functions as a special commodity of its own type which allows the social averaging and generalised abstraction that define the categories of abstract labour and value in the first place. Money is “the bond of all bonds” (Marx 1932, pp.122-23); it “represents the form of social relations; it represents, sanctions and organises them.” (Negri 1979, p.23).

33 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that over the four decades of its existence, the discipline largely neglected the military aspects of the Soviet economy, and the near-absence of the military sector from the published output of Sovietology.
Abstract: Post-collapse literature routinely describes the Soviet economy as a "war economy". Yet such statements represent a revolution in the characterization of the subject. Western academic study of the Soviet economy was created in the late 1940s as a response to the perceived national security threat. However, over the four decades of its existence, the discipline largely neglected the military aspects of the Soviet economy. This paper, drawn from a larger study, documents the near-absence of the military sector from the published output of Sovietology.

29 citations

References
More filters
Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard), who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved productivities, and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal, causing a ratchet effect to arise.
Abstract: Hierarchical organizations often perform poorly in inducing the adoption of innovations. The authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption-of-innovation choices (yielding moral hazard); who occupy jobs of differing, unobserved productivities (yielding adverse selection); and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal (causing a ratchet effect to arise). Increasing the rate of adoption of an innovation in such an organization causes the incentive costs of adoption to increase at an increasing rate. Relatively low rates of adoption may then be a response to the prohibitive incentive costs of higher adoption rates. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

60 citations

Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that rapid innovation and dynamism are not a random phenomenon that may or may not occur, but a deeply rooted system-specific property of capitalism.
Abstract: The essence of post-socialist transformation can be easily summarized in a few words—a large set of countries moved from socialism to capitalism. This shift itself is the strongest historical evidence of the superiority of capitalism over socialism. Nevertheless, it is our obligation to continue the impartial and unbiased comparison of the two systems. All the more so since we are living in difficult times, and nostalgia for the failed old regime can be felt by a significant portion of the population. We must convince our fellow citizens that we are heading in the right direction. There are several arguments to support this optimistic belief. I would like to spell out only one virtue of capitalism: its innovative and dynamic nature. In the first part of this study, I argue that rapid innovation and dynamism are not a random phenomenon that may or may not occur, but a deeply rooted system-specific property of capitalism. The same can be said about its opposite, the socialist system. Its inability to create great revolutionary new products and delay in other dimensions of technical progress are not due to some errors in policy but are a deeply rooted system-specific property of socialism. Unfortunately, this highly visible great virtue of capitalism does not get the appreciation it deserves. It is completely ignored by most people and even by most professional students of alternative systems, and I feel angry and frustrated watching that neglect, motivating me to choose the theme of this study.

38 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A consensus exists in the literature on international economic sanctions, it is that attempts to use economic instruments to achieve political objectives are likely to fail as mentioned in this paper, and this widely shared conclusion has been based on the analysis of a number of highly visible but unsuccessful attempts, including the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935-1936, the Arab boycott of Israel, U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and most recently, U
Abstract: If a consensus exists in the literature on international economic sanctions, it is that attempts to use economic instruments to achieve political objectives are likely to fail.1 This widely shared conclusion has been based on the analysis of a number of highly visible but unsuccessful attempts, including the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935–1936, the Arab boycott of Israel, U.S. sanctions against the Castro regime, United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and most recently, U.S. sanctions against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland.

33 citations

Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the question of "how much value is produced?" in the context of a critique of the value theory of labour and present a quantitative definition of the amount of labour that is necessary to produce a given product.
Abstract: labour and value. And hence, as long as we bear in mind that the labour we are discussing is wage-labour, abstract labour, we might equally well describe the critique as being focused around a value theory of labour. As Rubin puts it, value is not a property of things but a social form acquired by things due to the fact that people enter into determined production relations with each other through things. (1928. p.69). Such a brief summary has the merit of emphasising the essentially qualitative nature of our method, by pointing up the nature of abstract labour as labour which produces value. There now arises the quantitative question: how much value is produced? More to the point, what does ‘how much value?’ actually mean? Given that we know that only a single component is present in all commodities, namely labour, this reduces to the question: what does ‘how much labour?’ actually mean? We might, of course, seek to answer this question by formulating a definition according to which an hour of skilled labour counts for more than an hour of unskilled labour: the labour of a watchmaker for more than the labour of an office cleaner. This is undoubtedly how things actually seem from the point of view of the individual controllers of capital, regardless of the form taken by the capital under their control: a project, an enterprise, a shareholding, a nationalised firm, or whatever. But in fact CHAP.3 SOVIET CAPITALISM: A NEW THEORY 92 to take this road is to take our eye off the ball, for the category of value depends on the generalisation of exchange and on the category of abstract labour (labour in the abstract), and neither of these two categories appear to be of any weight at all in any answer based on the idea that some types of labour are ‘intrinsically’ more valuable than others. We can only conclude that the question of ‘how much value?’ should be answered in terms which are much more simple, and we thus arrive at the view that the quantity of value can only be determined by the total number of hours worked, regardless of the specific type and characteristics of the labour expended. No sooner have we reached this point, however, than objections immediately present themselves. What if a worker twiddles his thumbs all afternoon — surely we do not mean to suggest that hours spent like this can actually contribute to the value of the product? Indeed we do not, and we must therefore introduce the qualification that the labour-time referred to is in fact the average labour-time. Clearly what is ‘average’ in this sense is determined by the class struggle, not only within the workplace but also in the wider society. But for the moment, since we are endeavouring to consider capitalist production as an ‘objective’ system, this does not stand in the way of the development of the critique. Another objection rests on the fact that technological change can and does bring about circumstances where the amount of commodities of a given type produced by a given amount of labour-time increases. Of course the new technology is itself a product of abstract labour and therefore injects its own value into the product, but the point of the objection is that the labour-time necessary for the production of a commodity is liable to change. If one firm employs new technology and another employs old technology, our critique would thus seem to lead us to the conclusion that two commodities could have identical exchange-values and use-values but nonetheless contain different quantities of value. This is not, however, the case; and as the individual controller of capital would be likely to agree, what really happens is that the value of the commodities still being produced with the old technology decreases. (Marx 1867, p.318). Thus although the value of the product does not cease to be determined by the average quantity of labour-time, we must make the clarification that what we are referring to is the quantity of labour-time which is necessary. Since the context is precisely that of socialised production and socialised labour in their capitalist forms, we can further define this labour-time as that which is ‘socially necessary’ from the point of view of capital.6 Thus what happens in the plants using the old technology is that the quantity of socially necessary time worked, considered per individual commodity, falls. And of course the means of social ‘necessitation’ — and once again we exclude considerations of class struggle — is the same as the means of ‘averaging’: namely, the generalisation of exchange. In the second place, generalised exchange can only dominate production if value is able to take a form which is abstracted from specific products: namely, on one hand, from specific exchange-values, including those of specific forces of production, and on the other, from use-value in general. To understand why this is so it is useful to try to imagine a system based on generalised exchange where money was unknown: that is, a system of generalised barter. Clearly in such a system “a mass of swaps would be necessary before one obtained the 6 It should be remembered here that since capital is an ‘inhuman’ relation, socially necessary labour-time is equally well described as labour-time which is technologically necessary. CHAP.3 SOVIET CAPITALISM: A NEW THEORY 93 desired article in exchange.” (Marx 1885, p.215). Someone wanting a swimsuit, for example, might first find themselves constrained to exchange a table for a sack of potatoes. The point now is that for all sorts of possible reasons — delay in organising a new swap, for example — she might eventually decide to cook the potatoes and eat them, thereby destroying their exchangeability. Since she would have known all along that she might find reason to do this, the initial act of exchange would have been determined not simply by considerations of exchange-value but also by those of use-value. More generally, the strength of the ties which bonded an object’s exchangeability to its use-value would make the process of obtaining the ‘desired article’ extremely cumbersome; and whilst one might posit exchange relations as striving to dominate the entire process of circulation, they would in actual fact find themselves restricted by cords of use-value at every step of the way. In practice such a system — which has not been actualised — would be insufficient to allow exchange to achieve full generalisation.7 We therefore see that the generalisation of exchange depends upon the functional existence of a general equivalent.8 In an early stage of the development of exchange this can, of course, take the form of cattle or shells or any specially chosen material commodity, but historically the commodity owners experience a growing need for the spread of a simpler form. This form, the money-form, is general insofar as it represents pure exchangeability: in itself it has no use-value.9 The principle — although later we shall see it to be modified in practice — is simple: anything can be exchanged for money, and anything else can be bought with the money acquired. Money is the form which enables commodities to compete with each other in a generalised way; it mediates their exchange; and it functions as a special commodity of its own type which allows the social averaging and generalised abstraction that define the categories of abstract labour and value in the first place. Money is “the bond of all bonds” (Marx 1932, pp.122-23); it “represents the form of social relations; it represents, sanctions and organises them.” (Negri 1979, p.23).

33 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: For example, the authors found that over the four decades of its existence, the discipline largely neglected the military aspects of the Soviet economy, and the near-absence of the military sector from the published output of Sovietology.
Abstract: Post-collapse literature routinely describes the Soviet economy as a "war economy". Yet such statements represent a revolution in the characterization of the subject. Western academic study of the Soviet economy was created in the late 1940s as a response to the perceived national security threat. However, over the four decades of its existence, the discipline largely neglected the military aspects of the Soviet economy. This paper, drawn from a larger study, documents the near-absence of the military sector from the published output of Sovietology.

29 citations