Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the impact of economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting for populist parties in 31 European countries and find the most consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis.
Abstract: Rising support for populist parties has disrupted the politics of many Western societies. What explains this phenomenon? Two theories are examined here. Perhaps the most widely-held view of mass support for populism -- the economic insecurity perspective -- emphasizes the consequences of profound changes transforming the workforce and society in post-industrial economies. Alternatively, the cultural backlash thesis suggests that support can be explained as a retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change. To consider these arguments, Part I develops the conceptual and theoretical framework. Part II of the study uses the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to identify the ideological location of 268 political parties in 31 European countries. Part III compares the pattern of European party competition at national-level. Part IV uses the pooled European Social Survey 1-6 (2002-2014) to examine the cross-national evidence at individual level for the impact of the economic insecurity and cultural values as predictors of voting for populist parties. Part V summarizes the key findings and considers their implications. Overall, we find the most consistent evidence supporting the cultural backlash thesis.
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TL;DR: The authors argue that the perforation of national states by immigration, integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic article.
Abstract: This article argues that the perforation of national states by immigration, integration and trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic article. We present evidence suggesting that (1) party systems are determined in episodic breaks from the past; (2) political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, (3) as a consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties.
676 citations
Cites background from "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Popu..."
...Hence, opposition to transnationalism is for many a populist reaction against elites who have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart and Norris 2016; van Kessel 2015)....
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...Hence, opposition to transnationalism is for many a populist reaction against élites who have little sympathy for national borders (Inglehart and Norris 2016; van Kessel 2015)....
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Posted Content•
TL;DR: The authors argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash, and distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight.
Abstract: Populism may seem like it has come out of nowhere, but it has been on the rise for a while. I argue that economic history and economic theory both provide ample grounds for anticipating that advanced stages of economic globalization would produce a political backlash. While the backlash may have been predictable, the specific form it took was less so. I distinguish between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight. The first has been predominant in Latin America, and the second in Europe. I argue that these different reactions are related to the relative salience of different types of globalization shocks.
598 citations
Cites background from "Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Popu..."
...25The empirical case for cultural determinants of populism is made by Inglehart & Norris (2016)....
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TL;DR: For example, this article found that younger Postmaterialist birth cohorts supported environmentalist parties, while older, less secure cohorts supported authoritarian xenophobic parties, in an enduring intergenerational value clash.
Abstract: Growing up taking survival for granted makes people more open to new ideas and more tolerant of outgroups. Insecurity has the opposite effect, stimulating an Authoritarian Reflex in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms. The 35 years of exceptional security experienced by developed democracies after WWII brought pervasive cultural changes, including the rise of Green parties and the spread of democracy. During the past 35 years, economic growth continued, but virtually all of the gains went to those at the top; the less-educated experienced declining existential security, fueling support for Populist Authoritarian phenomena such as Brexit, France’s National Front and Trump’s takeover of the Republican party. This raises two questions: (1) “What motivates people to support Populist Authoritarian movements?” And (2) “Why is the populist authoritarian vote so much higher now than it was several decades ago in high-income countries?” The two questions have different answers. Support for populist authoritarian parties is motivated by a backlash against cultural change. From the start, younger Postmaterialist birth cohorts supported environmentalist parties, while older, less secure cohorts supported authoritarian xenophobic parties, in an enduring intergenerational value clash. But for the past three decades, strong period effects have been working to increase support for xenophobic parties: economic gains have gone almost entirely to those at the top, while a large share of the population experienced declining real income and job security, along with a large influx of immigrants and refugees. Cultural backlash explains why given individuals support Populist Authoritarian movements. Declining existential security explains why support for these movements is greater now than it was thirty years ago.
384 citations
Additional excerpts
...11 Inglehart and Norris 2016....
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Book•
14 Feb 2019TL;DR: The authors argued that the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fuelling support for authoritarian-populist parties and leaders in the US and Europe, and highlighted the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.
Abstract: Authoritarian populist parties have advanced in many countries, and entered government in states as diverse as Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland. Even small parties can still shift the policy agenda, as demonstrated by UKIP's role in catalyzing Brexit. Drawing on new evidence, this book advances a general theory why the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fuelling support for authoritarian-populist parties and leaders in the US and Europe. The conclusion highlights the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.
360 citations
References
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Book•
01 Jan 1990
TL;DR: In this paper, Esping-Andersen distinguishes three major types of welfare state, connecting these with variations in the historical development of different Western countries, and argues that current economic processes such as those moving toward a post-industrial order are shaped not by autonomous market forces but by the nature of states and state differences.
Abstract: Few discussions in modern social science have occupied as much attention as the changing nature of welfare states in Western societies. Gosta Esping-Andersen, one of the foremost contributors to current debates on this issue, here provides a new analysis of the character and role of welfare states in the functioning of contemporary advanced Western societies. Esping-Andersen distinguishes three major types of welfare state, connecting these with variations in the historical development of different Western countries. He argues that current economic processes, such as those moving toward a postindustrial order, are shaped not by autonomous market forces but by the nature of states and state differences. Fully informed by comparative materials, this book will have great appeal to all those working on issues of economic development and postindustrialism. Its audience will include students of sociology, economics, and politics."
16,883 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1997TL;DR: The 1990 WVS Questionnaire was used by as mentioned in this paper for the ICPSR Questionnaire, with variable numbers of items used in Table 1 and Table 2... Table 1.
Abstract: Acknowledgments Ch. 1 Value Systems: The Subjective Aspect of Politics and Economics Ch. 2 Individual-Level Change and Societal-Level Change Ch. 3 Modernization and Postmodernization in 43 Societies Ch. 4 Measuring Materialist and Postmaterialist Values Ch. 5 The Shift toward Postmaterialist Values, 1970-1994 Ch. 6 Economic Development, Political Culture, and Democracy: Bringing the People Back In Ch. 7 The Impact of Culture on Economic Growth Ch. 8 The Rise of New Issues and New Parties Ch. 9 The Shift toward Postmodern Values: Predicted and Observed Changes, 1981-1990 Ch. 10 The Erosion of Institutional Authority and the Rise of Citizen Intervention in Politics Ch. 11 Trajectories of Social Change App. 1 A Note on Sampling: Figures A.1 and A.2 App. 2 Partial 1990 WVS Questionnaire, with Short Labels for Items Used in Figure 3.2 App. 3 Supplementary Figures for Chapters 3, 9, and 10 Figures A.3 (Chapter 6), A.4-A.21 (Chapter 9), A.22-A.26 (Chapter 10), and A.27 (Chapter 11) App. 4 Construction of Key Indices Used in This Book App. 5 Complete 1990 WVS Questionnaire, with Variable Numbers in ICPSR Dataset References Index
5,399 citations
"Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Popu..." refers background in this paper
...38 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart....
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...52 Ronald F. Inglehart, 1997 Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies....
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...51 Ronald F. Inglehart, 2008....
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...50 Ronald Inglehart....
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...6 Ronald Inglehart....
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4,591 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1996
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the nature of mass belief, how we participate in politics, and who participates in the political process, and the social bases of party support, and discuss attitudes and voting choices.
Abstract: Tables and Figures Preface 1. Introduction I. POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC 2. The Nature of Mass Beliefs 3. How We Participate 4. Who Participates? II. POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS 5. Values in Change 6. Issues and Ideological Orientations III. THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 7. Elections and Political Parties 8. The Social Bases of Party Support 9. Partisanship and Voting 10. Attitudes and Voting Choice 11. Political Representation IV. DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE 12. Citizens and the Democratic Process Appendix A: Statistical Primer Appendix B: Major Data Sources Appendix C: World Values Survey Codebook References Index
1,367 citations