Twentieth Century Colonialism and China : Localities, the everyday, and the world
26 Jul 2012-
01 Jan 2017
TL;DR: In this paper, a socio-musicological inquiry about the music in Shanghai during the 1930s and 1940s is carried out, focusing on the Shanghai Municipal Brass Band (Shanghailanders).
Abstract: Acknowledgements Note on Chinese Characters List of Figures Prologue 12 ‘1930s and 1940s Shanghai’: A Socio-Musicological Inquiry Chapter 1 50 International Settlement (Treaty Port I), ‘Trying to listen to the music’: Shanghailanders, Parks, The Shanghai Municipal Brass Band Chapter 2 89 French Concession (Treaty Port II), ‘Aucun instrument de cuivre’: Colonial Rule, Licensed Venues, Musical Soundscape Chapter 3 124 Japanese-Occupied Shanghai, ‘Die gute Unterhaltungsmusik’: Landscape, Refugee Cafés, Sounds of ‘Little Vienna’ Chapter 4 174 Nationalist Shanghai, ‘Nightclub Café’: Taxable Eateries and Claims of a Distinct Musical Sound Epilogue 210 Beyond ‘1930s and 1940s Shanghai’: Reproduction Maps, Repositories, Archival Musicology
02 Jan 2019-Central Asian Survey
TL;DR: The Chinese statist project of occupying, minoritizing and securitizing diffe... as discussed by the authors is an essential myth that animates Chinese nationalism and is the basis for Chinese nationalism.
Abstract: China as a victim rather than a proponent of modern colonialism is an essential myth that animates Chinese nationalism. The Chinese statist project of occupying, minoritizing and securitizing diffe...
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: New Zealand recognized China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat were discussed in the Ministry of Defence files as discussed by the authors, where New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People's Republic of China in South East Asia.
Abstract: In 1965 New Zealand was an active member of alliances designed to contain the People’s Republic of China in South East Asia. Late the previous year, the Defence Council had warned Cabinet that New Zealand could be at war with China and/or Indonesia in six months. Less than seven years later New Zealand recognised China, as Britain and the US military presences were exiting from South East Asia. These events bookend a radical reshaping of New Zealand’s defence policies and its attitude towards China. The existing scholarship on New Zealand’s Cold War defence policies has underemphasised the role of China in New Zealand’s grand strategy and the scholarship on Sino-New Zealand relations has also largely ignored defence policy. This thesis uses recently released files from the Ministry of Defence to provide new insight into the construction of China as a threat during the mid-1960s and the challenges faced in meeting that perceived threat. New Zealand’s Forward Defence policy was one designed to contain China and Beijing-supported revolutionary groups in South East Asia. This strategy was predicated on active British or American support for containment. SEATO and ANZAM provided the basis of New Zealand war planning and day-to-day operations in Asia respectively. With the British decision to withdraw from South East Asia and the American quagmire in Vietnam, New Zealand had to reassess its position in South East Asia as containment of China was no longer thought possible. The need for a containment strategy was based upon a conceptualisation of China as a growing and hostile power. This view saw China as eventually developing the means to dominate South East Asia and threaten Australasia directly as Japan had done in 1942. This perception of China changed with the emergence of the Cultural Revolution. New Zealand officials watched from Hong Kong as violence and mass political disorder challenged established sources of authority. They took the view that Mao was in direct command of the revolution and was placing limits on it. The revolution destroyed the notion that China was a growing power bent on external expansion. As Mao moved to dampen the revolution, Beijing moved to re-establish its foreign policy and improve its links with the outside world. Both the means and ends of New Zealand’s grand strategy changed at the same time. New Zealand and its great power allies abandoned the containment project just as views on China shifted. From the end of the 1960s, New Zealand’s Forward Defence efforts ceased to be focused on the containment of China and moved to achieving much more limited goals. New security arrangements were developed to replace the AMDA, ANZAM, and SEATO pacts. The Five Power Defence Arrangements would provide the basis of New Zealand’s defence commitment to South East Asia with only limited assistance from Britain and without China as a significant threat. It is in this context that New Zealand made the decision to recognise China. New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake long maintained the view that the PRC should enter the United Nations and be recognised by New Zealand, provided the position of Taiwan was preserved. Once the effort to keep Taiwan in the UN was lost, New Zealand moved slowly toward recognition. However, it would take the election of the Third Labour Government for recognition to occur. This move was part of an international trend towards official relations with Beijing, but for New Zealand, the shift was greater as Wellington had moved from seeing China as a growing military threat to a state with which New Zealand could have an official dialogue.
28 Sep 2017
TL;DR: Shaping Modern Shanghai as mentioned in this paper provides a new understanding of colonialism in China through a fresh examination of Shanghai's International Settlement, which was the site of key developments of the Republican period: economic growth, rising Chinese nationalism and Sino-Japanese conflict.
Abstract: Shaping Modern Shanghai provides a new understanding of colonialism in China through a fresh examination of Shanghai's International Settlement. This was the site of key developments of the Republican period: economic growth, rising Chinese nationalism and Sino-Japanese conflict. Managed by the Shanghai Municipal Council (1854–1943), the International Settlement was beyond the control of the Chinese and foreign imperial governments. Jackson defines Shanghai's unique, hybrid form of colonial urban governance as transnational colonialism. The Council was both colonial in its structures and subject to colonial influence, especially from the British empire, yet autonomous in its activities and transnational in its personnel. This is the first in-depth study of how this unique body functioned on the local, national and international stages, revealing the Council's impact on the daily lives of the city's residents and its contribution to the conflicts of the period, with implications for the fields of modern Chinese and colonial history.
01 Jan 2013
TL;DR: In this article, the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree.
Abstract: OF DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History in the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University March, 2013
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