Two to tango: The role of government in fisheries co-management
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the role of government, primarily national government, in fisheries co-management and investigate the critical role of decentralization in a strategy of comanagement using a number of international cases.
About: This article is published in Marine Policy.The article was published on 1997-09-01. It has received 673 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Fisheries law & Fisheries co-management.
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TL;DR: The authors argue that societies have inherent capacities to adapt to climate change, but these capacities are bound up in their ability to act collectively, and they argue that this capacity is limited by the nature of the agents of change, states, markets and civil society.
Abstract: The effects of observed and future changes in climate are spatially and socially differentiated. The impacts of future changes will be felt particularly by resource-dependent communities through a multitude of primary and secondary effects cascading through natural and social systems. Given that the world is increasingly faced with risks of climate change that are at the boundaries of human experience3, there is an urgent need to learn from past and present adaptation strategies to understand both the processes by which adaptation takes place and the limitations of the various agents of change – states, markets, and civil society – in these processes. Societies have inherent capacities to adapt to climate change. In this article, I argue that these capacities are bound up in their ability to act collectively.
2,346 citations
TL;DR: Co-management, or the joint management of the commons, is often formulated in terms of some arrangement of power sharing between the State and a community of resource users, but in reality there often are multiple local interests and multiple government agencies at play, and co-management can hardly be understood as the interaction of a unitary State and an homogeneous community.
1,180 citations
Cites background from "Two to tango: The role of governmen..."
...Co-management can be looked upon as a continuum from the simple exchange of information to formal partnership (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997)....
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...The establishment of co-management systems may function as a means of conflict resolution between communities of local resource users and the State (Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Singleton, 1998)....
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...Keywords: Co-management; Cross-scale linkages; The state; Community; Governance; Decision-making; Environmental policy...
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TL;DR: The issue of evaluation in natural resource management is revisits and is recasts in light of complex adaptive systems thinking and an evaluative framework for adaptive co-management is developed which directs attention toward three broad components: ecosystem conditions, livelihood outcomes and process and institutional conditions.
546 citations
Cites background from "Two to tango: The role of governmen..."
...…FitzGibbon, 2004a), case studies of practice have been assembled (e.g., Pomeroy, 1996; Symes, 1997; Silvern, 1999), and conceptualizations (e.g., Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004b; Carlsson andBerkes, 2005) aswell as theoretical understanding have been explored (Pinkerton,…...
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Book•
01 Jan 2007
TL;DR: In this article, the authors highlight the contribution that inland and coastal small-scale fisheries can make to poverty alleviation and food security and make practical suggestions on ways that this contribution can be maximized.
Abstract: The objectives of this Technical Paper are to highlight the contribution that inland and coastal small-scale fisheries can make to poverty alleviation and food security and to make practical suggestions on ways that this contribution can be maximized. This paper is organized into three main sections. The first section discusses the concepts of poverty, vulnerability and food security, and briefly outlines how these concepts have evolved in recent years within the field of fisheries (in line with the rest of the development literature). The second section reviews the actual and potential contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty alleviation and food security. It illustrates, through use of examples, the role that small-scale fisheries can play in economic growth at the national level and poverty alleviation and rural development at the local level.The third and main section of the document discusses ways of increasing the contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty alleviation and food security.
514 citations
470 citations
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Book•
01 Jan 1990TL;DR: Douglass C. North as discussed by the authors developed an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time.
Abstract: Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
27,080 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
Abstract: Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
26,011 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1990TL;DR: In this paper, an institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations is presented, along with a framework for analysis of selforganizing and selfgoverning CPRs.
Abstract: Preface 1. Reflections on the commons 2. An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations 3. Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized and self-governed CPRs 4. Analyzing institutional change 5. Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities 6. A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs Notes References Index.
16,852 citations
TL;DR: Evidence accumulated over the last twenty-two years indicates that private, state, andcommunal property are all potentially viable resource management options.
Abstract: Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons model predicts the eventual overexploitation or degradation of all resources used in common. Given this unambiguous prediction, a surprising number of cases exist in which users have been able to restrict access to the resource and establish rules among themselves for its sustainable use. To assess the evidence, we first define common-property resources and present a taxonomy of property-rights regimes in which such resources may be held. Evidence accumulated over the last twenty-two years indicates that private, state, andcommunal property are all potentially viable resource management options. A more complete theory than Hardin's should incorporate institutional arrangements and cultural factors to provide for better analysis and prediction.
1,249 citations
825 citations