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Journal ArticleDOI

Two Views About Explicitly Teaching Nature of Science

01 Sep 2013-Science Education (Springer Netherlands)-Vol. 22, Iss: 9, pp 2109-2139
TL;DR: The effects that dated ideas about the nature of science (NOS) have on curriculum, instruction and assessments have been examined in this article, with a focus on the effects of NOS characterizations away from general heuristic principles toward cogni- tive and social elements.
Abstract: Our focus is on the effects that dated ideas about the nature of science (NOS) have on curriculum, instruction and assessments. First we examine historical developments in teaching about NOS, beginning with the seminal ideas of James Conant. Next we provide an overview of recent developments in philosophy and cognitive sciences that have shifted NOS characterizations away from general heuristic principles toward cogni- tive and social elements. Next, we analyze two alternative views regarding 'explicitly teaching' NOS in pre-college programs. Version 1 is grounded in teachers presenting 'Consensus-based Heuristic Principles' in science lessons and activities. Version 2 is grounded in learners experience of 'Building and Refining Model-Based Scientific Prac- tices' in critique and communication enactments that occur in longer immersion units and learning progressions. We argue that Version 2 is to be preferred over Version 1 because it develops the critical epistemic cognitive and social practices that scientists and science learners use when (1) developing and evaluating scientific evidence, explanations and knowledge and (2) critiquing and communicating scientific ideas and information; thereby promoting science literacy.
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the underlying model that the new Framework presents of science better represents contemporary understanding of nature of science as a social and cultural practice, and that adopting a framework of practices will enable better communication of meaning amongst professional science educators.
Abstract: This paper provides a rationale for the changes advocated by the Framework for K-12 Science Education and the Next Generation Science Standards. It provides an argument for why the model embedded in the Next Generation Science Standards is seen as an improvement. The Case made here is that the underlying model that the new Framework presents of science better represents contemporary understanding of nature of science as a social and cultural practice. Second, it argues that the adopting a framework of practices will enable better communication of meaning amongst professional science educators. This, in turn, will enable practice in the classroom to improve. Finally, the implications for teacher education are explored.

395 citations


Cites background from "Two Views About Explicitly Teaching..."

  • ...Developing students’ understanding of the epistemic basis of science—how we know what we know—requires students to study or engage in the common practices of science (Duschl & Grandy, 2013)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors highlight some of the recent debates on the topic and provide a rationale for a new direction in this area, by appealing to the theoretical grounding of arguments in science education on foundational fields like philosophy of science to ensure consistency with contemporary meta-accounts of science.
Abstract: The chapter sets out the agenda for the entire book. The primary aim is to illustrate the context for the articulation of how “Nature of Science” (NOS) can be conceptualized and subsequently applied in science education research, policy and practice. Considering the vast amount of research literature in science education on NOS, the intention is to highlight some of the recent debates on the topic and provide a rationale for a new direction in this area. The contribution to the NOS debate is made by appealing to the theoretical grounding of arguments in science education on foundational fields like philosophy of science to ensure consistency with contemporary meta-accounts of science. In other words, an evidence-based theoretical rationale is followed to illustrate what is meant by ‘science’. The implications of various investigations into different aspects of science (e.g. epistemic, cognitive and social aspects) are numerous for curriculum content, instructional approaches and learning outcomes. Even though the coverage is theoretical in nature, plenty of concrete examples are used to illustrate how the ideas might translate to the level of the classroom so that they are applicable and relevant for everyday science teachers and learners. Once the theoretical rationale for a new approach is built and unpacked, empirical validation of these ideas may follow in the work of other science educators, including the testing for the effectiveness of some of the proposed strategies.

267 citations

References
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Book
01 Jan 1962
TL;DR: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions as discussed by the authors is a seminal work in the history of science and philosophy of science, and it has been widely cited as a major source of inspiration for the present generation of scientists.
Abstract: A good book may have the power to change the way we see the world, but a great book actually becomes part of our daily consciousness, pervading our thinking to the point that we take it for granted, and we forget how provocative and challenging its ideas once were-and still are. "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" is that kind of book. When it was first published in 1962, it was a landmark event in the history and philosophy of science. And fifty years later, it still has many lessons to teach. With "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", Kuhn challenged long-standing linear notions of scientific progress, arguing that transformative ideas don't arise from the day-to-day, gradual process of experimentation and data accumulation, but that revolutions in science, those breakthrough moments that disrupt accepted thinking and offer unanticipated ideas, occur outside of "normal science," as he called it. Though Kuhn was writing when physics ruled the sciences, his ideas on how scientific revolutions bring order to the anomalies that amass over time in research experiments are still instructive in our biotech age. This new edition of Kuhn's essential work in the history of science includes an insightful introductory essay by Ian Hacking that clarifies terms popularized by Kuhn, including paradigm and incommensurability, and applies Kuhn's ideas to the science of today. Usefully keyed to the separate sections of the book, Hacking's essay provides important background information as well as a contemporary context. Newly designed, with an expanded index, this edition will be eagerly welcomed by the next generation of readers seeking to understand the history of our perspectives on science.

36,808 citations

MonographDOI
01 Jan 1996

6,168 citations


"Two Views About Explicitly Teaching..." refers background in this paper

  • ...Kuhn’s (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 2nd Edition represents a turning point....

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  • ...…models of science (Giere 1988; Goldman 1986; Kitcher 1993; Thagard 1992) coupled with sociocultural characterizations of science (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Kuhn 1970; Longino 1990, 2002) have established the importance that models and modeling, visual representations, knowledge exchange mechanisms and…...

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  • ...…cognitive models of science (Giere 1988; Goldman 1986; Kitcher 1993; Thagard 1992) coupled with sociocultural models of science (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Kuhn 1970; Longino 1990, 2002) have established the importance that models and modeling, visual representations, knowledge exchange mechanisms and…...

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  • ...With respect to the scientific disciplines, cognitive models of science (Giere 1988; Goldman 1986; Kitcher 1993; Thagard 1992) coupled with sociocultural characterizations of science (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Kuhn 1970; Longino 1990, 2002) have established the importance that models and modeling, visual representations, knowledge...

    [...]

  • ...With respect to the scientific disciplines, cognitive models of science (Giere 1988; Goldman 1986; Kitcher 1993; Thagard 1992) coupled with sociocultural models of science (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Kuhn 1970; Longino 1990, 2002) have established the importance that models and modeling, visual representations, knowledge exchange mechanisms and peer interactions have in the advancement and refinement of knowledge....

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Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1976
TL;DR: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge, proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses as discussed by the authors. But the notion of proven knowledge was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics.
Abstract: For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge — proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do — to the ideal of’probable truth’1 or — as some sociologists of knowledge do — to ‘truth by [changing] consensus’.2

4,969 citations


"Two Views About Explicitly Teaching..." refers methods in this paper

  • ...On one side of the debate, and the basis for Version 1 presented below, is the position that NOS should be benchmarked using domain-general, consensus-based aspects of NOS and taught through explicit references to a set of heuristic principles(1) that philosophers and historians of science use to characterize science as a way of knowing (c.f., Holton 1978; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977)....

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  • ...…that NOS should be benchmarked using domain-general, consensus-based aspects of NOS and taught through explicit references to a set of heuristic principles1 that philosophers and historians of science use to characterize science as a way of knowing (c.f., Holton 1978; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977)....

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