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Journal Article•DOI•

Utilizing Secondary Sanctions to Curtail the Financing of the Islamic State

Jimmy Gurule
01 Jan 2017-Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Georgetown University Press)-Vol. 18, Iss: 1, pp 36-42
TL;DR: In this paper, secondary sanctions may serve as a useful tool to limit the monetary resources of the Islamic State, and they have been shown to be effective in limiting the monetary resource of the group.
Abstract: As the modern world faces an increasing terrorist threat, international institutions and individual nations must work to create legislation that combats emerging forms of terrorist financing and money laundering. Though their use is limited, secondary sanctions may serve as a useful tool to limit the monetary resources of the Islamic State.

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Citations
More filters
Posted Content•
Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions

[...]

Jeffrey A. Meyer1, Jeffrey A. Meyer2•
Yale University1, Quinnipiac University2
30 Mar 2009-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the legality of secondary sanctions under customary principles of international jurisdiction law and suggest that a wide range of such measures are permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on "terrinational" grounds - on the combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction.
Abstract: This Article explores the legality of so-called "secondary sanctions" under customary principles of international jurisdiction law. Ordinarily, when the United States imposes economic sanctions, it imposes primary sanctions only - to restrict its own companies and citizens (or other people who are in the United States) from doing business with a rogue regime, terrorist group, or other international pariah. Secondary sanctions, such as secondary trade boycotts and foreign company divestment, involve additional economic restrictions designed to inhibit non-US citizens and companies abroad from doing business with a target of primary US sanctions. Secondary sanctions have proved highly controversial, in part because of broad claims that they are illegally "extraterritorial" in purpose and effect. This Article challenges the conventional view. It suggests that a wide range of secondary sanctions measures are permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on "terrinational" grounds - on the combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction. Secondary sanctions may seldom be wise as a matter of policy, but when primary sanctions fail, secondary sanctions may be a last alternative to the use of military force. Because the use of secondary sanctions has been complicated by lack of clarity about their legality, terrinational forms of secondary sanctions should be considered as an alternative to other more legally controversial forms of secondary sanctions.

20 citations

Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches [April 10, 2015]

[...]

Carla E. Humud, Robert L. Pirog, Liana W. Rosen
10 Apr 2015
Abstract: This report discusses the U.S. policy approaches for countering the financial resources of the Islamic State, which has seized significant territory in Iraq and Syria and threatened to conduct attacks against the United States and its citizens.

10 citations

References
More filters
The ISIS Twitter census: defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter

[...]

J.M. Berger, Jonathon Morgan
07 Mar 2015
TL;DR: A demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter is presented by analysing a sample of 20,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts, mapping the locations, preferred languages, and the number and type of followers of these accounts.
Abstract: Presents a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter by analysing a sample of 20,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts, mapping the locations, preferred languages, and the number and type of followers of these accounts. Overview Although much ink has been spilled on ISIS’s activity on Twitter, very basic questions about the group’s social media strategy remain unanswered. In a new analysis paper, J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan answer fundamental questions about how many Twitter users support ISIS, who and where they are, and how they participate in its highly organized online activities. Previous analyses of ISIS’s Twitter reach have relied on limited segments of the overall ISIS social network. The small, cellular nature of that network—and the focus on particular subsets within the network such as foreign fighters—may create misleading conclusions. This information vacuum extends to discussions of how the West should respond to the group’s online campaigns. Berger and Morgan present a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter by analyzing a sample of 20,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter accounts. Using a sophisticated and innovative methodology, the authors map the locations, preferred languages, and the number and type of followers of these accounts. Among the key findings: From September through December 2014, the authors estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization’s territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded. Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic. ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users. A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended by Twitter between September and December 2014. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended. Much of ISIS’s social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume. Based on their key findings, the authors recommend social media companies and the U.S government work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media, Berger and Morgan contend, are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the broad range of community, private, and public stakeholders.

239 citations

"Utilizing Secondary Sanctions to Cu..." refers background in this paper

  • ...It obtains the vast majority of its revenue from (1) oil and gas sales, (2) extortion and taxation, (3) kidnapping for ransom, (4) looting banks, (5) selling stolen antiquities, and (6) human trafficking— that is, selling young girls and women as sex slaves....

    [...]

Posted Content•
Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions

[...]

Jeffrey A. Meyer1, Jeffrey A. Meyer2•
Yale University1, Quinnipiac University2
30 Mar 2009-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the legality of secondary sanctions under customary principles of international jurisdiction law and suggest that a wide range of such measures are permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on "terrinational" grounds - on the combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction.
Abstract: This Article explores the legality of so-called "secondary sanctions" under customary principles of international jurisdiction law. Ordinarily, when the United States imposes economic sanctions, it imposes primary sanctions only - to restrict its own companies and citizens (or other people who are in the United States) from doing business with a rogue regime, terrorist group, or other international pariah. Secondary sanctions, such as secondary trade boycotts and foreign company divestment, involve additional economic restrictions designed to inhibit non-US citizens and companies abroad from doing business with a target of primary US sanctions. Secondary sanctions have proved highly controversial, in part because of broad claims that they are illegally "extraterritorial" in purpose and effect. This Article challenges the conventional view. It suggests that a wide range of secondary sanctions measures are permissible if tailored to regulate exclusively on "terrinational" grounds - on the combined basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction. Secondary sanctions may seldom be wise as a matter of policy, but when primary sanctions fail, secondary sanctions may be a last alternative to the use of military force. Because the use of secondary sanctions has been complicated by lack of clarity about their legality, terrinational forms of secondary sanctions should be considered as an alternative to other more legally controversial forms of secondary sanctions.

20 citations

Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches [April 10, 2015]

[...]

Carla E. Humud, Robert L. Pirog, Liana W. Rosen
10 Apr 2015
Abstract: This report discusses the U.S. policy approaches for countering the financial resources of the Islamic State, which has seized significant territory in Iraq and Syria and threatened to conduct attacks against the United States and its citizens.

10 citations

Islamic State Financing and U.S. Policy Approaches

[...]

Carla E. Humud, Robert L. Pirog, Liana W. Rosen
10 Apr 2015
TL;DR: The authors discusses the U.S. policy approaches for countering the financial resources of the Islamic State, which has seized significant territory in Iraq and Syria and threatened to conduct attacks against the United States and its citizens.
Abstract: This report discusses the U.S. policy approaches for countering the financial resources of the Islamic State, which has seized significant territory in Iraq and Syria and threatened to conduct attacks against the United States and its citizens.

3 citations

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