Book•
Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
01 Jan 2002-
TL;DR: In this paper, Veto players analysis of European Union Institutions is presented, focusing on the role of individual veto players and collective players in the analysis of the institutions of the European Union.
Abstract: List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309
Citations
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TL;DR: The authors argue that a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy, which is an essential element of even the 'thinnest' theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU.
Abstract: Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik have argued that the EU does not suffer a ‘democratic deficit’. We disagree about one key element: whether a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy. This aspect is an essential element of even the ‘thinnest’ theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU.
1,254 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2006TL;DR: The politics of vote-buying and the game of electoral transitions are discussed in this article, where the authors focus on the structural determinants of mass support and the electoral fraud.
Abstract: 1. Equilibrium party hegemony 2. Structural determinants of mass support 3. Budget cycles under autocracy 4. The politics of vote-buying 5. Judging economic performance in hard times 6. Ideological divisions in the opposition camp 7. How voters choose and mass coordination dilemmas 8. Electoral fraud and the game of electoral transitions 9. Conclusion.
1,227 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs, are discussed.
Abstract: In the process of the EU's eastern enlargement, the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have undergone a major process of external governance. What are the main characteristics of the mode of EU external governance in this region, and under which conditions is it most effective for the transfer of EU rules to the CEECs? The article presents the findings of a collaborative international research project including comparative case studies of EU rule transfer in a great variety of policy areas and CEECs. They show that rule transfer is best explained by an external incentives model of governance; its effectiveness varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of rule adoption. The impact of these conditions, however, depends on two contexts of conditionality: democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality.
1,038 citations
Book•
12 Sep 2005TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890 and present a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions.
Abstract: Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
873 citations
TL;DR: This article investigated the mechanisms through which leaders affect growth and found that autocrats affect growth directly, through fiscal and monetary policy, and also influence political institutions that, in turn, appear to affect growth.
Abstract: Economic growth within countries varies sharply across decades. This paper examines one explanation for these sustained shifts in growth - changes in the national leader. We use deaths of leaders while in office as a source of exogenous variation in leadership, and ask whether these randomly-timed leadership transitions are associated with shifts in country growth rates. We find robust evidence that leaders matter, particularly in autocratic settings. Moreover, the death of autocrats appears to lead towards improvements in growth. We investigate the mechanisms through which leaders affect growth and find that autocrats affect growth directly, through fiscal and monetary policy. Autocrats also influence political institutions that, in turn, appear to affect growth. In particular, we find that small movements toward democracy following the death of an autocrat appear to improve growth, while dramatic democratizations are associated with reductions in growth. The results suggest that individual leaders can play crucial roles in shaping the growth of nations.
813 citations
Cites background from "Veto Players: How Political Institu..."
...More broadly, the presence of many “veto players,” either constitutionally based institutions or opposing political parties, may severely constrain the action space of leaders and policy outcomes [Tsebelis 2002]....
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References
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TL;DR: In this article, a parameter covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic is presented, which does not depend on a formal model of the structure of the heteroSkewedness.
Abstract: This paper presents a parameter covariance matrix estimator which is consistent even when the disturbances of a linear regression model are heteroskedastic. This estimator does not depend on a formal model of the structure of the heteroskedasticity. By comparing the elements of the new estimator to those of the usual covariance estimator, one obtains a direct test for heteroskedasticity, since in the absence of heteroskedasticity, the two estimators will be approximately equal, but will generally diverge otherwise. The test has an appealing least squares interpretation.
25,689 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1957
TL;DR: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout as discussed by the authors, particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote.
Abstract: Downs presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work on voting and turnout. Particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should almost never bother to vote. This conclusion, especially as elaborated on by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) has shifted the attention of modern political scientists from explaining why people don't vote to explaining why they do.
14,677 citations
TL;DR: The authors show that the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures, and restate the assumptions made by Musgrave and Samuelson and the central problems with which they deal.
Abstract: NE of the most important recent developments in the area of "applied economic theory" has been the work of Musgrave and Samuelson in public finance theory.2 The two writers agree on what is probably the major point under investigation, namely, that no "market type" solution exists to determine the level of expenditures on public goods. Seemingly, we are faced with the problem of having a rather large portion of our national income allocated in a "non-optimal" way when compared with the private sector. This discussion will show that the Musgrave-Samuelson analysis, which is valid for federal expenditures, need not apply to local expenditures. The plan of the discussion is first to restate the assumptions made by Musgrave and Samuelson and the central problems with which they deal. After looking at a key difference between the federal versus local cases, I shall present a simple model. This model yields a solution for the level of expenditures for local public goods which reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level. The assumptions of the model will then be relaxed to see what implications are involved. Finally, policy considerations will be discussed.
12,105 citations
"Veto Players: How Political Institu..." refers background in this paper
...Second, Tiebout (1956) focused on the effects of competition among jurisdictions since people can “vote with their feet” and argued that federalism provides people with the choice among different menus of public goods....
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...First, they include capital mobility since countries may be forced to lower their tax rate to prevent capital flight as capital becomes more mobile (Tiebout 1956)....
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...However, empirical analyses of economic performance of federal systems seriously questions the conclusions of economic analyses (at least of the first generation: Hayeck(1939), Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972))....
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...For example, all federal countries involve constituent units which compete with each other for the attraction of citizens (Tiebout 1956)....
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...In terms of the direction of potential differences, on the one hand scholars like Tiebout (1956), Buchanan (1950), Oates (1972) and Weingast (1995) have described economic benefits of decentralization....
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Book•
01 Jan 1951TL;DR: Saari as mentioned in this paper introduced Arrow's Theorem and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science, and introduced a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, introducing Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
Abstract: Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers. "Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem,' has changed the way we think."-Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected
8,219 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that discretionary policy does not result in the social objective function being maximized, and that there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.
Abstract: Even if there is an agreed-upon, fixed social objective function and policymakers know the timing and magnitude of the effects of their actions, discretionary policy, namely, the selection of that decision which is best, given the current situation and a correct evaluation of the end-of-period position, does not result in the social objective function being maximized. The reason for this apparent paradox is that economic planning is not a game against nature but, rather, a game against rational economic agents. We conclude that there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.
7,652 citations
"Veto Players: How Political Institu..." refers background in this paper
...While Weaver and Rockman are interested in the capabilities of governments, a great volume of economic literature starting with Kydland and Prescott (1977) is concerned with the credible commitment of the government not to interfere with the economy....
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