Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India.
About: This article is published in Nations and Nationalism.The article was published on 2006-01-01. It has received 442 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Electoral geography & Competition (economics).
Citations
More filters
TL;DR: The authors show that states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict, such as armed rebellions, infighting, and seceding from the United States.
Abstract: Quantitative scholarship on civil wars has long debated whether ethnic diversity breeds armed conflict. We go beyond this debate and show that highly diverse societies are not more conflict prone. Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. We test these hypotheses for all independent states since 1945 using the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. Cross-national analysis demonstrates that ethnic politics is as powerful and robust in predicting civil wars as is a country s level of economic development. Using multinomial logit regression, we show that rebellion, infighting, and secession result from high degrees of exclusion, segmentation, and incohesi?n, respectively. More diverse states, on the other hand, are not more likely to suffer from violent conflict.
729 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence for a link between war, violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and victims of violence, and use this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political behavior.
Abstract: What is the political legacy of violent conflict? This paper presents evidence for a link between war, violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and victims of violence, and uses this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political behavior. The setting is northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment methods generated quasi-experimental variation in who became a rebel conscript and who did not. Original survey data shows that the exogenous element of conscription (by abduction) leads to significantly greater political participation later in life. The principal determinant of this increased political participation, moreover, appears to be war violence experienced. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect multiple non-political types of community participation. I show that these patterns are not easily explained by models of participation based on simple rational preferences, social preferences, mobilization by elites, or information availability. Only 'expressive' theories of participation appear consistent with the patterns observed, whereby exposure to violence augments the value a person places on the act of political expression itself. The implications for general theories of political participation are discussed.
597 citations
Cites background from "Votes and Violence: Electoral Compe..."
...In the burgeoning conflict literature, however, the impact of voting on violence receives more attention than the reverse (Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004)....
[...]
Abstract: This article draws on data from over 35,000 respondents in 22 public opinion surveys in 10 countries and finds strong evidence that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition. In particular, for every month closer their country is to a competitive presidential election, survey respondents are 1.8 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms. Using an innovative multinomial logit empirical methodology, we find that these shifts are accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the salience of occupational and class identities. Our findings lend support to situational theories of social identification and are consistent with the view that ethnic identities matter in Africa for instrumental reasons: because they are useful in the competition for political power.
507 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists.
Abstract: ▪ Abstract Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification—and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic st...
500 citations
Cites background from "Votes and Violence: Electoral Compe..."
...There remain only some quibbles on the margin about whether “castes” should be excluded (e.g. Fearon 2003) or retained (e.g. Atlas Narodov Mira 1964, Varshney 2001, Chandra 2004, Wilkinson 2004, Sambanis 2004, Htun 2004, Posner 2005) and whether “region” and “clan” should be included in the list ....
[...]
...Much of the recent theoretical literature on ethnic politics explicitly follows this umbrella classification (e.g. Varshney 2001, Chandra 2004, Wilkinson 2004, Htun 2004, Posner 2005)....
[...]
TL;DR: In this article, a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000 shows that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to participate in government, but it also encourages the growth of regional parties.
Abstract: Political decentralization is widely believed to reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism in the world today. Yet decentralization is more successful in reducing conflict and secessionism in some countries than in others. In this article, I explore why this difference occurs. I demonstrate using a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000 that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to participate in government, but that decentralization increases ethnic conflict and secessionism indirectly by encouraging the growth of regional parties. Regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.Earlier versions of this article were presented at Harvard University and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. The author would like to thank Sandra Alfonso-Leon, James Alt, Micah Altman, Barry Friedman, Shigeo Hirano, Simon Hug, Gary King, Rose Rozaghian, Tulia Falleti, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
480 citations
References
More filters
TL;DR: The authors show that states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict, such as armed rebellions, infighting, and seceding from the United States.
Abstract: Quantitative scholarship on civil wars has long debated whether ethnic diversity breeds armed conflict. We go beyond this debate and show that highly diverse societies are not more conflict prone. Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts. We test these hypotheses for all independent states since 1945 using the new Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set. Cross-national analysis demonstrates that ethnic politics is as powerful and robust in predicting civil wars as is a country s level of economic development. Using multinomial logit regression, we show that rebellion, infighting, and secession result from high degrees of exclusion, segmentation, and incohesi?n, respectively. More diverse states, on the other hand, are not more likely to suffer from violent conflict.
729 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence for a link between war, violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and victims of violence, and use this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political behavior.
Abstract: What is the political legacy of violent conflict? This paper presents evidence for a link between war, violence and increased individual political participation and leadership among former combatants and victims of violence, and uses this link to understand the deeper determinants of individual political behavior. The setting is northern Uganda, where rebel recruitment methods generated quasi-experimental variation in who became a rebel conscript and who did not. Original survey data shows that the exogenous element of conscription (by abduction) leads to significantly greater political participation later in life. The principal determinant of this increased political participation, moreover, appears to be war violence experienced. Meanwhile, abduction and violence do not appear to affect multiple non-political types of community participation. I show that these patterns are not easily explained by models of participation based on simple rational preferences, social preferences, mobilization by elites, or information availability. Only 'expressive' theories of participation appear consistent with the patterns observed, whereby exposure to violence augments the value a person places on the act of political expression itself. The implications for general theories of political participation are discussed.
597 citations
Abstract: This article draws on data from over 35,000 respondents in 22 public opinion surveys in 10 countries and finds strong evidence that ethnic identities in Africa are strengthened by exposure to political competition. In particular, for every month closer their country is to a competitive presidential election, survey respondents are 1.8 percentage points more likely to identify in ethnic terms. Using an innovative multinomial logit empirical methodology, we find that these shifts are accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the salience of occupational and class identities. Our findings lend support to situational theories of social identification and are consistent with the view that ethnic identities matter in Africa for instrumental reasons: because they are useful in the competition for political power.
507 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists.
Abstract: ▪ Abstract Since the publication of Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification—and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications. I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists. These outcomes include violence, democratic st...
500 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000 shows that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to participate in government, but it also encourages the growth of regional parties.
Abstract: Political decentralization is widely believed to reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism in the world today. Yet decentralization is more successful in reducing conflict and secessionism in some countries than in others. In this article, I explore why this difference occurs. I demonstrate using a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000 that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to participate in government, but that decentralization increases ethnic conflict and secessionism indirectly by encouraging the growth of regional parties. Regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.Earlier versions of this article were presented at Harvard University and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. The author would like to thank Sandra Alfonso-Leon, James Alt, Micah Altman, Barry Friedman, Shigeo Hirano, Simon Hug, Gary King, Rose Rozaghian, Tulia Falleti, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
480 citations