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Journal ArticleDOI

Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information

01 Sep 1997-Econometrica (Wiley-Blackwell)-Vol. 65, Iss: 5, pp 1029-1058
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters and showed that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity.
Abstract: We analyze two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. Each voter has noisy private information about the state variable. We show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. Nevertheless, elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge. Equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule, i.e., if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election, then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one. Finally, if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain, then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived

948 citations


Cites background from "Voting behavior and information agg..."

  • ...Sub- 1 But see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1995 and Myerson 1994 for large population results. sequently, we consider two extensions of the basic model to explore the robustness of the main result (i.e., that sincere voting by all individuals cannot generally be both informative and rational) to…...

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Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them in equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture.
Abstract: It is widely recognized that active media can play a role in enhancing political competition by informing voters Collusion between government and media can, however, undermine this role We extend the political accountability model to include the presence of media outlets and the possibility that the incumbent exerts influence over them In equilibrium, the media structure is linked to political outcomes in two ways: directly through its monitoring capacity and indirectly through political capture We examine evidence both across countries and within India

796 citations


Cites background from "Voting behavior and information agg..."

  • ...If only a fraction of voters were informed, jury theorems such as Feddersen and Pesendorfer [11] would guarantee that that fraction is pivotal in the election....

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Posted Content
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.
Abstract: The authors analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. They demonstrate the existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless. The swing voter's curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

793 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a voting model to investigate the effects of radio on government policies and found that U.S. counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds.
Abstract: If informed voters receive favorable policies, then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not. These ideas are developed in a voting model. The model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major New Deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio. The main empirical finding is that U. S. counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds. More funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment, but controlling for these and other variables, the effects of radio are large and highly significant.

749 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order, and the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model.
Abstract: A new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order. Expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits. If these programs are valuable, a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised. We argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century Britain is consistent with our model. I. INTRODUCTION At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in most countries, narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs. Even in England, where parliament was an influential institution, suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy, and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters, while cities such as Manchester did not have any representative. A century later, most western countries had universal male suffrage, with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter. What brought about this “democratic revolution?” In many cases, the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions. However, there are important examples, such as England, where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage, and these were accompanied by little overt violence. “It is the peculiar pride of England that [the record of social and political reform] is to be found on the statute book, not in the annals of revolution” [Cheyney 1931, p. vii]. Such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political-economic models. In those models, extending the franchise dilutes the elite’s power to influence policy and results

690 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
Abstract: : In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.

3,857 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a fully-specified equilibrium framework for analyzing a number of proposals for mitigating electoral cycles in fiscal policy, in which a political budget cycle arises via a multidimensional signaling process.
Abstract: Prior to elections, governments (at all levels) frequently undertake a consumption binge. Taxes are cut, transfers are raised, and government spending is distorted towards highly visible items. The "political business cycle" (better be thought of as "the political budget cycle") has been intensively examined, at least for the case of national elections. A number of proposals have been advanced for mitigating electoral cycles in fiscal policy. The present paper is the first effort to provide a fully-specified equilibrium framework for analyzing such proposals. A political budget cycle arises here via a multidimensional signaling process, in which incumbent leaders try to convince voters that they have recently been doing an excellent job in administering the government. Efforts to mitigate the cycle can easily prove counterproductive, either by impeding the transmission of information or by inducing politicians to select more costly ways of signaling. The model also indicates new directions for empirical research.

1,772 citations

ReportDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an equilibrium theory for the political budget cycle is proposed, and the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure are considered.
Abstract: Political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia. This paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models, though with significant refinements. The "political budget cycle" emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation; it arises via a multidimensional signal process. One can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

1,427 citations

Book
01 Jan 1995
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed an integrated approach to understand the American economy and national elections, and they argued that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections.
Abstract: This book develops an integrated approach to understanding the American economy and national elections. Economic policy is generally seen as the result of a compromise between the President and Congress. Because Democrats and Republicans usually maintain polarised preferences on policy, middle-of-the-road voters seek to balance the President by reinforcing in Congress the party not holding the White House. This balancing leads, always, to relatively moderate policies and, frequently, to divided government. The authors outline the rational partisan business cycle, where Republican administrations begin with recessions, and Democratic ones with expansions, and the midterm cycle, where the President's party loses votes in the midterm congressional election. The book argues that both cycles are the result of uncertainty about the outcome of presidential elections. Other topics covered include retrospective voting on the economy, coat-tails, and incumbency advantage.

967 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred Most extant proofs of this theorem implicitly make the behavioral assumption that individuals vote "sincerely" in the collective decision making, a seemingly innocuous assumption, given that individuals are taken to possess a common preference for selecting the better alternative However, in the model analyzed here we find that sincere behavior by all individuals is not rational even when individuals have such a common preference In particular, sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably "do better" than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived

948 citations


"Voting behavior and information agg..." refers background in this paper

  • ...See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Myerson (1994b), and Klevorick et al. (1984) for exceptions to the assumption of naive voting....

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  • ...6Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1995)....

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  • ...See also Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Myerson (1994) for a discussion of strategic voting and Jury theorems....

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