What Factors Drive Global Stock Returns
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that a multifactor model that includes factor-mimicking portfolios based on momentum and cash flow-to-price captures significant time-series variation in global stock returns, and has lower pricing errors and fewer model rejections than the global CAPM or a popular model that uses size and book to market factors.
Abstract: Using monthly returns for over 27,000 stocks from 49 countries over a three-decade period, we show that a multifactor model that includes factor-mimicking portfolios based on momentum and cash flow-to-price captures significant time-series variation in global stock returns, and has lower pricing errors and fewer model rejections than the global CAPM or a popular model that uses size and book-to-market factors. We find reliable evidence that the global cash flow-to-price factor is related to a covariance risk model. In contrast, we reject the covariance risk model in favor of a characteristic model for size and book-to-market factors. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.
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TL;DR: In this paper, empirical asset pricing models capture the value and momentum patterns in international average returns and whether asset pricing seems to be integrated across the four regions (North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific).
1,700 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a five-factor model that adds profitability and investment factors to the three factor model of Fama and French (1993) largely absorbs the patterns in average returns is proposed.
414 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether the geographic proximity of information disseminated by the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak events combined with intense media coverage affected stock prices in the U.S. and found that the Ebola outbreak event effect is strongest for the stocks of companies with exposure of their operations to the West African countries (WAC) and the United States.
251 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that people revise their beliefs about climate change upward when experiencing warmer than usual temperatures in their area and that stocks of carbon-intensive firms underperform firms with low carbon emissions in abnormally warm weather.
Abstract: We find that people revise their beliefs about climate change upward when experiencing warmer than usual temperatures in their area. Using international data, we show that attention to climate change, as proxied by Google search volume, increases when the local temperature is abnormally high. In financial markets, stocks of carbon-intensive firms underperform firms with low carbon emissions in abnormally warm weather. Retail investors (not institutional investors) sell carbon-intensive firms in such weather, and return patterns are unlikely to be driven by changes in fundamentals. Our study sheds light on peoples’ collective beliefs and actions about global warming.
249 citations
TL;DR: The authors studied whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries, finding that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance.
Abstract: We study whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008–2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries. We find that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance. Further, we find that within family groups liquidity shocks are passed on through investment cuts across the group. Our evidence is consistent with families taking actions to increase the likelihood that the firms under their control and their control benefits survive the crisis, at the expense of outside shareholders.
233 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify five common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds, including three stock-market factors: an overall market factor and factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity.
24,874 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Bhandari et al. found that the relationship between market/3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable, and when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size.
Abstract: Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market 3, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in 3 that is unrelated to size, the relation between market /3 and average return is flat, even when 3 is the only explanatory variable. THE ASSET-PRICING MODEL OF Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Black (1972) has long shaped the way academics and practitioners think about average returns and risk. The central prediction of the model is that the market portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1959). The efficiency of the market portfolio implies that (a) expected returns on securities are a positive linear function of their market O3s (the slope in the regression of a security's return on the market's return), and (b) market O3s suffice to describe the cross-section of expected returns. There are several empirical contradictions of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) model. The most prominent is the size effect of Banz (1981). He finds that market equity, ME (a stock's price times shares outstanding), adds to the explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by market Os. Average returns on small (low ME) stocks are too high given their f estimates, and average returns on large stocks are too low. Another contradiction of the SLB model is the positive relation between leverage and average return documented by Bhandari (1988). It is plausible that leverage is associated with risk and expected return, but in the SLB model, leverage risk should be captured by market S. Bhandari finds, howev er, that leverage helps explain the cross-section of average stock returns in tests that include size (ME) as well as A. Stattman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) find that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm's book value of common equity, BE, to its market value, ME. Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) find that book-to-market equity, BE/ME, also has a strong role in explaining the cross-section of average returns on Japanese stocks.
14,517 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between average return and risk for New York Stock Exchange common stocks was tested using a two-parameter portfolio model and models of market equilibrium derived from the two parameter portfolio model.
Abstract: This paper tests the relationship between average return and risk for New York Stock Exchange common stocks. The theoretical basis of the tests is the "two-parameter" portfolio model and models of market equilibrium derived from the two-parameter portfolio model. We cannot reject the hypothesis of these models that the pricing of common stocks reflects the attempts of risk-averse investors to hold portfolios that are "efficient" in terms of expected value and dispersion of return. Moreover, the observed "fair game" properties of the coefficients and residuals of the risk-return regressions are consistent with an "efficient capital market"--that is, a market where prices of securities
14,171 citations
TL;DR: Using a sample free of survivor bias, this paper showed that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual fund's mean and risk-adjusted returns.
Abstract: Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers PERSISTENCE IN MUTUAL FUND performance does not reflect superior stock-picking skill Rather, common factors in stock returns and persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund returns Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous Mutual fund persistence is well documented in the finance literature, but not well explained Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Wermers (1996) find evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance over short-term horizons of one to three years, and attribute the persistence to "hot hands" or common investment strategies Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (1996) document mutual fund return predictability over longer horizons of five to ten years, and attribute this to manager differential information or stock-picking talent Contrary evidence comes from Jensen (1969), who does not find that good subsequent performance follows good past performance Carhart (1992) shows that persistence in expense ratios drives much of the long-term persistence in mutual fund performance My analysis indicates that Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) one-year momentum in stock returns accounts for Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands effect in mutual fund performance However, funds that earn higher
13,218 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that strategies that buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that had performed poorly in past years generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods.
Abstract: This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented
10,806 citations