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When Does Gender Matter in Negotiation
01 Nov 2005-Research Papers in Economics (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government)-
TL;DR: In this article, structural ambiguity and gender triggers make negotiations ripe for gender effects, and they are discussed in terms of situational factors that make gender salient and relevant to behavior or expectations.
Abstract: We propose that two situational dimensions moderate gender effects in negotiation. Structural ambiguity refers to potential variation in a party’s perception of the bargaining range and appropriate standards for agreement. Gender triggers are situational factors that make gender salient and relevant to behavior or expectations. Based on a review of field and experimental data and social psychological theory on individual difference, we explain how structural ambiguity and gender triggers make negotiations ripe for gender effects.
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TL;DR: In this article, the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision-making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors.
Abstract: We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party?s gender is known to both actors We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender These findings are consistent with predictions from psychology Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed
143 citations
TL;DR: This article found that masculine stereotypes have a negative influence on both male and female Democratic candidates in good times, but only on the female Democratic candidate when the threat of terrorism is primed, while Republican candidates are unaffected by masculi...
Abstract: How does the threat of terrorism affect evaluations of female (vs. male) political leaders, and do these effects vary by the politician’s partisanship? Using two national surveys, we document a propensity for the U.S. public to prefer male Republican leadership the most in times of security threat, and female Democratic leadership the least. We theorize a causal process by which terrorist threat influences the effect of stereotypes on candidate evaluations conditional on politician partisanship. We test this framework with an original experiment:a nationally representative sample was presented with a mock election that varied the threat context and the gender and partisanship of the candidates. We find that masculine stereotypes have a negative influence on both male and female Democratic candidates in good times (thus reaffirming the primacy of party stereotypes), but only on the female Democratic candidate when terror threat is primed. Republican candidates—both male and female—are unaffected by masculi...
133 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that employed women are less satisfied with life in liberal communities where the gender wage gap is smaller and that norms regarding the appropriate relative pay of women compared to men are shaping gender differences in well-being.
Abstract: Women earn less than men but are not less satisfied with life. This paper explores whether norms regarding the appropriate pay for women compared to men may explain these findings. We find that the gender wage gap is smaller where a larger fraction of the citizenry has voted in favor of equal pay. We also find that employed women are less (not more) satisfied with life in liberal communities where the gender wage gap is smaller. These findings suggest that norms regarding the appropriate relative pay of women compared to men are shaping gender differences in well-being.
119 citations
Cites background from "When Does Gender Matter in Negotiat..."
...In fact, there is now substantial evidence that women ask for less than men, or do not ask at all in pay negotiations (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Riley and McGinn 2002; Säve-Söderbergh 2006; see also Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999 for a meta-analysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes)....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party's gender is known to both actors was studied.
Abstract: We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.
112 citations
Cites background from "When Does Gender Matter in Negotiat..."
...Given that structural ambiguity is expected to trigger gender differences in economic behavior (Bowles and McGinn, 2002), possible differences between field and laboratory studies may be traced back to this issue....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compared the objectives, results obtained and communication patterns used by men and women in 1159 purchasing role plays over a period of 18 years and found that female negotiators are more realistic and strive for mid-range objectives.
10 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors review studies conducted by themselves and coauthors that document a "self-serving" bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations.
Abstract: The authors review studies conducted by themselves and coauthors that document a 'self-serving' bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. They discuss experimental evidence showing that (1) the bias causes impasse; (2) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (3) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. The authors also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both document the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting and demonstrates its impact on strikes.
1,092 citations
TL;DR: Gender differences in bargaining are examined using the trust game introduced by Joyce Berg et al. as mentioned in this paper, where the proposer is given a choice of sending some, all, or none of his or her $10 experimental payment to an anonymous partner, the responder.
Abstract: Gender is rarely included as a factor in economic models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. Gender differences in bargaining are examined using the trust game introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). In this two-person game, the proposer is given a choice of sending some, all, or none of his or her $10 experimental payment to an anonymous partner, the responder. For US subjects, Berg et al. found that 30 of 32 proposers deviated from economic equilibrium and sent some money to their partners. In sending money, proposers are trusting that their partners will return some money to them. In addition, 24 out of 32 of responders who received money returned some. Gender differences in this game are discussed.
644 citations
TL;DR: This article found that negotiators' judgments of fair outcomes were biased in an egocentric direction, and that the magnitude of the parties' biases strongly predicted the length of strikes, and the role of situational complexity was examined.
472 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game and examine how behavior is affected by the gender of the players under these conditions, concluding that women will accept a smaller amount than men will.
Abstract: SARA J. SOLNICK [*] I explore the behavior of men and women in the ultimatum game. In one treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, players' gender is common knowledge. Average offers made do not differ based on the gender of player 1. Offers are affected by the gender of player 2, with men attracting higher offers, particularly from female players 1. Players 2 of both genders choose a higher minimum acceptable offer when facing a female player 1. These patterns led to substantial differences in earnings. Such striking differences in expectations and decisions could impact salary negotiations and other real-world transactions. (JEL C78, C92, J16) 1. INTRODUCTION The gender gap in wages has been a persistent feature of the labor market (Goldin, 1990). Women consistently earn less than men, even after controlling for a variety of human capital factors. Socialization before encountering the labor market may affect the divergent labor market outcomes of women and men (Corcoran and Courant, 1987). One contributing factor to women's lower wages that has not been explored may be different expectations and outcomes in bargaining. For many jobs, the market does not completely specify the wage. There is a "zone of indeterminacy," allowing the wage setter room to negotiate (Rees, 1993). In general, women may end up with a smaller share of the portion of wages that is up for grabs. Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found that male and female MBA students were equally likely to negotiate about their starting salaries. On average, men obtained increases of 4.3% over the initial offer, while women raised their salaries by only 2.7%. The differential negotiation outcomes accounted for 16% o f the male advantage in starting salary. Different abilities and expectations in bargaining can also affect the prices men and women pay as consumers when haggling is possible. In an experiment on discrimination in consumer-goods markets, testers were trained to bargain for new cars (Ayres, 1991, 1995; Ayres and Siegelman, 1995). Males received significantly lower initial offers and final prices after negotiating in a prescribed manner. Ayres attributed these results partly to factors specific to the car market, such as a lack of awareness by some groups that haggling over the price of a new car is expected. An alternative possibility is a widespread attitude among both women and men, perhaps based on decades of women's worse labor market experience, that women will be satisfied with less. Such an attitude could affect the wages offered to women whenever salary negotiation takes place. I search for differences in bargaining by men and women that may affect wages and other economic outcomes by exploring behavior in a stylized setting: the ultimatum game. The ultimatum game has been the basis for many experimental investigations (reviewed in Thaler [1988] and Roth [1995]). In the simplest form of the ultimatum game, one player proposes an allocation of a fixed sum of money. The second player may either accept the proposal, in which case the funds are divided accordingly, or reject it, in which case both receive nothing. [1] Outcomes rarely match what is expected from standard economic theory for the one-shot game, which indicates a token offer being made and accepted. The experiment reported in this paper involves two treatments of the ultimatum game. In each case I recorded the gender of the players. In the first treatment, players remain mutually anonymous. In the second treatment, the gender of the players is common knowledge. I examine how behavior is affected by the gender of the players under these conditions. I find that men and women both make lower offers to women and both men and women chose higher minimum acceptable offers when player 1 is a woman. Players 1 seem to believe that women will accept a smaller amount than men will. As a consequence of these patterns, men in the experiment earn more than women, with men paired with women gaining the most. …
405 citations
TL;DR: Meta-analytic review of research reports on the relationship between gender and competitive behavior in dyadic bargaining interactions suggested that constraints on negotiators (imposed by abstract bargaining paradigms and restrictions on communication) lessen gender differences in negotiation behavior.
343 citations