When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States
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Cites background from "When Islam and Democracy Meet: Musl..."
...Hijabis are likely to be stigmatized due to their affiliation with Muslims, a group that is often associated with negative stereotypes, attitudes, and perceptions (Cesari, 2004; Poynting and Mason, 2007; Sheridan, 2006)....
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117 citations
Cites background from "When Islam and Democracy Meet: Musl..."
...Such intersectional sensibilities are apparent in relation to gender and Muslim identity (Cesari, 2004; Haddad, 2006; Razack, 2008; Scott, 2007; Yamani, 1996), often centred around the question of how Muslim difference presents a challenge to both universal ideas of equality and identities within…...
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Cites background from "When Islam and Democracy Meet: Musl..."
...Cesari (2004) describes a ‘‘Bin Laden Effect’’ in Western societies after September 11, which has led to discrimination and even violence against Muslims. The ‘‘Bin Laden Effect,’’ according to Cesari, ‘‘consists mainly of casting all Muslims within the U.S. and Europe in the role of The Enemy, transforming them into scapegoats for the entire society’’ (p. 35). In this view, perceived security threats associated with Muslims by many in the majority population are leading to negative reactions against this minority community. Many scholars have attempted to advance our understanding of threat perception by identifying different types of threats and evaluating their relative impact on public opinion, as well as other dependent variables (Huddy et al., 2002; Davis & Silver, 2004; Gibson, 2004b). For example, in their study of arrest rates for African Americans in the U.S., Eitle and D’Alessio (2002) test three different threat perception hypotheses: the ‘‘political threat hypothesis,’’ the ‘‘economic threat hypothesis,’’ and the ‘‘black crime hypothesis,’’ and ultimately the authors conclude that only the black crime hypothesis can be supported, finding that arrest rates for African Americans are correlated with the amount of black-on-white crime in a given area, but not with the amount of black-on-black crime. Meanwhile, Stephen et al. (2002) distinguish between symbolic and realistic threats. Symbolic threats ‘‘involve perceived group differences in morals, values, standards, beliefs, and attitudes’’ and ‘‘jeopardize the worldview of the ingroup,’’ while realistic threats ‘‘refer to threats to the very existence of the ingroup (e.g., through warfare), threats to the political and economic power of the ingroup, and threats to the physical or material well-being of the ingroup’’ (p. 1243). Sniderman et al. (2004) find support for something akin to the symbolic threat hypothesis in their study of Dutch public opinion, discovering that perceived threats to Dutch culture lead to negative views of immigrant groups....
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...Cesari (2004) describes a ‘‘Bin Laden Effect’’ in Western societies after September 11, which has led to discrimination and even violence against Muslims. The ‘‘Bin Laden Effect,’’ according to Cesari, ‘‘consists mainly of casting all Muslims within the U.S. and Europe in the role of The Enemy, transforming them into scapegoats for the entire society’’ (p. 35). In this view, perceived security threats associated with Muslims by many in the majority population are leading to negative reactions against this minority community. Many scholars have attempted to advance our understanding of threat perception by identifying different types of threats and evaluating their relative impact on public opinion, as well as other dependent variables (Huddy et al., 2002; Davis & Silver, 2004; Gibson, 2004b). For example, in their study of arrest rates for African Americans in the U.S., Eitle and D’Alessio (2002) test three different threat perception hypotheses: the ‘‘political threat hypothesis,’’ the ‘‘economic threat hypothesis,’’ and the ‘‘black crime hypothesis,’’ and ultimately the authors conclude that only the black crime hypothesis can be supported, finding that arrest rates for African Americans are correlated with the amount of black-on-white crime in a given area, but not with the amount of black-on-black crime. Meanwhile, Stephen et al. (2002) distinguish between symbolic and realistic threats....
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...Corresponding author: Richard Wike; e-mail: rwike@pewresearch.org nloaded from https://academ ic.oup.com /ijpor/article-abstract/22/1/4/666575 by guest on 16 April 2019 demonstrated that few Muslims support Islamic extremism (Pew Global Attitudes, 2006, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2007), the threat posed by Al Qaeda and affiliated groups continues to generate apprehension in the U.S. and Europe, raising concerns about extremist groups abroad and the potential for violence committed by ‘‘sleeper cells’’ at home....
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...This study aims to add to our understanding of this topic by examining public opinion in five countries in which integration and assimilation of Muslim minorities, as well as broader tensions between Western and Muslim nations, have been major issues in recent years—Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and the U.S....
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...Over time, other studies have also found support for the link between religiosity and a lack of tolerance in the U.S. (Wilcox & Jalen, 1990; Wald, 1997)....
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References
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