Who Falls for Fake News? The Roles of Bullshit Receptivity, Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking
TL;DR: The results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims, which may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.
Abstract: Objective: Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news. Method: We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for three online surveys. Results: The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences – pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity – correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline’s source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news). Conclusion: Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open-mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.
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TL;DR: The authors found that people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks, and that the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them.
Abstract: Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories (“fake news”), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: (i) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their “most important” source; (ii) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; (iii) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and (iv) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.
3,959 citations
New York University1, University of Chicago2, Mackenzie Presbyterian University3, Middlesex University4, University of Kent5, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń6, Harvard University7, Yale University8, Stanford University9, Northwestern University10, University of Sussex11, Utrecht University12, University of California, San Diego13, University of Maryland, College Park14, McGovern Institute for Brain Research15, University of Queensland16, University of Michigan17, California Institute of Technology18, Lehigh University19, University of Regina20, University of Oregon21, Ohio State University22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology23, University of St Andrews24, University of Cambridge25, University of British Columbia26, University of Illinois at Chicago27, University of California, Berkeley28, Carleton University29, VU University Amsterdam30, Cornell University31
TL;DR: Evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics is discussed, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping.
Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic represents a massive global health crisis. Because the crisis requires large-scale behaviour change and places significant psychological burdens on individuals, insights from the social and behavioural sciences can be used to help align human behaviour with the recommendations of epidemiologists and public health experts. Here we discuss evidence from a selection of research topics relevant to pandemics, including work on navigating threats, social and cultural influences on behaviour, science communication, moral decision-making, leadership, and stress and coping. In each section, we note the nature and quality of prior research, including uncertainty and unsettled issues. We identify several insights for effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight important gaps researchers should move quickly to fill in the coming weeks and months.
3,223 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that cognitive reflection test performance is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy of fake news, and positively correlated with the ability to distinguish fake news from real news, even for headlines that align with individuals' political ideology.
Abstract: Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines (“fake news”)? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology? Here we test these competing accounts in two studies (total N = 3,446 Mechanical Turk workers) by using the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as a measure of the propensity to engage in analytical reasoning. We find that CRT performance is negatively correlated with the perceived accuracy of fake news, and positively correlated with the ability to discern fake news from real news – even for headlines that align with individuals’ political ideology. Moreover, overall discernment was actually better for ideologically aligned headlines than for misaligned headlines. Finally, a headline-level analysis finds that CRT is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively implausible (primarily fake) headlines, and positively correlated with perceived accuracy of relatively plausible (primarily real) headlines. In contrast, the correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy is unrelated to how closely the headline aligns with the participant’s ideology. Thus, we conclude that analytic thinking is used to assess the plausibility of headlines, regardless of whether the stories are consistent or inconsistent with one’s political ideology. Our findings therefore suggest that susceptibility to fake news is driven more by lazy thinking than it is by partisan bias per se – a finding that opens potential avenues for fighting fake news.
635 citations
TL;DR: This article found that even a single exposure to fake news headlines increases subsequent perceptions of accuracy, both within the same session and after a week, despite a low level of overall believability and even when the stories are labeled as contested by fact checkers or are inconsistent with the reader's political ideology.
Abstract: The 2016 U.S. presidential election brought considerable attention to the phenomenon of "fake news": entirely fabricated and often partisan content that is presented as factual. Here we demonstrate one mechanism that contributes to the believability of fake news: fluency via prior exposure. Using actual fake-news headlines presented as they were seen on Facebook, we show that even a single exposure increases subsequent perceptions of accuracy, both within the same session and after a week. Moreover, this "illusory truth effect" for fake-news headlines occurs despite a low level of overall believability and even when the stories are labeled as contested by fact checkers or are inconsistent with the reader's political ideology. These results suggest that social media platforms help to incubate belief in blatantly false news stories and that tagging such stories as disputed is not an effective solution to this problem. It is interesting, however, that we also found that prior exposure does not impact entirely implausible statements (e.g., "The earth is a perfect square"). These observations indicate that although extreme implausibility is a boundary condition of the illusory truth effect, only a small degree of potential plausibility is sufficient for repetition to increase perceived accuracy. As a consequence, the scope and impact of repetition on beliefs is greater than has been previously assumed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).
486 citations
TL;DR: It is found that laypeople—on average—are quite good at distinguishing between lower- and higher-quality sources, and having algorithms up-rank content from trusted media outlets may be a promising approach for fighting the spread of misinformation on social media.
Abstract: Reducing the spread of misinformation, especially on social media, is a major challenge. We investigate one potential approach: having social media platform algorithms preferentially display content from news sources that users rate as trustworthy. To do so, we ask whether crowdsourced trust ratings can effectively differentiate more versus less reliable sources. We ran two preregistered experiments (n = 1,010 from Mechanical Turk and n = 970 from Lucid) where individuals rated familiarity with, and trust in, 60 news sources from three categories: (i) mainstream media outlets, (ii) hyperpartisan websites, and (iii) websites that produce blatantly false content (“fake news”). Despite substantial partisan differences, we find that laypeople across the political spectrum rated mainstream sources as far more trustworthy than either hyperpartisan or fake news sources. Although this difference was larger for Democrats than Republicans—mostly due to distrust of mainstream sources by Republicans—every mainstream source (with one exception) was rated as more trustworthy than every hyperpartisan or fake news source across both studies when equally weighting ratings of Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, politically balanced layperson ratings were strongly correlated (r = 0.90) with ratings provided by professional fact-checkers. We also found that, particularly among liberals, individuals higher in cognitive reflection were better able to discern between low- and high-quality sources. Finally, we found that excluding ratings from participants who were not familiar with a given news source dramatically reduced the effectiveness of the crowd. Our findings indicate that having algorithms up-rank content from trusted media outlets may be a promising approach for fighting the spread of misinformation on social media.
421 citations
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01 Jan 2011TL;DR: Buku terlaris New York Times and The Economist tahun 2012 as mentioned in this paper, and dipilih oleh The NewYork Times Book Review sebagai salah satu dari sepuluh buku terbaik tahune 2011, Berpikir, Cepat and Lambat ditakdirkan menjadi klasik.
Abstract: Buku terlaris New York Times
Pemenang Penghargaan Buku Terbaik Akademi Sains Nasional pada tahun 2012
Dipilih oleh New York Times Book Review sebagai salah satu dari sepuluh buku terbaik tahun 2011
A Globe and Mail Judul Buku Terbaik Tahun 2011
Salah Satu Buku The Economist tahun 2011
Salah Satu Buku Nonfiksi Terbaik The Wall Street Journal of the Year 2011
2013 Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipient
Pekerjaan Kahneman dengan Amos Tversky adalah subyek dari Proyek Undoing Michael Lewis: Persahabatan yang Mengubah Pikiran Kita
Dalam buku terlaris internasional, Berpikir, Cepat, dan Lambat, Daniel Kahneman, psikolog terkenal dan pemenang Hadiah Nobel dalam Ekonomi, membawa kita pada perjalanan pemikiran yang inovatif dan menjelaskan dua sistem yang mendorong cara kita berpikir. Sistem 1 cepat, intuitif, dan emosional; Sistem 2 lebih lambat, lebih deliberatif, dan lebih logis. Dampak dari terlalu percaya pada strategi perusahaan, kesulitan memprediksi apa yang akan membuat kita bahagia di masa depan, efek mendalam dari bias kognitif dalam segala hal mulai dari bermain pasar saham hingga merencanakan liburan kita berikutnya ― masing-masing dapat dipahami hanya dengan mengetahui bagaimana kedua sistem tersebut membentuk penilaian dan keputusan kami.
Melibatkan pembaca dalam percakapan yang hidup tentang bagaimana kita berpikir, Kahneman mengungkapkan di mana kita bisa dan tidak dapat mempercayai intuisi kita dan bagaimana kita dapat memanfaatkan manfaat dari pemikiran yang lambat. Dia menawarkan wawasan praktis dan mencerahkan tentang bagaimana pilihan dibuat baik dalam bisnis kita dan kehidupan pribadi kita ― dan bagaimana kita dapat menggunakan teknik yang berbeda untuk menjaga gangguan mental yang sering membawa kita ke dalam masalah. Pemenang Penghargaan Buku Terbaik Akademi Sains Nasional dan Hadiah Buku Los Angeles Times dan dipilih oleh The New York Times Book Review sebagai salah satu dari sepuluh buku terbaik tahun 2011, Berpikir, Cepat dan Lambat ditakdirkan menjadi klasik.
12,984 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a scale to assess the need for cognition (i.e., the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking) was developed and validated, and a factor analysis was performed on the selected items and yielded one major factor.
Abstract: Four studies are reported in which a scale to assess the need for cognition (i.e., the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking) was developed and validated. In Study 1 a pool of items was administered to groups known to differ in need for cognition. Members of a university faculty served as subjects in the high-need-for-cognition group, whereas assembly line workers served as subjects in the low-need-for-cognition group. The criteria of ambiguity, irrelevance, and internal consistency were used to select the items for subsequent studies. A factor analysis was performed on the selected items and yielded one major factor. In 'Study 2 the scale was administered to a more homogeneous population (400 undergraduates) to validate the factor structure obtained in Study 1 and to determine whether the scale tapped a construct distinct from test anxiety and cognitive style. The factor structure was replicated in Study 2, responses to the need for cognition scale were predictably and weakly related to cognitive style, and responses were unrelated,to test anxiety. In Study 3, 104 subjects completed need for cognition, social desirability, and dogmatism scales and indicated what their American College Test scores were. Results indicated that need for cognition was related weakly and negatively to being close minded, unrelated to social desirability, and positively correlated with general intelligence. Study 4 replicated the major findings of Study 3 and furnished evidence of thj predictive validity of the Need for Cognition Scale: Attitudes toward simple an complex versions of a cognitive task appeared indistinguishable until the subjects' need for cognition was considered. The theoretical utility of the construct and measure of need for cognition are discussed.
4,801 citations
TL;DR: A large-scale analysis of tweets reveals that false rumors spread further and faster than the truth, and false news was more novel than true news, which suggests that people were more likely to share novel information.
Abstract: We investigated the differential diffusion of all of the verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from 2006 to 2017. The data comprise ~126,000 stories tweeted by ~3 million people more than 4.5 million times. We classified news as true or false using information from six independent fact-checking organizations that exhibited 95 to 98% agreement on the classifications. Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information. We found that false news was more novel than true news, which suggests that people were more likely to share novel information. Whereas false stories inspired fear, disgust, and surprise in replies, true stories inspired anticipation, sadness, joy, and trust. Contrary to conventional wisdom, robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate, implying that false news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it.
4,241 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks, and that the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them.
Abstract: Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, many have expressed concern about the effects of false stories (“fake news”), circulated largely through social media. We discuss the economics of fake news and present new data on its consumption prior to the election. Drawing on web browsing data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from a new online survey, we find: (i) social media was an important but not dominant source of election news, with 14 percent of Americans calling social media their “most important” source; (ii) of the known false news stories that appeared in the three months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared 8 million times; (iii) the average American adult saw on the order of one or perhaps several fake news stories in the months around the election, with just over half of those who recalled seeing them believing them; and (iv) people are much more likely to believe stories that favor their preferred candidate, especially if they have ideologically segregated social media networks.
3,959 citations
TL;DR: This paper introduced a three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability, i.e., the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind.
Abstract: This paper introduces a three-item "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The author will show that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory. Indeed, the relation is sometimes so strong that the preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability—an empirical fact begging for a theoretical explanation. The author examines the relation between CRT scores and two important decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. The CRT scores are then compared with other measures of cognitive ability or cognitive "style." The CRT scores exhibit considerable difference between men and women and the article explores how this relates to sex differences in time and risk preferences. The final section addresses the interpretation of correlations between cognitive abilities and decision-making characteristics.
3,902 citations