Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use
TL;DR: In this paper, a colloque consacre a l'essai de Wittgenstein sur "La certitude" is described, and l'interpretation proposed by M. McGinn is examined.
Abstract: Dans le cadre du colloque consacre a l'essai de Wittgenstein sur «La certitude», organise par H. E. Mason a l'universite du Minnesota en octobre 1996, l'A. etudie la conception du non-sens developpee par Wittgenstein en reponse a la refutation du scepticisme entreprise par Moore. Soulignant l'incompatibilite de la proposition et du contexte de son utilisation, et examinant l'interpretation proposee par M. McGinn, l'A. montre que le probleme souleve dans «La certitude» releve de la definition de la signification chez Frege, d'une part, et montre comment la philosophie tardive de Wittgenstein realise une generalisation du principe fregeen du contexte a l'ensemble des jeux de langage, d'autre part
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01 Jan 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a non-propositionality of some 'propositions' Objective Certainty vs. Scepticism Certainty as Trust: Belief as a Nonpropositional Attitude Conclusion: No Gap to Mind
Abstract: Introduction Objective Certainty vs. Knowledge The Nonpropositionality of Some 'Propositions' Objective Certainty and Objective Certainties The Features of Hinges Types and Origins of Hinges Linguistic and Personal Hinges Local and Universal Hinges Objective Certainty vs. Scepticism Certainty as Trust: Belief as a Nonpropositional Attitude Conclusion: No Gap to Mind Endnotes Bibliography
271 citations
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemologi-cal problem of skepticism, focusing on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse.
Abstract: This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemologi-cal problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular , this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this area have taken place since the late 1980s and early 1990s, it is necessary to also discuss some of the movements that have developed since 1970 in order to give these recent developments the necessary setting. The date of 1970 is dictated by the publication in that year of Fred Dretske's seminal article " Epistemic Operators , " which both pushed a " relevant alternatives " theory of knowledge to the fore of discussion and also brought into focus one possible line of argument against the so-called " closure " principle for knowledge. In so doing, it provided one of the main sources of response to the emergent interest in the " infallibilist " motivation for radical skepticism, as expressed by, for example, Peter Unger (1971; 1975). As argued below, this relevant alternatives model was developed along two extremely influential lines in subsequent discussion. On the one hand, we find the first wave of relevant alternatives theorists that includes Dretske (1971) himself and Robert Nozick (1981), who both advocate a modal theory of knowledge that results in the rejection of the principle that knowledge is " closed " under known entailment (the so-called " closure " principle for knowledge). On the other hand, we have the later wave of relevant alternatives theorists, and in particu-, who opt for an explicitly contextualist thesis that retains closure. This type of theory in turn evolved into the kind of sophisticated con-textualism (henceforth, " semantic " contex-tualism) advocated by such figures as Keith DeRose (1995), David Lewis (1996) and Cohen himself that is currently in vogue in the literature. Due to its dominance in the recent debate , this relevant alternatives movement in contemporary epistemology will be the focus for this discussion. Nevertheless, this
119 citations
Cites background from "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use"
...For more on this interpretation, see Conant (1998) and the response by McGinn (2002)....
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TL;DR: The goal here is to present a more compelling version of Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of reasons which can evade difficulties of the traditional scepticism/anti-scepticism debate.
Abstract: In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, Wittgenstein offers a distinctive conception of the nature of reasons. Central to this conception is the idea that at the heart of our rational practices are essentially arational commitments. This proposal marks a powerful challenge to the standard picture of the structure of reasons. In particular, it has been thought that this account might offer us a resolution of the traditional scepticism/anti-scepticism debate. It is argued, however, that some standard ways of filling out the details of this proposal ultimately lead to an epistemology which is highly problematic. The goal here is to present a more compelling version of Wittgenstein’s account of the structure of reasons which can evade these difficulties.
107 citations
Cites background from "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use"
...For on this view can’t there be distinct epistemic systems which incorporate different hinge commitments and thus generate opposing rational beliefs? But if that is possible, then how is a disagreement amongst two parties who adhere to these respective epistemic systems to be rationally resolved? Interestingly, there are passages in On Certainty where Wittgenstein seems acutely aware of this concern (see, e.g., OC, §§611–612). It would take me too far afield to discuss this worry here, though I do think that the reading I offer of Wittgenstein’s account of hinge commitments is able to evade it. See Pritchard (2010, forthcoming b, cf. Pritchard 2009) for more details. For an important recent discussion of the relationship between Wittgenstein’s stance on hinge commitments and epistemic relativism, see Williams (2007), to which Pritchard (2010) is effectively a response....
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...Two further distinct renderings of On Certainty worthy of note include the therapeutic line offered by Conant (1998), whereby the radical sceptic’s assertions are strictly senseless, and the naturalistic line offered by Strawson (1985), which claims that there is something essentially unnatural…...
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06 Dec 2019
TL;DR: The core meaning of the concept ubuntu is frequently expressed using the Zulu-Xhosa aphorism "umuntu numuntu ngabantu" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: term used to frame the process of transition from an apartheid regime to a new “rainbow nation” and an African renaissance. There is no consensus on what ubuntu actually means, and the precise content of the concept is still contested. The translations range from “humanity” and “charity” to “common sense” and “generosity.” Often ubuntu is seen as a concept enshrined in a traditional philosophy of life, although one needs to further differentiate between ubuntu as a moral quality of a person or as a way of living. The core meaning of the concept ubuntu is frequently expressed using the Zulu-Xhosa aphorism “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” – “A human being is a human being through other people.” meaning that every human being needs other people in order to be human; every person is part of a whole, integrated into a comprehensive network of mutual dependencies. The aphorism expresses “the African idea of persons: persons exist only in relation to other persons. The human self . . . only exists in relationship to its surroundings; these relationships are what it is. And the most important of these are the relationships we have with other persons” (Shutte 2001, 23). Thus, the aphorism refers to the deep relational character of ubuntu and underlines at the same time that human beings (umuntu) are a “being
85 citations
Cites background from "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use"
...Finally, according to therapeutic readings (drawing on Conant 1998, see Crary 2005; Maddy 2017), On Certainty contains no theory of hinges at all....
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Book•
12 Mar 2012
TL;DR: Baz argues that analytic philosophy itself has suffered as a result of its failure to take OLP's perspective seriously as discussed by the authors, and suggests ways that OLP could be applied to other philosophically troublesome concepts.
Abstract: A new form of philosophizing known as ordinary language philosophy took root in England after the Second World War, promising a fresh start and a way out of long-standing dead-end philosophical debates. Pioneered by Wittgenstein, Austin, and others, OLP is now widely rumored, within mainstream analytic philosophy, to have been seriously discredited, and consequently its perspective is ignored. Avner Baz begs to differ. In "When Words Are Called For", he shows how the prevailing arguments against OLP collapse under close scrutiny. All of them, he claims, presuppose one version or another of the very conception of word-meaning that OLP calls into question and takes to be responsible for many traditional philosophical difficulties. Worse, analytic philosophy itself has suffered as a result of its failure to take OLP's perspective seriously. Baz blames a neglect of OLP's insights for seemingly irresolvable disputes over the methodological relevance of "intuitions" in philosophy and for misunderstandings between contextualists and anti-contextualists (or "invariantists") in epistemology. Baz goes on to explore the deep affinities between Kant's work and OLP and suggests ways that OLP could be applied to other philosophically troublesome concepts. "When Words Are Called For" defends OLP not as a doctrine but as a form of practice that might provide a viable alternative to work currently carried out within mainstream analytic philosophy. Accordingly, Baz does not merely argue for OLP but, all the more convincingly, practices it in this eye-opening book.
77 citations
Cites background from "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use"
...See Conant (1998) for an argument on behalf of Wittgenstein against the prevailing assumption that (barring indexicality, ambiguity, etc.) every declarative sentence has a determinate and truth-evaluable something that it, as such, says....
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