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Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 5: 1884-1886

01 Dec 1993-
TL;DR: The Herbartian view of the human mind has been criticised by as discussed by the authors, who pointed out that if there is no tendency for natural ideas to be true, there can be no hope of ever reaching true inductions and hypotheses.
Abstract: ly considered, a system of like parabolas similarly placed, or any one of an infinity of systems of curves, is as simple as the system of straight lines. Again, motions and forces are combined according to the principle of the parallelogram, and a parallelogram appears to us a very simple figure. Yet the whole system of parallelograms is no more simple than any relief-perspective of them, or than any one of an infinity of other systems. As Sir Isaac Newton well said, geometry is but a branch of mechanics. No definition of the straight line is possible except that it is the path of a particle undisturbed by any force; and no definitions of parallels, etc. are possible which do not depend upon the definition of equal distances as measured by a rigid body, or other mechanical means. Thus, in dynamics, the natural ideas of the human mind tend to approximate to the truth of nature, because the mind has been formed under the influence of dynamical laws. Now, logical considerations show that if there is no tendency for natural ideas to be true, there can be no hope of ever reaching true inductions and hypotheses. So that philosophy is committed to the postulate,—without which it has no chance of success,—[. . .] Psychology has only lately become a positive science, and in my humble opinion the new views are now carried too far. I cannot see, for example, why psychologists should make such a bugbear of “faculties.” If in dynamics it has proved safe to rely upon our natural ideas, checked, controlled, and corrected by experience, why should not our natural ideas about mind, formed as they certainly have been under the influence of the true laws of mental action, be likely to approximate to the truth as much as natural ideas of space, force, and the like have been found to do? Upon this point, I must confess to entertaining somewhat heterodox opinions. The Herbartian philosophy, with the mode of reasoning which leads to it, seems to me thoroughly unsound and illusory,—though I fully admit the value and profundity of some of the suggestions of that philosophy. But to trust to such reasoning in the slightest degree seems to me ever so much less safe than trusting to one’s native or natural notions about mind, though these no doubt need to be modified by observation and experiment. For my part it seems to me that the elementary phenomena of mind fall into three categories. First, we have feelings, comprising all that is immediately present, such as pleasure and pain, blue, cheerfulness, and the feeling which arises upon the contemplation of a complete theory. It is hard to define what I mean by feeling. If I say it is what is present, I W r i t i n g s o f C . S . P e i r c e 1 8 9 0 – 1 8 9 2 96 shall be asked what I mean by present, and must confess I mean nothing but feeling again. The only way is to state how any state of consciousness is to be modified so as to render it a feeling, although feeling does not essentially involve consciousness proper. But imagine a state of consciousness reduced to perfect simplicity, so that its object is entirely unanalyzed, then that consciousness reduced to that rudimentary condition, unattainable by us, would be a pure feeling, and not properly consciousness at all. Let the quality of blue, for example, override all other ideas, of form, of contrast, of commencement or cessation, and there would be pure feeling. When I say that such impossible states exist as elements of all consciousness, I mean that there are ideas which might conceivably thus exist alone and monopolize the whole mind. Besides feelings, we have in our minds sensations of reaction, as when a person blindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a muscular effort, or when any feeling gives way to another feeling. Suppose I had nothing in my mind but a feeling of blue, which were suddenly to give place to a feeling of red; then, at the instant of transition there would be a sense of reaction, my blue life being transmuted to red life. If I were now also endowed with a memory, that sense would continue for some time. This state of mind would be more than pure feeling, since in addition to the feeling of red a feeling analogous to blue would be present, and not only that but a sense of reaction between the two. This sense of reaction would itself carry along with it a peculiar feeling which might conceivably monopolize the mind to the exclusion of the feelings of blue and red. But were this to happen, though the feeling associated with a sense of reaction would be there, the sense of reaction as such would be quite gone; for a sense of reaction cannot conceivably exist independent of at least two feelings between which the reaction takes place. A feeling, then, is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other. A sense of reaction, or say for short a sensation, is a state of mind containing two states of mind between which we are aware of a connection, even if that connection is no more than a contrast. No analysis can reduce such sensations to feelings. Looking at the matter from a physiological point of view, a feeling only calls for an excited nerve-cell,—or indeed a mere mass of excited nerve-matter without any cell, or shut up in any number of cells. But sensation supposes the discharge or excitation of a nerve-cell, or a transfer of excitement from one part of a mass of nerve-matter to another, or the spontaneous production or cessation of an excited condition. 22. Architecture of Theories. Initial Version, 1890 97 Besides feelings and sensations, we have general conceptions; that is, we are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general rule; or, looking at the matter from another point of view, a general conception is the being aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual power is simply facility in taking habits and in following them in cases essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the normal cases of sensation, or connection of feelings, under which those habits were formed. The one primordial law of mental action is a tendency to generalization; that is, every connection between feelings tends to spread to neighboring feelings. If you ask what are neighboring feelings, it is like the question that was answered by the parable of the Good Samaritan. A neighboring feeling is simply a connected feeling. These connections are of two kinds, internal or manifest, and external or occult. A feeling is manifestly connected with feelings which it resembles or contrasts with; the connection is merely an identity of feeling. A feeling is occultly connected with feelings bound to it by some external power, as the roll of thunder with the flash of lightning. The mental law belongs to a widely different category of law from physical laws. A physical law determines that a certain component motion must take place, otherwise the law is violated. But such absolute conformity is not required by the mental law. It does not call for any definite amount of assimilation in any case. Indeed such a precise regulation would be in downright conflict with the law. For it would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit. The law of mind makes something the more likely to happen. It thus resembles the “non-conservative” forces of physics, such as viscosity and the like, which are due to chance encounters of molecules.
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01 Jan 1962

112 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is impossible not to be aware of the derivative character of some of the language of Lowell's "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration" and the influence of Milton in such phrases as high emprise and ethereal essence.
Abstract: IT is impossible not to be aware of the derivative character of some of the language of Lowell's "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration." The influence of Milton, for example, is clearly evident in such phrases as high emprise and ethereal essence. Words like guerdon, sear (as a homonym, hard upon the heels of laurels in both "Lycidas" and the "Commemoration Ode"), mantle, and reck not reveal the extent to which Lowell has absorbed the vocab-

4 citations

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that although we cannot have an idea of a spirit, we can at least have a notion of it, and this notion can be used to reason about the cause of our perceptions.
Abstract: In his Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley opposes the "opinion strangely prevailing amongst men" that the objects of our senses inhere in an insensible matter that cannot itself be perceived.1 In its stead, Berkeley espouses a form of idealism, which he calls "immaterialism."2 As it turns out, however, a major problem for Berkeley's argument is that what makes the hypothesis of insensible matter untenable seems to apply equally to spirits. As is well known, Berkeley tries to circumvent this result by claiming that although we cannot have an idea of spirit we can at least have a notion of it. Unfortunately, he fails to give a clear account of what this "having a notion of a spirit" means. This has led to the objection, raised most prominently by Hume and embraced by many after him, that the hypothesis of spirit must also be discarded. I am going in the opposite direction. I will argue that Berkeley is in fact committed, on his own terms, to accept that we can have an idea of matter, and, consequently, that he must abandon the view that reality consists solely of spirits with ideas. Interestingly, this reinstatement of corporeal, or unthinking, matter need not undermine Berkeley's esse is percipi doctrine.In my discussion of Berkeley's views on matter I will expand upon an argument that is brought forward by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.3 Peirce shows not only that we can have an idea of Berkeley's unthinking matter, but also that Berkeley's denial of matter results from a failure to recognize the true function of the hypothesis of matter.From the Principles onward, Berkeley maintains a substance-attribute view. He seeks to explain the objects of our perception by showing how they depend on a self-sufficient ground that is the cause of their being, character, and unity. He believes it necessary to suppose such a substance, on the ground that the ideas we perceive are entirely passive. This means that an explanation of our perceptions wholly in terms of ideas cannot suffice, as such an explanation cannot account for our perception of the succession of our ideas, in which "some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear."4 Consequently, Berkeley calls the view that ideas can exist entirely on their own "evidently absurd"5 and "repugnant."6 Instead, he argues, there must be "some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them."7The substance-attribute view was prominently defended by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding* Berkeley follows Locke in that substance, whether material or spiritual, can never be perceived directly, but must be inferred from its effects. This is especially clear from how he formulates the issue in The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained, where he writes:When we have well understood and considered the nature of vision, we may, by reasoning from thence, be better able to collect some knowledge of the external, unseen Cause of our ideas, whether it be one or many, intelligent or unintelligent, active or inert, body or spirit.9This means that matter and spirit are both explanatory hypotheses (i.e., conclusions from arguments that run from perceived effects to unperceived causes) that are raised to explain the being, character, and unity of the objects that come before the mind, that is, of our ideas. For the purpose of this paper I will take this adherence to a substance-attribute view for granted.The main purpose of Berkeley's Principles is to show that the hypothesis of spirit is the right one. Berkeley does this by arguing that the hypothesis of matter is untenable. Since Berkeley remains faithful to the substance-attribute view, and since-immersed in the Cartesian tradition as he was-he takes for granted that matter and spirit are the only two alternatives, a successful refutation of the hypothesis of matter allows him to conclude that all substance must be spirit. This is exactly what he does. …

8 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explored and investigated C. S.S. Peirce's writings on the economy of research, abduction, and games, and provided a more expansive conception of Pece's pragmatism, an expansion I believe he intended to make.
Abstract: Abstract:The writings of C. S. Peirce, the American polymath philosopher, scientist, and mathematician, are explored and investigated from a hypothetical and perhaps novel perspective. The argument pursued here is that Peirce's \"economy of research\" is not only of central importance to his philosophy, but that it also should be expanded to include games and the process of abduction. An abductive and game-theoretic interpretation of the economy of research creates an economically and philosophically dynamic conception of how humans create new knowledge. This broader conception of an abductive, economically constrained, and strategically embellished process of intellectual innovation may be humanity's most economic resource. Philosophically, the hypotheses provides a more expansive conception of Peirce's pragmatism, an expansion I believe he intended to make. Peirce's writings on the economy of research, abduction, and games could be of great significance for contemporary applications of Peirce's pragmatism to economics, social science, and interdisciplinary fields such as law and economics.

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that Peirce puts forth a powerful theory of self-consciousness based on his semeiotic understanding of selfreference and indexicality, which is in turn rooted in very specific dimensions of human experience.
Abstract: The aim of this article is to address the problem of what is usually called “self-consciousness” by studying Charles S. Peirce’s semeiotic treatment of self-referential statements. Peirce believes that an adequate study of the mind requires “to reduce all mental action,” including “self-consciousness,” “to the formula of valid reasoning” (W 2:214, EP 1:30, 5:267, 1868) and its semeiotic nature. While Peirce makes frequent use of the notion of “consciousness,” he is at the same time distant from the understanding of the “conscious mind” that Descartes invented and made canonical (e.g., W 1:491, 1866), and which from the modern epoch stretches out to the contemporary discussion on, as David Chalmers put it, the “hard problem” of the mind.1 In what follows, I argue that Peirce puts forth a powerful theory of self-consciousness based on his semeiotic understanding of self-reference and indexicality.2 To the question, “How can we elucidate the phenomenon of self-consciousness?”, we should answer, with Peirce, “What we call self-consciousness corresponds to the practice of narratives and descriptions ultimately based on indexical self-referential statements, which are in turn rooted in very specific dimensions of human experience.” It is also important to underscore from the outset that the problem of indexical self-reference cannot be separated from Peirce’s concept of experience, which is one of the most interesting insights of Peirce’s philosophy and classical American pragmatism. In particular, it will be essential to see what are the experiential-perceptual conditions under which indexical self-referential statements can work as such.3 Peirce scholarship has usually seen the problem of self-reference as a chapter of the major metaphysical problem of individuation and has consequently dwelt with it in the light of this latter. It has been long claimed that Peirce’s

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a world consisting of nothing but the sensation of this single oboe A, and having never consisted of anything but it, it is indeed doubtful whether one would be conscious of the tone at all, since there would be no background of experience in terms of which to interpret the sound, either perceptually or rationally as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Imagine a single musical tone—for instance, the A above middle C that the oboe plays to tune an orchestra Now imagine this tone, with no variation in dynamics, pitch, or timbre, extended over the course of “an hour or a day,” existing, as Peirce describes in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (W3:262),1 “as perfectly in each second of that time as in the whole taken together; so that, as long as it is sounding, it might be present to a sense from which everything in the past was as completely absent as the future itself ” (W3:262) Imagine a world consisting of nothing but the sensation of this single oboe A, and having never consisted of anything but it In such a world, Peirce indicates, there would be no consciousness of the passage of time It is indeed doubtful whether one would be conscious of the tone at all, since there would be no background of experience in terms of which to interpret the sound, either perceptually or rationally2 Although the sound waves would register physically in the ear, the distinctive timbre of the oboe would not be perceived because there would be no experience of other timbres with which to compare it The aural perception of a musical theme or a tune, on the other hand, is inexorably temporal The performance of a tune unfolds over time It “consists in an orderliness in the succession of sounds which strike the ear at different times; and to perceive it there must be some continuity of consciousness which makes the events of a lapse of time present to us” (W3:262) The physical sensation of each sound is “completely present at every instant” while it lasts, but the tune or theme—the music—is never given to consciousness as an unmediated presence The “orderliness in the succession of sounds”—which

7 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss a possible way to overcome the semioticians' puzzlement and the metaphysicians' bewilderment, based on Peirce's broad concept of mind and on the presupposition that no pure, absolute secondness or brute reality can be found in nature nor in thought.
Abstract: Peirce's statement that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" has puzzled semioticians as much as his dictum of matter being "effete mind" has bewildered physicists and metaphysicians. Based on Peirce's broad concept of mind and on the presupposition that no pure, absolute secondness or brute reality can be found, neither in nature nor in thought, this paper discusses a possible way to overcome the semioticians' puzzlement and the metaphysicians' bewilderment. In the metaphysical context of synechism, mind is synonymous with continuity; in the logical context of semiotics it is synonymous with semiosis. Mind is continuity and semiosis. In the light of synechism, human mind and physical matter are the two extremes of a very subtle and complex range of differentiations along the continuous time-arrow that constitutes nature. If mind, the one kind of stuff in the universe, is conceived of as semiosis, then semiotics supplies us with concepts to guide the conjunction between semiosis and the synechistic postulate of continuity between mind and matter.

6 citations