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Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 5: 1884-1886

01 Dec 1993-
TL;DR: The Herbartian view of the human mind has been criticised by as discussed by the authors, who pointed out that if there is no tendency for natural ideas to be true, there can be no hope of ever reaching true inductions and hypotheses.
Abstract: ly considered, a system of like parabolas similarly placed, or any one of an infinity of systems of curves, is as simple as the system of straight lines. Again, motions and forces are combined according to the principle of the parallelogram, and a parallelogram appears to us a very simple figure. Yet the whole system of parallelograms is no more simple than any relief-perspective of them, or than any one of an infinity of other systems. As Sir Isaac Newton well said, geometry is but a branch of mechanics. No definition of the straight line is possible except that it is the path of a particle undisturbed by any force; and no definitions of parallels, etc. are possible which do not depend upon the definition of equal distances as measured by a rigid body, or other mechanical means. Thus, in dynamics, the natural ideas of the human mind tend to approximate to the truth of nature, because the mind has been formed under the influence of dynamical laws. Now, logical considerations show that if there is no tendency for natural ideas to be true, there can be no hope of ever reaching true inductions and hypotheses. So that philosophy is committed to the postulate,—without which it has no chance of success,—[. . .] Psychology has only lately become a positive science, and in my humble opinion the new views are now carried too far. I cannot see, for example, why psychologists should make such a bugbear of “faculties.” If in dynamics it has proved safe to rely upon our natural ideas, checked, controlled, and corrected by experience, why should not our natural ideas about mind, formed as they certainly have been under the influence of the true laws of mental action, be likely to approximate to the truth as much as natural ideas of space, force, and the like have been found to do? Upon this point, I must confess to entertaining somewhat heterodox opinions. The Herbartian philosophy, with the mode of reasoning which leads to it, seems to me thoroughly unsound and illusory,—though I fully admit the value and profundity of some of the suggestions of that philosophy. But to trust to such reasoning in the slightest degree seems to me ever so much less safe than trusting to one’s native or natural notions about mind, though these no doubt need to be modified by observation and experiment. For my part it seems to me that the elementary phenomena of mind fall into three categories. First, we have feelings, comprising all that is immediately present, such as pleasure and pain, blue, cheerfulness, and the feeling which arises upon the contemplation of a complete theory. It is hard to define what I mean by feeling. If I say it is what is present, I W r i t i n g s o f C . S . P e i r c e 1 8 9 0 – 1 8 9 2 96 shall be asked what I mean by present, and must confess I mean nothing but feeling again. The only way is to state how any state of consciousness is to be modified so as to render it a feeling, although feeling does not essentially involve consciousness proper. But imagine a state of consciousness reduced to perfect simplicity, so that its object is entirely unanalyzed, then that consciousness reduced to that rudimentary condition, unattainable by us, would be a pure feeling, and not properly consciousness at all. Let the quality of blue, for example, override all other ideas, of form, of contrast, of commencement or cessation, and there would be pure feeling. When I say that such impossible states exist as elements of all consciousness, I mean that there are ideas which might conceivably thus exist alone and monopolize the whole mind. Besides feelings, we have in our minds sensations of reaction, as when a person blindfold suddenly runs against a post, when we make a muscular effort, or when any feeling gives way to another feeling. Suppose I had nothing in my mind but a feeling of blue, which were suddenly to give place to a feeling of red; then, at the instant of transition there would be a sense of reaction, my blue life being transmuted to red life. If I were now also endowed with a memory, that sense would continue for some time. This state of mind would be more than pure feeling, since in addition to the feeling of red a feeling analogous to blue would be present, and not only that but a sense of reaction between the two. This sense of reaction would itself carry along with it a peculiar feeling which might conceivably monopolize the mind to the exclusion of the feelings of blue and red. But were this to happen, though the feeling associated with a sense of reaction would be there, the sense of reaction as such would be quite gone; for a sense of reaction cannot conceivably exist independent of at least two feelings between which the reaction takes place. A feeling, then, is a state of mind having its own living quality, independent of any other. A sense of reaction, or say for short a sensation, is a state of mind containing two states of mind between which we are aware of a connection, even if that connection is no more than a contrast. No analysis can reduce such sensations to feelings. Looking at the matter from a physiological point of view, a feeling only calls for an excited nerve-cell,—or indeed a mere mass of excited nerve-matter without any cell, or shut up in any number of cells. But sensation supposes the discharge or excitation of a nerve-cell, or a transfer of excitement from one part of a mass of nerve-matter to another, or the spontaneous production or cessation of an excited condition. 22. Architecture of Theories. Initial Version, 1890 97 Besides feelings and sensations, we have general conceptions; that is, we are conscious that a connection between feelings is determined by a general rule; or, looking at the matter from another point of view, a general conception is the being aware of being governed by a habit. Intellectual power is simply facility in taking habits and in following them in cases essentially analogous to, but in non-essentials widely remote from, the normal cases of sensation, or connection of feelings, under which those habits were formed. The one primordial law of mental action is a tendency to generalization; that is, every connection between feelings tends to spread to neighboring feelings. If you ask what are neighboring feelings, it is like the question that was answered by the parable of the Good Samaritan. A neighboring feeling is simply a connected feeling. These connections are of two kinds, internal or manifest, and external or occult. A feeling is manifestly connected with feelings which it resembles or contrasts with; the connection is merely an identity of feeling. A feeling is occultly connected with feelings bound to it by some external power, as the roll of thunder with the flash of lightning. The mental law belongs to a widely different category of law from physical laws. A physical law determines that a certain component motion must take place, otherwise the law is violated. But such absolute conformity is not required by the mental law. It does not call for any definite amount of assimilation in any case. Indeed such a precise regulation would be in downright conflict with the law. For it would instantly crystallize thought and prevent all further formation of habit. The law of mind makes something the more likely to happen. It thus resembles the “non-conservative” forces of physics, such as viscosity and the like, which are due to chance encounters of molecules.
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01 Jan 1962

112 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, it is impossible not to be aware of the derivative character of some of the language of Lowell's "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration" and the influence of Milton in such phrases as high emprise and ethereal essence.
Abstract: IT is impossible not to be aware of the derivative character of some of the language of Lowell's "Ode Recited at the Harvard Commemoration." The influence of Milton, for example, is clearly evident in such phrases as high emprise and ethereal essence. Words like guerdon, sear (as a homonym, hard upon the heels of laurels in both "Lycidas" and the "Commemoration Ode"), mantle, and reck not reveal the extent to which Lowell has absorbed the vocab-

4 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper, a model that founds its antecedents in the reformatting actions of the teachers and initiators of educational sciences, who have formulated various concepts in the area of humanistic pedagogy, in the post-modern era is presented.

2 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: In most countries of Continental Europe, undergraduate students take from four to five years to obtain their Licenciate, a degree roughly corresponding to a Bachelor's in the American system, but requiring approximately 20% more coursework, and involving a greater focus on core classes, with correspondingly lesser time available for electives as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: As is well known, the European University system differs substantially from the American one. In most countries of Continental Europe, undergraduate students take from four to five years to obtain their Licenciate, a degree roughly corresponding to a Bachelor's in the American system, but requiring approximately 20% more coursework, and involving a greater focus on core classes, with correspondingly lesser time available for electives. The Licentiate was, until recently, sufficient preparation for entering the student's chosen profession, whether in science or the humanities (Philosophy, History, Law, Medicine, etc.). In recent years, Master's degrees have become popular for many students wishing to enter their professions with a more specialized preparation.

2 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this response to the five rich papers on Cambridge Pragmatism published in the current issue of the Transactions, the author improves on his account of truth as adhering to habits as well as propositions, and clarifies his position on pragmatism and the free will debate.
Abstract: Abstract:In my response to the five rich papers on Cambridge Pragmatism published in the current issue of the Transactions, I happily acknowledge Clifford as perhaps the first Cambridge (England) pragmatist; improve on my account of truth as adhering to habits as well as propositions; clarify my position on pragmatism and the free will debate; and speak to the need, and grounds upon which, to differentiate pragmatism from other traditions.

2 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: This article revisited some of the best-known locuses of both Peirce's meaning and his inquiry pragmatism, and concluded that the distinction between meaning and inquiry in meaning pragmatisms dissolves in Pece, concluding that the very mechanism for elucidating a concept's meaning requires ongoing inquiry.
Abstract: Taking my lead from Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin’s distinction between “meaning pragmatism” and “inquiry pragmatism,” and guided throughout by Christopher Hookway’s understanding of Peirce, I revisit some of the best-known locuses of both Peirce’s meaning pragmatism and his inquiry pragmatism, and conclude that the distinction dissolves in Peirce. For Peirce, the very mechanism for elucidating a concept’s meaning, the pragmatic maxim, requires ongoing inquiry. Moreover, in performing an inquiry, we elucidate meaning.

2 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The distinction between comprehension and interpretation of a film interpretation is discussed in this paper, where it is argued that interpretation is a process of croissance rationnel des signes of a movie.
Abstract: L’interpretation des films a fait l’objet de plusieurs critiques ces dernieres annees de la part du mouvement cognitiviste en etudes cinematographiques. Selon d’aucuns, les enonces interpretatifs seraient depourvus de sens. Cet article cherche a demontrer le contraire en faisant appel a la philosophie pragmatique et semiotique de Charles S. Peirce. L’argumentaire se divise en deux parties. La premiere porte sur le pragmatisme de Peirce et explique pourquoi toute theorie est inferentielle et interpretative. L’auteur distingue entre les methodes pragmatique et scientifique, puis etudie le role que joue l’habitude pour pallier le dualisme qui oppose l’esprit et la matiere. Enfin, il est question du realisme et de la doctrine peirceenne du sens commun critique. La seconde partie de l’article examine certaines idees qui ont recemment domine les debats sur l’interpretation en etudes cinematographiques et litteraires. Plus particulierement, l’auteur s’interroge sur la critique de l’interpretation elaboree par David Bordwell et la facon dont elle se fonde sur des principes a la fois sceptiques et nominalistes empruntes au theoricien de la litterature Stanley Fish. Il montre comment la distinction bordwellienne entre comprehension et interpretation repose sur le role que joue, au cinema, la perception sensorielle, puis critique cette distinction en faisant appel a l’empirisme peirceen, dont l’une des particularites est de ne pas se reduire au sensualisme. Pour Peirce, en effet, la perception se deploie de facon continue entre le monde exterieur et le monde interieur. Suit un bref commentaire sur les travaux d’Umberto Eco quant a la distinction entre interpretation et surinterpretation qui conduit l’auteur a considerer le role du vague dans l’entreprise interpretative ainsi qu’a traiter des problemes que soulevent la visee et la pertinence des interpretations lorsque celles-ci sont definies a partir de tout ce qui s’impose a notre esprit au contact direct — ou meme indirect — d’un film. Enfin, l’auteur conclut que l’interpretation d’un film releve d’un processus de croissance rationnel des signes — y compris des signes esthetiques.

2 citations