scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Journal Article•DOI•

You Are in Charge: Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office

Christoph Engel1, Lilia Zhurakhovska1•
Max Planck Society1
10 Apr 2017-The Journal of Legal Studies (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)-Vol. 46, Iss: 1, pp 1-50
TL;DR: The authors found that when given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach and more sensitive to their personal social value orientation, suggesting that the effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims but follows from the office motive: the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with an assigned task.
Abstract: Apparently, judges’ decisions are not motivated by maximizing profit. Two explanations compete: there are long-term monetary consequences; conscientious individuals self-select into the profession. In a lab experiment, we rule out both explanations. Nonetheless, authorities do a reliable job of overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities public officials or judges strengthens the effect. This suggests that the effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims but follows from the office motive: the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with an assigned task. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach and more sensitive to their personal social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations. Experienced judges are more affected by their social value orientation.

Summary (3 min read)

Jump to: [1. Introduction] – [3. Design of the Baseline] – [4. Related Experimental Literature] – [Figure 1 Baseline] – [6. Do Public Officials and Judges Behave Differently?] – [Figure 2 Framing Effects] – [Figure 3 Visual Representation of Three-Way Interactions from Table 4] – [Figure 4 Announcing a Policy] – [8. Do Elected Judges Behave Differently?] – [Figure 5 Appointed vs. Elected Judges] – [9. Do Experienced Judges Behave Differently?] – [Figure 6 Judicial Experience] and [10. Conclusion]

1. Introduction

  • The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the authors summarize the rich literature that tries to explain why judges seemingly defy rational choice theory.
  • From this literature, the authors derive the hypotheses they test in the BASELINE.
  • Section 4 relates their paper to the experimental literature.
  • Section 5 reports the results from the BASELINE.
  • Section 8 investigates the behavior of judges that have been elected.

3. Design of the Baseline

  • Participants were invited using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) .
  • For more information about the conduct of this BASELINE and all five treatments (discussed in sections 6-9), see Table 1.

Figure 1 Baseline

  • These visual impressions are supported by statistical analysis.
  • The authors have two alternative measures for punishment: the probability that an active participant is punished by whatever number of punishment points ("certainty"), and the amount of ECU subtracted from this participant's period profit ("severity").
  • 11 For profit, the theoretical prediction, assuming standard preferences, is not at the limit of support, which is why the authors do not need any additional statistical safeguards.
  • For two reasons the authors prefer this specification over a model with group fixed effects.
  • The idiosyncratic social value orientation of the respective authority moderates how she reacts to a lower absolute contribution.

6. Do Public Officials and Judges Behave Differently?

  • Figure 2 indicates that "public officials" punish a bit less, in particular in later periods, while "judges" punish a bit more.
  • But the authors neither find a significant treatment effect with nonparametric nor with parametric statistics, neither on the certainty nor on the severity of punishment.

Figure 2 Framing Effects

  • The authors begin with treatment effects on socially desirable motives (models 1 and 3).
  • For both treatments, the authors also find significant treatment effects on the sensitivity towards the contribution level in the respective group.
  • 26 In Table 3 , the authors had derived the socially undesirable effect from the fact that the two-way interactions between contributions and the authorities' social value orientation score were significant, as well as the two-way interactions between the level of contributions in the previous period and this score.
  • Three-way interactions are not significant at conventional levels.
  • Strikingly, this socially undesirable effect of personal policy preferences completely disappears with either frame.

Figure 3 Visual Representation of Three-Way Interactions from Table 4

  • In the first step, the authors generate data that precisely matches the data generating process in their sample, including the distribution of the fixed and random varia-bles.
  • The frequency of p-values below a certain α-level is their measure of statistical power.

Figure 4 Announcing a Policy

  • Left-hand side: data from judge frame treatment only certainty: a dummy that is 1 if an active member receives any punishment severity: number of ECU subtracted from period profit of an active member.
  • In the linear mirror model on severity, the interaction effect is insignificant, though.
  • If judges have announced their punishment policy, the severity of their choices is less sensitive to the level of contributions the more they are socially minded themselves.
  • In the regression explaining punishment severity, the authors also find a main effect and an interaction with the judges' personal social value orientation score.
  • It only matters for the punishment of citizens' who contribute less than the announced minimum.

8. Do Elected Judges Behave Differently?

  • Yet, statistically, the authors do not find any significant difference, whether they use non-parametric or parametric statistics.
  • The authors do not find a significant interaction either between treatment and period on any of these dependent variables.

Figure 5 Appointed vs. Elected Judges

  • Whether judges are appointed or elected is less important for the sensitivity of authorities to socially desirable and undesirable motives.
  • In model 1 of Table 7 , however, the authors do find that elected judges react more intensely to the absolute level of contributions, in the socially desirable direction (two-way interaction between treatment ELECT and Contribution).
  • 42 This suggests that elected judges feel empowered to act upon their personal preferences.
  • 42 Social value orientation scores of judges do not significantly differ between both treatments.
  • On the non-linear mirror models, the authors find even more significant effects (see We thus only find partial support for H 6 and conclude Result 7: If judges are elected, the likelihood of punishment is more sensitive to the absolute level of contributions.the authors.

9. Do Experienced Judges Behave Differently?

  • 43 Specifically the authors repeat the main experiment, not the test for social value orientation.
  • The authors compare data of judges in the first phase and in the second phase.
  • This dependence is captured by judge random effects.
  • In a regression that interacts the phase of the experiment with the period of each part of the experiment; the interaction term reaches p = .060 in the linear model.

Figure 6 Judicial Experience

  • The authors do, however, find clear effects of experience on the sensitivity of judges towards the choices of the subjects they govern.
  • This normatively desirable effect is, however, the weaker the more the judge is socially minded herself (the significant three-way interactions have opposite sign).
  • The authors find a similar pattern for reactions to local circumstances, i.e., to average contributions in the previous period.
  • Experienced judges are more sensitive to this information (two-way interactions between Average contributions in the previous period and EXPERIENCE), but the effect is weakened the more they are socially minded themselves (three-way interactions).
  • Answering the call of duty might require self-control, which diminishes with repetition.

10. Conclusion

  • As the (in)famous Stanford prison experiment has made obvious, there is also a dark side.
  • The legal order is full of safeguards to make this unlikely.
  • To an extent a mere legal frame has already been shown to have this effect (Engel and Reuben, 2015) .

Did you find this useful? Give us your feedback

Content maybe subject to copyright    Report

Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2016/15
You Are In Charge –
Experimentally Testing the
Motivating Power of Holding
a Judicial Ofce
Christoph Engel /
Lilia Zhurakhovska
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute
for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2016/15
You Are In Charge – Experimentally Testing the
Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Ofce
Christoph Engel / Lilia Zhurakhovska
October 2016,
revised January 2017
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn
http://www.coll.mpg.de
YouAreInCharge–ExperimentallyTestingtheMotivating
PowerofHoldingaJudicialOffice
*
ChristophEngel
(MaxPlanckInstituteforResearchonCollectiveGoods,Bonn)
LiliaZhurakhovska
(UniversityofDuisburg‐Essen)
Abstract
Apparently judges’ decisions are not motivated by maximizing their own profit. The litera‐
tureusestwostrategiestoexplainthisobservation:judgescareaboutthelong‐termmone‐
tary consequences for themselves, or individuals who are more strongly motivated by the
common
goodself‐selectintotheprofession.Wesuggestthatthereisanadditionalexplana‐
tion, the "office motive". In a labexperiment,weruleoutbothtraditionalexplanationsby
design.Nonethelessauthoritiesdoareliablejobatovercomingasocialdilemma.Callingthe
authorities"publicofficial"or"judge"increasestheirsensitivity towardsthedegreebywhich
individuals are selfish, and it reduces the effect of their social value orientation (making
themmoreneutral).Thissuggeststhatthesociallydesirableeffectisnotdrivenbyangeror
sympathywiththevictims,butfollowsfromthedesiretofulfilltheexpectationsthatcome
withtheassignedtask. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce
an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach, and
more sensitive to their social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they
reactmoreintenselyto norm violations. Experienced judges are moreaffectedby their so‐
cialvalueorientation.
JEL:C91,D03,D63,D73,H11,H41,H83,K41
Keywords:judicialbehavior,officemotive,public‐goodsexperiment,judicialframe,election,
experience

* Wegratefullyacknowledgehelpfulcommentsbytheeditor,anan onymousreferee,JudgePosner,JeffRachlinski,Kon‐
stantinosChatziathanasiouandSvenjaHippelandaudiencesattheRoyalAcademyofSciencesintheNetherlands,and
attheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniaLawSchool.
2
1. Introduction
"What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? The Same Thing Everybody Else Does" (Posner,
1993).ThetitleofJudgePosner’s1993articlehasprovokedawholeliterature.Actually,the
bodyofhispaperismuchmorenuanced,ashislatercontributionsare(theyaresummarized
in Posner, 2010). Yet the original question remains still unresolved. In economic parlance,
judgesareagents,whilethepeople,thestate,orthegovernmentare/istheir principal(s).A
hugeliterature in economicsstarts fromthe assumptionthat a principal‐agent relationship
createsaproblem(forasummaryaccountsee LaffontandTirole,1993).Iftheprincipal can‐
notconditiontheagent’spayoffontheagent’saction,theagentactssuchthatshemaximiz‐
esherownpayoff,irrespectiveofthedetrimentfortheprincipal.Therulesmeanttoprotect
judicial independence (almost) completely shield judges from intervention. Why does the
principal‐agent problem nonetheless seemingly not materialize for judges? The two main
answersthathavebeengivenare:judgesare,indeed,selfishbutjudicialdecision‐makingis
sufficiently contained by constraints; judges hold different preferences and self‐select into
office.
Weclaimthatthisliterature overlooksamotivethatishighlyimportantfor,butnotspecific
to,judges.Judgesdonotbehave(plainly)selfishlysimplybecausetheyhavebeenassigneda
public office. In their majority they live up to the expectationsthat go with holding the of‐
fice. To put this claim to the test, we design a lab experiment. In the lab, we are able to
completelyremoveinstitutionalandsocialconstraints.Weconstructanenvironmentwhere
thereisaclearandeasilyobservableconflictbetweenselfishbehaviorandtheexpectations
thatgowiththeoffice.Wegivesubjectsintheroleofauthoritiestheopportunitytoaddress
atruesocialproblem,atacosttothemselves.Werandomlyassigntheoffice,thusexcluding
any possibility of particularly conscientious individuals self‐selecting into the position. We
ruleoutanylong‐termeffectsonauthorities’profit.
Tocreateasocialproblemthatcallsforintervention,werelyonastan darddesignfromex‐
perimentaleconomics,alinearpublicgood.Thisdesigncreatesasocialproblem.Individual‐
ly,eachparticipantisbestoffifshedoesnotcontributetoajointproject.Yetthegroupto
which this participant is randomly assigned is best off if everybody contributes maximally.
Thisexperimenthasbeenreplicatedhundredsoftimes(foroverviews
seeChaudhuri,2011,
Ledyard,1995,Zelmer,2003).Averyrobust patternresults:onaverage,contributionsstart
somewherein the middle between nothing and everything,but gradually decay over time.
Thepatternisreversed,though,ifparticipantsaregivenanopportunitytopunisheachoth‐
er,evenifthisiscostly(Fehr
andGächter,2002,2000,NikiforakisandNormann,2008).The
threat of punishment disciplines free‐riders. We deviate from the standard design in one
respect.Werandomlyassigntoeachgroupoffourcontributorsafifthparticipant.Thispar‐
ticipantalonehaspowertometeoutpunishment,whichiscostlyforher.Shedoesnotben‐
efitfromcontributionstothepublicgood.Insteadsheearnsafixedfeeandhasanaddition‐
alendowmentthatshecanuseforpunishment(orkeep).Thegameisrepeated.Throughout
theexperiment,groupcompositionisheldconstant.
In the literature, the puzzle is presented in the language of a principal‐agent‐relationship.
Oncetheyareinoffice,judgescouldabusetheguaranteeofindependencetoincreasetheir
personalprofit, e.g.bymaximizingleisure.Yetitisaprincipal ‐agentproblemwithaspecial
feature:theprincipalarethepeople.Theassignedtaskoftheagentistogovernthepeople,
3
i.e.theprincipal.Itisthisspecialfeaturethatweclaimiscriticalinbehavioralterms.Atypi‐
caljudgefeelstheurgetofulfilltheexpectationsthatcomewiththeoffi ce,andnottoabuse
thepowersassignedtoherforselfishpurposes.Thedesignofthe experimentpreservesthis
featureofthereallifesituation.
An important feature of our design is that we test students with various majors, while we
wanttounderstandthechoices of judges.For us students arenot just aconveniencesam‐
ple. In fact, not testing professional judges is critical for identification. Had we found the
sameresultswithjudges,wewouldnothaveknownwhetherresults aredrivenbythefact
thatspecialindividualsselectintobecomingjudges,orby theirexposuretothejudicialpro‐
fessional environment. We would not have been able to isolate the office motive. By con‐
trast,wecandosowithstudents,sincewecanrandomlyassigntheofficetooneinfivepar‐
ticipants.Furthernotethatasituationis frequentinjudicialpracticethatsharesthisfeature
withourexperiment:individualsonone‐timejuryduty.
Ifauthoritiesholdstandardpreferences,i.e.,iftheymaximizetheirpayoff,wehaveaclear
prediction. There is no punishment. Contributions to the public good decay over time, as
theywouldintheabsenceofthepunishmentoption.Infact,28%oftheauthoritiesbehave
this way. But the vast majority of 72% are willing to discipline free‐riders, although this
means a smaller payoff for them. Punishment is explained by two reasonable and socially
desirablefactors.Participantsarethemorelikelytobepunishedthelesstheyhavecontrib‐
uted. Authorities, on top, care about the degree by which participants deviate from the
group average in the previous period. Authorities thus conjointly apply an absolute and a
relative definition of free‐riding, and target both. Holding an office indeed strongly moti‐
vatesonetodowhatiscalledfor.
Ideally, the legislator would want all wrongdoers to be treated equally, irrespective of the
particularauthoritytheyarefacing.Thepolicypreferencesoftheauthorityshouldbeimma‐
terial. To test whether policy preferences of the authority have explanatory power, before
thestartofthemainexperiment,usingastandardtest,weelicittheauthorities’socialvalue
orientation (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988).
1
We find that punishment behavior is signifi‐
cantlymoderatedbytheauthorities’personalsocialvalueorientation.Notethatinourde‐
signan authority doesnothave powerto equal out her own payoff. The factthat her per‐
sonalsocialvalueorientationexplainsherpunishmentchoicesshowsthatshe
hasaprefer‐
enceforothersbehavinginaway,andforothers’payoffsbeingdistributedinawaythatis
consistent with the way she would want to be treated herself. This is why we refer to the
authorities’socialvalueorientationasapolicypreference.
It is normatively desirable that individuals who have no personal interest in the outcome
nonethelessdisciplineothers,evenifthiscomesatacost. Butinandofitselfthisevidence
doesnotsuffice toisolateanofficemotive.Theoutsiderscouldjustbeangryabouttheanti‐
socialbehaviorofsomeindividuals,or
theycouldshowsympathywiththevictims.Thus,in
ordertofindout whether "beingincharge"isrelevant,we rerun theexperiment,butnow
add a frame. In one treatment, we call the outsider a "public official".
2
In the other treat‐

1 Notethatfeedbackaboutthesocialvalueorientationtestisonlygivenattheveryendoftheexperiment.Thatwaywe
canensurethattheauthorities’decisionsinthepublic‐goodsexperimentarenotinfluencedbytheoutcomeofthefirst
partoftheexperiment.
2 "Beamter“intheGermanoriginal.
Citations
More filters
Monograph•DOI•
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Behavior: A Comparative Perspective

[...]

Lee Epstein1, Keren Weinshall2•
Washington University in St. Louis1, Hebrew University of Jerusalem2
30 Jun 2021
TL;DR: The authors survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians and the public.
Abstract: The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.

3 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Political competition in judge and prosecutor elections

[...]

Gregory DeAngelo1, Bryan C. McCannon2•
Claremont Graduate University1, West Virginia University2
01 Oct 2019-European Journal of Law and Economics
TL;DR: In this article, the authors use a laboratory experiment to investigate how these two important policy changes to political competition affect campaign spending and outcomes and find that subjects spend beyond both the socially optimal level and the amount predicted by theory.
Abstract: The United States is unique in that important actors within the criminal justice system, namely judges and prosecutors, are selected in popular election. Several states are currently adjusting whether political party affiliation is listed on the ballot. Additionally, states differ by how easy it is for candidates from non-dominant parties to gain access to the ballot. We use a laboratory experiment to investigate how these two important policy changes to political competition affect campaign spending and outcomes. Using asymmetric contests designed to capture the institutional change, we find that subjects spend beyond both the socially optimal level and the amount predicted by theory. This over-competition is not uniform, but rather concentrated in those subjects who have the strategic advantage (either dominant-party affiliation or restricted ballot access of competitors). Opening up the election process, therefore, leads to reductions in the wasteful, rent-seeking spending (contrary to theory). Disadvantaged subjects are less likely to exit the race when the election process is opened, as well. Thus, a level playing field promotes participation. Furthermore, we explore heterogeneous treatment effects, finding less campaign spending for risk-loving, non-ambiguity averse, strategically sophisticated, and pro-social subjects. Therefore, elections disproportionately select individuals without these characteristics. Additionally, the mix of those who win the election adjust with changes in the electoral rules as well.

2 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Judicial Decision-Making. A Survey of the Experimental Evidence

[...]

Christoph Engel
01 Jan 2022-Social Science Research Network
TL;DR: The authors provide a systematic overview of the rich evidence, points out gaps that still exist, and discusses methodological challenges, concluding that the need for evidence is crucial to find a solution when the evidence is inconclusive and contested.
Abstract: Judges are human beings. Is their behavior therefore subject to the same effects that psychology and behavioral economics have documented for convenience samples, like university students? Does that fact that they decide on behalf of third parties moderate their behavior? In which ways does the need matter to find a solution when the evidence is inconclusive and contested? How do the multiple institutional safeguards resulting from procedural law, and the ways how the parties use it, affect judicial decision-making? Many of these questions have been put to the experimental test. The paper provides a systematic overview of the rich evidence, points out gaps that still exist, and discusses methodological challenges.

2 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Lucky you: Your case is heard by a seasoned panel—Panel effects in the German Constitutional Court

[...]

25 Oct 2022-Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
TL;DR: In the German Constitutional Court, the effect of familiarity on three success measures can be causally identified: success on the merits, with the request for a preliminary ruling, or with a procedural request as discussed by the authors .
Abstract: Panel effects have been widely studied in randomly composed panels. However, for many courts, panel composition stays constant. Then judges become familiar with each other. They know what to expect from each other. Mutual trust may develop. A local culture may emerge. If rejection is the default, familiarity is likely to help plaintiffs, as familiar panels can be more effective, and more self-confident. In the German Constitutional Court, the effect of familiarity on three success measures can be causally identified: success on the merits, with the request for a preliminary ruling, or with a procedural request. Justices experience multiple, exogenous recompositions of their chamber. In the logic of regression discontinuity, the effect of familiarity on the alternative measures for success can be identified if these recompositions lead to a clear decrease in familiarity with the other members of the chamber.

1 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Fines as enforcers’ rewards or as a transfer to society at large? Evidence on deterrence and enforcement implications

[...]

Florian Baumann, Sophie Bienenstock, Tim Friehe, Maiva Ropaul
21 Oct 2022-Public Choice
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors analyzed experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who receives the fines' proceeds and found that the characteristics of enforcers who are willing to incur private costs to create a positive detection probability seem to depend on whether fines reward enforctors or are transferred to society at large.
Abstract: Abstract We analyze experimental data to assess whether the deterrent effect of expected fines depends on who receives the fines’ proceeds. We compare behavior in treatments when the revenue is a reward for enforcement agents to the alternative when fines are transferred to society at large. Most important, with a fixed detection probability, potential offenders’ material incentives are held constant across treatments. Our evidence suggests that the deterrent effect of expected fines is greater when enforcement agents obtain the fine revenue. Our results also document that the characteristics of enforcers who are willing to incur private costs to create a positive detection probability seem to depend on whether fines reward enforcers or are transferred to society at large.

1 citations

References
More filters
Journal Article•DOI•
A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation

[...]

Ernst Fehr1, Klaus M. Schmidt2•
University of Zurich1, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich2
01 Aug 1999-Quarterly Journal of Economics
TL;DR: This paper showed that if some people care about equity, the puzzles can be resolved and that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior in cooperative games.
Abstract: There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitivemarkets butnot inbilateral bargainingsituations. Thereisalsostrong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selesh types dominate equilibrium behavior.

8,783 citations

Book•
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

[...]

Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
01 Jan 1993
TL;DR: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (TIIN) as mentioned in this paper is a popular textbook for regulatory economics, with a particular focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.
Abstract: More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities. The book's clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the new regulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questions tackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductory chapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency. The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics. Each chapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicable model, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, including sufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory. Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a description of complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the book valuable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at the end of the book.

3,602 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments

[...]

David K. Levine1•
University of California, Los Angeles1
01 Jul 1998-Review of Economic Dynamics
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined a simple theory of altruism in which players' payoffs are linear in their own monetary income and their opponents' opponents' private information and varies in the population, depending on what the opponent's coefficient is believed to be.

1,415 citations

Book•
The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited

[...]

Jeffrey A. Segal1, Harold J. Spaeth2•
State University of New York System1, Michigan State University2
26 Feb 1993
TL;DR: In this article, two leading scholars of the US Supreme Court and its policy making, systematically present and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making.
Abstract: This book, authored by two leading scholars of the Supreme Court and its policy making, systematically presents and validates the use of the attitudinal model to explain and predict Supreme Court decision making. In the process, it critiques the two major alternative models of Supreme Court decision making and their major variants: the legal and rational choice. Using the US Supreme Court Data Base, the justices' private papers, and other sources of information, the book analyzes the appointment process, certiorari, the decision on the merits, opinion assignments, and the formation of opinion coalitions. The book will be the definitive presentation of the attitudinal model as well as an authoritative critique of the legal and rational choice models. The book thoroughly reflects research done since the 1993 publication of its predecessor, as well as decisions and developments in the Supreme Court, including the momentous decision of Bush v. Gore.

895 citations

Journal Article•DOI•
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)

[...]

Richard A. Posner1•
University of Chicago1
01 Jan 1993-Supreme Court Economic Review
TL;DR: In this article, a positive economic theory of the behavior of appellate judges and Justices is presented, arguing that the effort to insulate judges from significant economic incentives, through devices such as life tenure and stringent conflict of interest rules has not rendered judicial behavior immune to economic analysis.
Abstract: This article presents a positive economic theory of the behavior of appellate judges and Justices. The essay argues that the effort to insulate judges from significant economic incentives, through devices such as life tenure and stringent conflict of interest rules, has not rendered judicial behavior immune to economic analysis. Drawing on analogies to the managers of non-profit enterprises, to those who vote in political elections, and to theatrical spectators, the essay models the judicial utility function in terms that allows judges to be seen as ordinary people responding rationally to ordinary incentives. This model provides a theoretical alternative to the common view of judges as Prometheans or saints, and it suggests new ways of looking at such practical issues as the design of the judicial compensation system.

720 citations

Related Papers (5)
The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice

[...]

07 Jan 2013
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Richard A. Posner
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)

[...]

01 Jan 1993-Supreme Court Economic Review
Richard A. Posner
A Behavior-based Evaluation Instrument for Judges

[...]

01 Sep 1995-Justice System Journal
E. Lee Bernick, David J. Pratto
Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan

[...]

12 Mar 1996-Research Papers in Economics
John Ramseyer, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
The Role of Competence in Promotions from the Lower Federal Courts

[...]

26 Sep 2015-The Journal of Legal Studies
Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner