政治自由主义 = Political liberalism
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Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...This ‘sense of fairness’ can be observed through surveys but, given its variegated meanings in specific contexts, cannot be conceptualized without resorting to a philosophy taking into account the ‘public culture’ of a given society (Rawls, 1971, 1993, 2001)....
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Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...(Rawls 2005, 94) Joshua Cohen has lucidly criticised Rawls’ surprising claim....
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...(Rawls 2005, 55) argument—accepting them is a condition for being reasonable....
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...Joshua Cohen has lucidly criticised Rawls’ surprising claim. Truth is the norm of beliefs, Cohen (2009, 13–15) states, and because even political conceptions of justice that avoid commitments to comprehensive doctrines must assert some beliefs, doing without the concept of truth (and not just without a substantial theory of truth) is impossible. He therefore proposes a political conception of truth, a conception ‘thin’ enough to fit within the confines of an overlapping consensus in which the plurality of reasonable doctrines meet. According to Cohen, conceptions of justice must include a non-metaphysical (“political”) account of truth that minimally includes four “commonplaces” about truth which Cohen deems relatively uncontroversial: (a) Truth is the norm for beliefs, assertions and judgements. (b) True beliefs represent things as they are. (c) Truth is more than justification. (d) Truth is independently important (26f.). However, Cohen’s argument that we need not explain those four commonplaces in detail and thus that we need no substantial theory of truth to have a political conception of truth (28) seems problematic. He claims that deflationary theories of truth say “too little” (26) because they cannot explain the value of truth. Yet his assertion that truth does have a value independently of justifications is hardly more illuminating without giving further details. Thus Cohen either falls prey to his own critique or would have to include a substantial theory of truth in his account of truth, thus implicating him in the philosophical controversies that the political account was designed to circumvent. Even if we grant Cohen this political conception of truth, admitting the existence of an overlapping consensus and thus a meeting point of reasonable doctrines despite their pluralism judges the fact of reasonable pluralism to be bounded from the start or even reintroduces the unity of reason as a regulative ideal.[19] Either way we start to weaken or outright contradict the insight into the fact of reasonable pluralism. Thus, the only way left to cope with that insight seems to be relativistic in the sense that all truths are equal. If we allow for more than one truth regarding the same issue—and nothing else would amount to a pluralism of truths—, then denying the equality of these truths seems to re-introduce a criterion by which we could judge which of these truths is ‘more true’, thereby rejecting our premise of the plurality of truths. Hence relativism seems unavoidable as soon as we embrace the Rawls conviction wholeheartedly, yet of course we know why that is problematic: On the one hand, the position appears to be unstable, as admitting that more than one truth about the same issue exists leads us to conclude that no truth about the issue exists (if we accept the law of the excluded middle and the law of noncontradiction). On the other hand, it seems that resolving reasonable disagreements will mostly come about by force. Relativism indeed does not appear to be a particularly attractive position.[20] [19] Obviously, the debate whether Rawls (2005) can show the possibility of an overlapping consensus between reasonable doctrines becomes important here....
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...It is not a problem that must be solved, Rawls argues, because a just society with democratic institutions encourages the free use of reason, and reasonable pluralism is the necessary result (Rawls 2005, 37)....
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...For he argues that reasonable disagreements stem from (at least six) obstacles to our exercise of reason (see Rawls 2005, 56f.): (a) We encounter conflicting and complex evidence....
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19 citations
References
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