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政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

01 Jan 2000-
About: The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1762 citations till now.
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01 Jan 2015
TL;DR: In this paper, the relevance of realism for practical rationality in political contexts is discussed, focusing on the importance of practical rationality for a conception of realism in political practice, and the common focus of all essays is the relevance this paper.
Abstract: The challenge of realism is one of the common features of current philosophical debates, across different cultural traditions, and in many areas of investigation (epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theory of action, etc.). The implications of realism for political philosophy and political practice, though, are just starting to become an object of systematic discussions. Such implications, however, are significant, since the area of politics is contiguous with that of ethics and action, for example. This volume intends to contribute to debates on the relevance of realism – especially moral realism – for politics. The essays included in the collection address a number of related issues, ranging from foundational problems of realism in ethics, action theory and politics, to questions about pragmatics, to difficulties in political theory, and to political hindrances related to economics and legal theory. The common focus of all essays is the relevance of realism for a conception of practical rationality in political contexts.

19 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Oct 2001
TL;DR: In this article, an overview and a critical scrutiny of the Senian perspective from the point of view of an economist is provided. But the authors do not discuss the relevance of markets within the freedom approach, and, in particular, the most important empirical interconnections between different freedoms studied by Sen.
Abstract: Amartya Sen, in his most recent book Development as Freedom, argues that expansion of human freedom should be viewed both as the primary end and the principle means of development. This article provides an overview and a critical scrutiny of the Senian perspective from the point of view of an economist. First, the author discusses to what extent Sen's normative theory of development justifies a particular focus on inequality and poverty. Second, he looks at Sen's perspective on democratic reasoning as the constructive vehicle for valuational exercises, and in particular how this perspective fits with the recent human development framework of the UNDP. Third, he discusses the relevance of markets within the freedom approach, and, fourth, he reviews some of the most important empirical interconnections between different freedoms studied by Sen.

19 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Goodin and Klingemann as mentioned in this paper introduced truth into the possible constraints alongside rhetoric, persuasion, compromise and negotiation in political philosophy, and argued that philosophy is about truth whereas politics is about power or, more accu¬rately, the constrained use of social power.
Abstract: Political philosophy is that area of philosophy dealing with politics and government, that unstable mix of war and foedus, conflictual division and authoritative union. As ‘philosophy’ it is part of the vita contemplativa, which is pure thinking; as ‘political’ it has always something to do with vita activa, that is action and praxis in a world that exists with its own rules and language games before any philosophical attempt to make that world the embodiment of a theory as Plato did (Arendt, 1953, 1959). Philosophy, like science, is about truth whereas politics is about power or, more accu¬rately, ‘the constrained use of social power’ (Goodin and Klingemann, 1996). This formulation reintroduces truth into the possible constraints alongside rhetoric, persuasion, compromise and negotiation.

19 citations


Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"

  • ...This ‘sense of fairness’ can be observed through surveys but, given its variegated meanings in specific contexts, cannot be conceptualized without resorting to a philosophy taking into account the ‘public culture’ of a given society (Rawls, 1971, 1993, 2001)....

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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that post-truth is a failed concept, both epistemically and politically: its simplification of the relationship between truth and politics cripples our understanding and encourages authoritarianism.
Abstract: ‘Post-truth’ is a failed concept, both epistemically and politically: its simplification of the relationship between truth and politics cripples our understanding and encourages authoritarianism. This makes the diagnosis of our ‘post-truth era’ as dangerous to democratic politics as relativism with its premature disregard for truth. In order to take the step beyond relativism and ‘post-truth’, we must conceptualise the relationship between truth and politics differently by starting from a ‘non-sovereign’ understanding of truth.

19 citations


Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"

  • ...(Rawls 2005, 94) Joshua Cohen has lucidly criticised Rawls’ surprising claim....

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  • ...(Rawls 2005, 55) argument—accepting them is a condition for being reasonable....

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  • ...Joshua Cohen has lucidly criticised Rawls’ surprising claim. Truth is the norm of beliefs, Cohen (2009, 13–15) states, and because even political conceptions of justice that avoid commitments to comprehensive doctrines must assert some beliefs, doing without the concept of truth (and not just without a substantial theory of truth) is impossible. He therefore proposes a political conception of truth, a conception ‘thin’ enough to fit within the confines of an overlapping consensus in which the plurality of reasonable doctrines meet. According to Cohen, conceptions of justice must include a non-metaphysical (“political”) account of truth that minimally includes four “commonplaces” about truth which Cohen deems relatively uncontroversial: (a) Truth is the norm for beliefs, assertions and judgements. (b) True beliefs represent things as they are. (c) Truth is more than justification. (d) Truth is independently important (26f.). However, Cohen’s argument that we need not explain those four commonplaces in detail and thus that we need no substantial theory of truth to have a political conception of truth (28) seems problematic. He claims that deflationary theories of truth say “too little” (26) because they cannot explain the value of truth. Yet his assertion that truth does have a value independently of justifications is hardly more illuminating without giving further details. Thus Cohen either falls prey to his own critique or would have to include a substantial theory of truth in his account of truth, thus implicating him in the philosophical controversies that the political account was designed to circumvent. Even if we grant Cohen this political conception of truth, admitting the existence of an overlapping consensus and thus a meeting point of reasonable doctrines despite their pluralism judges the fact of reasonable pluralism to be bounded from the start or even reintroduces the unity of reason as a regulative ideal.[19] Either way we start to weaken or outright contradict the insight into the fact of reasonable pluralism. Thus, the only way left to cope with that insight seems to be relativistic in the sense that all truths are equal. If we allow for more than one truth regarding the same issue—and nothing else would amount to a pluralism of truths—, then denying the equality of these truths seems to re-introduce a criterion by which we could judge which of these truths is ‘more true’, thereby rejecting our premise of the plurality of truths. Hence relativism seems unavoidable as soon as we embrace the Rawls conviction wholeheartedly, yet of course we know why that is problematic: On the one hand, the position appears to be unstable, as admitting that more than one truth about the same issue exists leads us to conclude that no truth about the issue exists (if we accept the law of the excluded middle and the law of noncontradiction). On the other hand, it seems that resolving reasonable disagreements will mostly come about by force. Relativism indeed does not appear to be a particularly attractive position.[20] [19] Obviously, the debate whether Rawls (2005) can show the possibility of an overlapping consensus between reasonable doctrines becomes important here....

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  • ...It is not a problem that must be solved, Rawls argues, because a just society with democratic institutions encourages the free use of reason, and reasonable pluralism is the necessary result (Rawls 2005, 37)....

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  • ...For he argues that reasonable disagreements stem from (at least six) obstacles to our exercise of reason (see Rawls 2005, 56f.): (a) We encounter conflicting and complex evidence....

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Book ChapterDOI
TL;DR: The concept of justice and the normative framework justice offers to lasting social harmony, needs to be considered in relation to local social ethics and values, and to the public ethics requirement of impartiality.
Abstract: Theoretical and empirical studies analysing various ethical aspects of inter-national relations — and particularly those related to war, peace and conflict resolution — have primarily focused on the moral justification of war and intervention, as well as on ‘the ethics of peace’1 by analysing the plausibility of various moral, political and economic means and ends in peacemaking. Since existing injustices and the quest for justice are usually seen to be the main causes for violent clashes, it is often claimed that the creation or restoration of justice must be the most important goal of post-conflict reconstruction. However, the current policy approaches, social movements, and theoretical models for conflict resolution tend to look at justice from merely a technical point of view, as a rapid fix to overcome war and violence. This relates the notion of ‘peace’ to ‘security’, and replaces the concept of ‘justice’ with the concepts of ‘law and order’. Creation or restoration of justice, however, does not merely mean establishment of the rule of law; it has wider moral dimensions. Therefore, the concept of justice, and the normative framework justice offers to lasting social harmony, needs to be considered in relation to local social ethics and values, and to the public ethics requirement of impartiality.

19 citations

References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls, the idea of the reasonable, and conclude that this concept helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
Abstract: This paper aims to explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls: the idea of the reasonable. While the concept has its roots in both Aristotle and Kant, Rawls develops a unique account of the reasonable in the light of his theory of political liberalism. The paper includes Rawlsian responses to the practical challenges of radical democrats on the one hand, and epistemological challenges to the reasonable on the other. It concludes that Rawls’s account of the reasonable helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.

1,108 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate the concern for human development in the present with that in the future, and explore the relationship between distributional equity, sustainable development, optimal growth, and pure time preference.

726 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro-lifers in the Ivory Coast.
Abstract: Meaning is inscribed in the material/built environment and this article considers the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro...

635 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The notion of deliberative democracy was coined by Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or "aristocratic" interpretation of the American Constitution.
Abstract: roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal,deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices ofliberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt andthen further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation theterm stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or‘‘aristocratic’’ interpretation of the American Constitution.

595 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
Nancy Fraser1
TL;DR: This article propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as identity-based conceptions.
Abstract: In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as w...

570 citations