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政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

01 Jan 2000-
About: The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1762 citations till now.
Citations
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09 Jul 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that higher prudence should be regarded as the supreme virtue in international politics, rather than the lower prudence preferred by political realist Hans Morgenthau.
Abstract: This article defends a radical, morally ambitious version of prudence in international politics Thus, it claims that, rather than the ‘lower prudence’ favoured by political realist Hans Morgenthau, ‘higher prudence’ (Cochran 1983) should be regarded as the supreme virtue in international politics This claim is based on a threefold argument First, while Morgenthau rightly stresses the key importance of prudence for international political decision making, his own understanding of prudence lacks adequate ethical development and justification Second, prudence in international politics must accept the ultimate authority of the ‘theoretical wisdom’ of cosmopolitan justice Third, as international ‘practical wisdom’, prudence in international politics should accept risk for the ethically relevant yet non-basic values of national survival and international order for the sake of cosmopolitan justice, safeguarding only core national interests and values Theoretically, higher prudence is a key concept of an international ethics that has advanced from political realism to cosmopolitan pluralism by including recent cosmopolitan insights Keywords: international ethics, prudence, political realism, cosmopolitanism, pluralism

16 citations


Cites methods from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"

  • ...It is consistent with his original method of ‘moral philosophy’ (Rawls 1971; later abandoned for one of ‘political philosophy’; Rawls 1993; 1999; cf. also Miller’s 2000, 174 rather sudden, basic ethical acceptance of a ‘weakly egalitarian’ understanding of global justice, discussed in Kamminga…...

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Dissertation
01 Jun 2014
TL;DR: The Sustainable Communities Act (SCA) as discussed by the authors is a participatory-deliberative process (PDP) set up to influence central government policy agendas in the UK; the SCA was selected for its analytically relevant features.
Abstract: The thesis argues that responsive governance can be achieved through institutions that increase civic influence upon policy agendas. Participatory-deliberative processes (PDPs) are understood to offer mechanisms for democratic responsiveness. However, the ways in the outcomes of (PDPs) can be linked to policy making has received little attention, especially at higher governance tiers. The thesis analyses a PDP set up to influence central government policy agendas in the UK; the Sustainable Communities Act (SCA) (2007).The SCA was selected for its analytically relevant features. It differs from other PDPs for a combination of three reasons: (a) it was specifically designed to allow citizens to identify policy problems, develop policy proposals and influence agendas; (b) it operated across governance levels, connecting local participation to national policy development; and (c) it institutionalised a link to the policy process. The thesis aims to evaluate the processes through which proposals were developed and integrated within policy development, with a view to assessing impacts upon ambitions for more responsive governance. The analysis finds achievements such as the importance of reflexive agenda setting processes that allow participants to explore and (re)define problems, as well as the realisation of a form of responsiveness characterised by a deliberative, rather than a causal, relation between input and output. However, modest achievements are marred by important problems. First, proposal development processes were prone to ‘capture’ by the political priorities of local authorities and interest group representatives. In this respect, the analysis concludes that the SCA often resembled a ‘lobbying tool’ for local elites. Second, when it came to integrating proposals within policy development, SCA proposals were subsumed by the policy development, electoral and legislative cycles of representative institutions. Such constraints are real, but not absolute, and can be mitigated through institutional design. The thesis ends by making recommendations to this end.

16 citations

Dissertation
01 Jan 2019
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider six arguments against the proposition that state consent is either sufficient or necessary for the legitimacy of international law, and conclude that to properly legitimate international law state consent would need to fulfil the additional necessary requirement of being "authorised" by the individuals within the state; arguably through a process of deliberative democratic decision-making.
Abstract: With the post-WWII acceleration of globalisation and the proliferation of transnational concerns (such as nuclear armament, financial instability, climate change, the spread of diseases etc.), there has been a concomitant increase in international laws and institutions designed to regulate this activity and facilitate international cooperation. This widening and deepening of international law brings to the fore normative concerns about how and from where international law derives its legitimacy. Indeed, international legal institutions have been suffering a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in recent years: from the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’ to Brexit. This thesis aims to contribute to the philosophical literature on the political legitimacy of international law. In particular, it seeks to morally evaluate the traditional theory of international legal legitimation: ‘state consent’. After conducting an in-depth conceptual analysis of three key concepts (international law, political legitimacy, and state consent), the thesis will consider six arguments against the proposition that state consent is either sufficient or necessary for the legitimacy of international law. I conclude that state consent is not ‘sufficient’ as – to properly legitimate international law – state consent would need to fulfil the additional necessary requirement of being ‘authorised’ by the individuals within the state; arguably through a process of deliberative democratic decision-making. I also conclude, however, that state consent may be ‘necessary’ for the legitimacy of a certain category of international law; namely, the international law of ‘cooperation’ (as opposed to ‘coexistence’). The thesis ends by tentatively suggesting proposals for how international law may increase its claim to legitimacy under the existing state-consent model: first, by incentivising a process of internal democratisation, and second, by establishing an international ‘harm principle’ that better protects third-parties from indirect harm.

16 citations


Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"

  • ...97 For example, see: Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174. In this case, the ICJ arguably created the following new general principles of international law: the principle of functional protection of an IGO; the principle of implied powers; and the principle of the objective legal personality of the UN. See also: Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. (2015) Public International Law: pp....

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Dissertation
03 Feb 2016
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the concept of political neutrality as discussed and expounded in the political and constitutional writings of James Madison and Benjamin Constant and pointed out the complex interdependent relationship between the liberal and republican philosophical traditions in late eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century political theory.
Abstract: The liberal and republican traditions of political thought are commonly treated as divergent political-philosophical doctrines which existed in a state irreconcilable opposition in late eighteenth-century France and America. The present study challenges this notion through examining the concept of political neutrality as discussed and expounded in the political and constitutional writings of James Madison and Benjamin Constant. In seeking to account for not only why, but also how, both thinkers endeavoured to construct political systems geared toward securing the production of neutral laws, this thesis explores and highlights the complex interdependent relationship between the liberal and republican philosophical traditions in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century political theory. It is argued that in their desire to construct political-constitutional systems tailored toward guaranteeing the materialisation of neutral laws, Madison and Constant incorporated republican, or ?Real Whig?, concepts into their respective constitutional strategies. Their shared objective, it is shown, was to form limited and neutral states through exploiting the diversity of public opinion in such a way that would render popular sovereignty self-neutralising. More specifically, this thesis suggests that both Madison and Constant placed considerable emphasis on de-legitimising particular justifications for legislative action, and that their respective efforts in this area were motivated by a desire to restrict the legislature to the promotion of objective, and impartially-conceived, accounts of the public good. Thus through examining Madison?s and Constant?s attempts to form neutral states, this thesis challenges the traditional account of the development of modern liberalism through pointing to the existence of an autonomous liberal-republican philosophy in post-revolutionary French and American political thought. It is argued that this hybrid political philosophy ? which underpinned the constitutionalisms advanced by both Madison and Constant ? had as its principal objective the reconciliation of the practice of popular governance with the restoration and maintenance negative individual liberty. Both thinkers, in other words, exploited republican concepts and institutions in order to realise the distinctly liberal end of forming limited and neutral states.

16 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the epistemic justifications of political authority are compatible with a liberal commitment to respecting reasonable value pluralism, and that if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, the standard of competence we should use is a pragmatic one.
Abstract: It has proven difficult to reconcile epistemic justifications of political authority, especially epistemic theories of democracy, with a basic liberal commitment to respecting reasonable value pluralism. The latter seems to imply that there can be no universally acceptable substantive outcome standard to evaluate the epistemic reliability of different political procedures. This paper shows that this objection rests on an implausible interpretation of political competence. In particular, the paper defends two claims: first, that epistemic theories of political authority are in fact compatible with a liberal commitment to respecting reasonable pluralism; but second, that if we take reasonable pluralism seriously, the standard of competence we should use is a pragmatic one. Good political decision procedures reliably fix practical problems of social coordination and adapt to new demands and developments; we need not demand that their decisions are all-things-considered just or optimal. This pragmatic account...

16 citations


Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"

  • ...See for instance Rawls (2005), Estlund (2008), Gaus (1996), MacGilvray (2004) and Nagel (1987)....

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  • ...…coordinate the behavior of the millions of individuals making up modern social systems in such a way as to make mutually beneficial cooperation (see Rawls 2005, pp. 15–22, Knight and Johnson 2011, p. 1, Gaus 2011b, p. 103) possible, given the difficulties arising from people’s ‘partly competing,…...

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References
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls, the idea of the reasonable, and conclude that this concept helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
Abstract: This paper aims to explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls: the idea of the reasonable. While the concept has its roots in both Aristotle and Kant, Rawls develops a unique account of the reasonable in the light of his theory of political liberalism. The paper includes Rawlsian responses to the practical challenges of radical democrats on the one hand, and epistemological challenges to the reasonable on the other. It concludes that Rawls’s account of the reasonable helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.

1,108 citations

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate the concern for human development in the present with that in the future, and explore the relationship between distributional equity, sustainable development, optimal growth, and pure time preference.

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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro-lifers in the Ivory Coast.
Abstract: Meaning is inscribed in the material/built environment and this article considers the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro...

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TL;DR: The notion of deliberative democracy was coined by Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or "aristocratic" interpretation of the American Constitution.
Abstract: roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal,deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices ofliberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt andthen further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation theterm stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or‘‘aristocratic’’ interpretation of the American Constitution.

595 citations

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Nancy Fraser1
TL;DR: This article propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as identity-based conceptions.
Abstract: In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as w...

570 citations