Abstract: [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Which Rights Should Be Universal? by William J. Talbott. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005. 232pp. Preface by Jamie Mayerfeld The struggle for human rights has been shadowed by philosophical doubt. Can we assert universal human rights without engaging in moral imperialism? Can we have confidence in the moral beliefs that underlie human rights claims? Can we justify human rights to those who do not believe in the intrinsic value of autonomy? Which Rights Should Be Universal?, the first of two projected volumes on human rights, is a significant contribution to this literature. In a series of original and mind-opening arguments, William Talbott, a professor of philosophy at the University of Washington, lifts us over one philosophical impasse after another. Admirers of Which Rights Should Be Universal? will find their thinking about human rights enlarged and enhanced by a wealth of new concepts; critics will be kept busy in answering the book's copious arguments. From any perspective, Professor Talbott's book moves the conversation about human rights onto a new plane. This symposium emerged from two public panels devoted to Professor Talbott's boo----the first in Seattle on April 10, 2006, to mark the formal inauguration of the Program on Values in Society of the University of Washington, and the second in Philadelphia on August 31, 2006, at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. The participants are all leading scholars of human rights: Brooke Ackerly (Vanderbilt University), Charles Beitz (Princeton University), Jack Donnelly (University of Denver), Henry Shue (Oxford University), and Kok-Chor Tan (University of Pennsylvania). Jamie Mayerfeld (University of Washington) leads off with a synopsis of Talbott's book. The critical essays raise the following questions and challenges for Talbott's arguments: what theoretical approaches best promote the human rights of women? (Ackerly). Do we need the idea of moral objectivity to make sense of human rights? (Ackerly and Donnelly). Should values other than autonomy be highlighted in the justification of human rights? (Donnelly, Shue, and Tan). Does empirical evidence support the view that democracy is a human right? (Beitz). Should human rights include cultural rights? (Tan). Which criteria may justify external intervention in a state's domestic affairs? (Tan and Beitz). How should we distinguish paternalist from non-paternalist strategies of promoting human rights? (Shue). In an essay published concurrently in Human Rights & Human Welfare, Professor Talbott responds at length. He uses the occasion to provide detailed answers to his colleagues' questions and criticisms, and to elaborate upon the arguments of his book. An Overview and Appreciation by Jamie Mayerfeld Some of us believe in a human right to freedom of speech and freedom of religion, in the equality of men and women, in a human right to democracy, and in a human right to economic subsistence where that includes adequate nutrition, basic health care, safe drinking water, and elementary education. We believe that all human beings have these rights. That is our moral belief. But some people, and perhaps some cultural groups as a whole, do not share this belief. They deny that all these things are human rights. What should we say about this situation? Are these people mistaken in their moral beliefs, or is that an unacceptably arrogant thing to say? Are we arrogantly imposing our views on other cultures? To ask the question another way: are there any universal human rights, rights that ought to be honored even in cultures that do not believe in them? And if so, what rights belong in the list of universal human rights? These are the questions that William Talbott sets out to answer in his book. He argues that we should believe in universal human rights. He is a moral universalist because he believes that "there are moral truths that apply to everyone, even those who disagree with them" (15). …