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政治自由主义 = Political liberalism
01 Jan 2000-
About: The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1762 citations till now.
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TL;DR: In this paper, a distinction between the notion of political justice and the concept of legitimacy is made between proto-rights and constitutional rights, which are moral, not legal, rights and they are less specific than constitutional rights: one set of proto rights allows for various schemes of legal constitutional rights.
Abstract: There is a tension between the idea of popular sovereignty and our understanding that basic constitutional rights and liberties have a normative authority which is independent from the results of democratic decision‐making procedures. On the one hand there is the claim that the content of political justice, at least as far as the basic liberties are concerned, is to be fixed solely by substantive moral and political argument, while on the other there is the claim that it is the people who determine the specific scheme of basic liberties that they live under. The apparent tension between the two claims can be resolved by introducing, firstly, a distinction between the concept of justice and the concept of legitimacy and, secondly, between proto‐rights and constitutional rights. Unlike constitutional rights, proto‐rights are moral, not legal, rights, and they are less specific than constitutional rights: one set of proto‐rights allows for various schemes of legal constitutional rights. Proto‐rights are part...
52 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...(Rawls 1993, p. 137) A serious flaw of this formulation of liberal legitimacy is that it already presupposes a constitution as a given framework for the legitimate exercise of political power....
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...The explicit distinction between ‘concepts’ and ‘conceptions’ has been introduced by John Rawls (1993, p. 14n; 1999, p. 5) who gives credit for it to Herbert Hart (1994, p. 160)....
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..., in the work of Jürgen Habermas (1988) and John Rawls (1993). In comparison with Weber’s empirical concept the normative concept of legitimacy has two distinctive features....
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...…all citizens; (2) everyone acts in conformity with the public conception of justice; (3) everyone knows that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, and this is itself common knowledge; and (4) a consensus exists as to the justification of the first principles of justice (Rawls 1993, pp. 35ff, 66f)....
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...This is central for the understanding of legitimacy, e.g., in the work of Jürgen Habermas (1988) and John Rawls (1993)....
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01 Jan 2010
TL;DR: Loureiro et al. as mentioned in this paper argued that liberal democracy has become the ultimate form of political governance and that some competing and conflicting elements are introduced into the political landscape of Christian and Muslim groups.
Abstract: Politics and Eschatology: Christian, Muslim and Liberal Traditions and Their Visions of Humankind‘s Future. (December 2010) Roberto V. Loureiro, B.A. Presbyterian Seminary of the South, Brazil; Th.M. Covenant Theological Seminary; M.A. Covenant Theological Seminary Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Cary J. Nederman Within the context of contemporary politics, Christian, Muslim and Liberal traditions have been, in many instances, at odds with each other regarding how humankind‘s social political future should be ordered. Such a conflicting condition has been aggravated by the global circulation of democratic ideals, which has significantly disseminated Western liberal values and made those ideals an almost universal desirable social commodity. In support of this argument, one can observe the unprecedented and controversial assumption that liberal democracy has become the ultimate form of political governance. It is in the context of these end-times liberal aspirations, whether self desired or imposed through external pressure, that some competing and conflicting elements are introduced into the political landscape of Christian and Muslim groups. By presenting itself as the universal and final solution for humanity‘s future, liberalism
51 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the relevance of J.S. Mill's political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics and argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well being.
Abstract: In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill’s political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill’s arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.
51 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...Non-basic liberties are ones pertaining to marketplace activities such as contract and certain forms of property acquisition and transfer (Rawls, 1971: 273; Rawls, 1993: 291–299)....
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...However, Rawls’s explication of that remark reveals that he only intends to say that overriding non-basic liberties requires ‘good and sufficient reasons’ (Rawls, 1993: 291)....
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...…assumption is thus that all liberties are not ‘on a par’ (Rawls, 1971: 273), and accordingly, he does not extend the categorical protection afforded to the basic liberties to every instance in which there is the prospect of state interference with choice (Rawls, 1971: 273; Rawls, 1993: 291–299)....
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...For example, he notes that some moral considerations, in addition to those that are specific to the basic liberties, might provide the appropriate basis for a measure of added burden of proof on liberty infringement (Rawls, 1993: 296)....
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...In some instances, some ‘general presumption’ for non-basic liberties may be warranted, he says, but not for the same reasons that basic liberties are accorded their lexical priority (Rawls, 1993: 291)....
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TL;DR: The authors compare two alternative answers to the question "Who is the addressee of welfare economics?" and show that the conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a "social planner" whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice.
Abstract: This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ‘Who is the addressee of welfare economics?’ These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics and have different implications for how welfare economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a ‘social planner’, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined as a benevolent despot, receptive to the economist's advice. The alternative contractarian answer is that welfare economics is addressed to individuals who are seeking mutually beneficial agreements; a contractarian recommendation has the form ‘It is in the interests of each of you separately that all of you together agree to do x’. Each of these answers should be understood as a literary convention that uses a highly simplified model of politics. I defend the contr...
51 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the defence of associative political obligations is continued by sketching an argument that supports commonplace ideas about our having a special, ethical relationship with the polity of which we are members.
Abstract: This article continues the defence of associative political obligations begun in Part One. It does so by sketching an argument that supports commonplace ideas about our having a special, ethical relationship with the polity of which we are members. The argument begins by showing how non-voluntary groups in general can have value, and then seeks to identify the generic good of a polity: that good is the provision of order and security. While this is a necessary condition of associative political obligations, it is not sufficient. It needs to be supplemented by an argument explaining why we have obligations to the particular polity of which we are members. This ‘associative’ argument has two sides to it. The first explains how membership of a polity is for most people something like an ascribed status; that is, an identity or role that a person is taken to occupy without having chosen it. The second suggests how, through a process of identification, we incorporate membership within our self-understanding. T...
51 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...Or, differently again, it is possible to read Rawls’ later work as attempting to furnish an answer to a broadly similar question through his conception of a political ethic informed by an overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1993)....
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References
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls, the idea of the reasonable, and conclude that this concept helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
Abstract: This paper aims to explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls: the idea of the reasonable. While the concept has its roots in both Aristotle and Kant, Rawls develops a unique account of the reasonable in the light of his theory of political liberalism. The paper includes Rawlsian responses to the practical challenges of radical democrats on the one hand, and epistemological challenges to the reasonable on the other. It concludes that Rawls’s account of the reasonable helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate the concern for human development in the present with that in the future, and explore the relationship between distributional equity, sustainable development, optimal growth, and pure time preference.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro-lifers in the Ivory Coast.
Abstract: Meaning is inscribed in the material/built environment and this article considers the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro...
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TL;DR: The notion of deliberative democracy was coined by Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or "aristocratic" interpretation of the American Constitution.
Abstract: roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal,deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices ofliberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt andthen further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation theterm stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or‘‘aristocratic’’ interpretation of the American Constitution.
595 citations
TL;DR: This article propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as identity-based conceptions.
Abstract: In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as w...
570 citations