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政治自由主义 = Political liberalism
01 Jan 2000-
About: The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1762 citations till now.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls, the idea of the reasonable, and conclude that this concept helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
Abstract: This paper aims to explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls: the idea of the reasonable. While the concept has its roots in both Aristotle and Kant, Rawls develops a unique account of the reasonable in the light of his theory of political liberalism. The paper includes Rawlsian responses to the practical challenges of radical democrats on the one hand, and epistemological challenges to the reasonable on the other. It concludes that Rawls’s account of the reasonable helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
1,108 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate the concern for human development in the present with that in the future, and explore the relationship between distributional equity, sustainable development, optimal growth, and pure time preference.
726 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...London: Joseph Johnson....
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...The idea that ``income'' is what can be spent while leaving the asset base intact is precisely the concept of sustainable income established by John Hicks (1946, p. 172) more than 50 years ago: The purpose of income calculations in practical a airs is to give people an indication of the amount which they can consume without impoverishing themselves....
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...The Eighteenth J. Seward Johnson Lecture....
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...Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press....
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...It is easily seen why Repetto (1985) saw an analogy between the idea of sustainable development and the economic accountant's notion of what spendable income is....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro-lifers in the Ivory Coast.
Abstract: Meaning is inscribed in the material/built environment and this article considers the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro...
635 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...(Superstitious and irrational beliefs do not belong to this field of reasonable disagreement, cf. John Rawls 1993, pp. 54ff.) At the same time there is also a need for institutional interaction, for instance between the judiciary and the political system, as well as between politics as power and…...
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TL;DR: The notion of deliberative democracy was coined by Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or "aristocratic" interpretation of the American Constitution.
Abstract: roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal,deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices ofliberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt andthen further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation theterm stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or‘‘aristocratic’’ interpretation of the American Constitution.
595 citations
TL;DR: This article propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as identity-based conceptions.
Abstract: In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as w...
570 citations
References
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TL;DR: In this article, a comparative analysis of the use of the social contract model in two earlier domains, namely political authority and social justice, is conducted, and four criteria for any future contractarian business ethics are developed.
Abstract: Contractarian business ethics (CBE) is in great vogue in the present study of corporate morality. Its stated ambition is to provide better practical guidance than the more general ethical theories of business ethics, such as Kantianism, pragmatism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics or the stakeholder model. But how good is this new trend in business ethics theorizing? This article aims to assess CBE's credentials as a social contract argument. For this purpose, it embarks on a comparative analysis of the use of the social contract model in two earlier domains: political authority and social justice. Building on this comparison, it then develops four criteria for any future CBE. To apply the social contract model properly to the domain of corporate morality, it should be: (1) self-disciplined, i.e. not aspire to results beyond what the contract model can realistically establish; (2) argumentative, i.e. provide principles that are demonstrative results of the contractarian method; (3) task-directed, i.e. it sho...
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is suggested that teachers can construct a just and fair pedagogy, which is truly liberal in its assumptions, by following a procedure similar to that advocated by Rawls.
Abstract: This paper proposes that the ideas of political philosopher John Rawls could be adapted to offer a new starting point for a pedagogy of religious education (RE) in the non‐denominational sector. It is argued that contemporary approaches to RE may infringe the liberal principle of freedom of belief by favouring certain methods of interpreting religions. In response to this criticism, it is suggested that teachers can construct a just and fair pedagogy, which is truly liberal in its assumptions, by following a procedure similar to that advocated by Rawls. Readers are invited to don a ‘veil of ignorance’ and imagine that from this perspective they are to enter into a hypothetical contract outlining the founding principles of a pedagogical approach. It is argued that those entering into such a contract would opt for a form of critical RE not dissimilar to Wright’s that aims to present religions and competing ideologies without distortion. It is hoped that this hypothetical contract can thus characterise and l...
23 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine Amartya Sen's capability approach in the light of these questions and conclude that the capability approach suggests a conception of some aspects of intragenerational justice, but not of intergenerational justice itself.
Abstract: The idea of intergenerational justice has practical consequences, not least because it is linked to the politically influential, wide-ranging concept of sustainable development. It also bears on several philosophical puzzles arising in the context of intergenerational justice. They need to be solved in order to establish a case for intergenerational obligations of justice. In this paper we shall examine Amartya Sen's capability approach in the light of these questions. In developing an account of human development, Sen's capability approach suggests a conception of some aspects of intragenerational justice, but not of intergenerational justice itself. This paper aims to close this gap in two steps: first, it identifies necessary elements of a theory of justice; second, and subsequently, it examines how successful the capability approach is in providing these elements.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that to be moral is to do (or to be) what one should or ought to do or be, which is a tautology.
Abstract: IntroductionIf someone asks ‘‘Why should I (or ought I to) do x?’’—where x can be any particularaction that may require some self-sacrifice in the interests of others—we normallythink that this person asks a reasonable question that deserves a serious answer.One such answer can be: ‘‘it is moral to do x,’’ meaning that to do x is somethinggood or right; in other words, it is something that one should or ought to do. How-ever, if the person further asks: ‘‘Why should I (or ought I to) be moral?’’ we maythink that this person is starting to become unreasonable or even irrational. On theone hand, to be moral is to do (or to be) what one should or ought to do (or be). So toask ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ is equivalent to asking ‘‘Why should I be (or do) whatI should be (or do)?’’—which is a tautology. On the other hand, to be moral is pre-sumably to be concerned with the interests and welfare of others, and it seems thatthe person who asks the question is looking for a self-interested reason to be moral.So to ask ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ is equivalent to asking ‘‘What self-interestedreasons are there for me to be not self-interested?’’—which is a contradiction.However, as I shall argue below, if we think this way we may have missed thepoint of the question. If the person is satisfied with our initial answer to his or herquestion ‘‘Why should I do x?’’ it is clear that this person is already motivated to bemoral. The only reason he or she asks the question is to be sure that x is a moralthing to do. However, if the person is not satisfied with our initial answer and furtherasks the question ‘‘Why should I be moral?’’ it is clear that the person perhapsalready knows, even before asking the question, that x is a moral thing to do butlacks the motivation to be moral. In other words, the person who asks the questionis not in search of a theoretical answer that explains the nature of the action (to do x)but is interested in a practical answer that can motivate him or her to do x. In thissense, I think that the question is clearly a legitimate one. What is not so clear iswhether there is any legitimate answer to this question. Since the person who asksthe question, if I am right, lacks the motivation to be moral, this person must bean egoist. Here, I do not think that it is necessarily contradictory to provide egoisticreasons to motivate the egoist to be not egoistic (actually this is what we often hearfrom some discussions in business ethics. For example, we are often told that to befair to customers is the best way to make money, particularly in the long run). Theproblem is that when we provide such egoistic reasons to motivate a person to bemoral, even if we do succeed, we are afraid that we are providing the wrong reasonsfor being moral.
23 citations