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政治自由主义 = Political liberalism
01 Jan 2000-
About: The article was published on 2000-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 1762 citations till now.
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls, the idea of the reasonable, and conclude that this concept helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
Abstract: This paper aims to explore an important concept in the work of the later Rawls: the idea of the reasonable. While the concept has its roots in both Aristotle and Kant, Rawls develops a unique account of the reasonable in the light of his theory of political liberalism. The paper includes Rawlsian responses to the practical challenges of radical democrats on the one hand, and epistemological challenges to the reasonable on the other. It concludes that Rawls’s account of the reasonable helps to bridge the gap between liberal theory and democratic practice.
1,108 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors integrate the concern for human development in the present with that in the future, and explore the relationship between distributional equity, sustainable development, optimal growth, and pure time preference.
726 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...London: Joseph Johnson....
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...The idea that ``income'' is what can be spent while leaving the asset base intact is precisely the concept of sustainable income established by John Hicks (1946, p. 172) more than 50 years ago: The purpose of income calculations in practical a airs is to give people an indication of the amount which they can consume without impoverishing themselves....
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...The Eighteenth J. Seward Johnson Lecture....
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...Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press....
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...It is easily seen why Repetto (1985) saw an analogy between the idea of sustainable development and the economic accountant's notion of what spendable income is....
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro-lifers in the Ivory Coast.
Abstract: Meaning is inscribed in the material/built environment and this article considers the materiality of change in urban Africa, focusing particularly on the kitchens of a group of first-generation pro...
635 citations
Cites background from "政治自由主义 = Political liberalism"
...(Superstitious and irrational beliefs do not belong to this field of reasonable disagreement, cf. John Rawls 1993, pp. 54ff.) At the same time there is also a need for institutional interaction, for instance between the judiciary and the political system, as well as between politics as power and…...
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TL;DR: The notion of deliberative democracy was coined by Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or "aristocratic" interpretation of the American Constitution.
Abstract: roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal,deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices ofliberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt andthen further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation theterm stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or‘‘aristocratic’’ interpretation of the American Constitution.
595 citations
TL;DR: This article propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as identity-based conceptions.
Abstract: In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as w...
570 citations
References
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TL;DR: This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) The authors' species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value and 2) their species plays valuable ecological roles.
Abstract: Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.
20 citations
TL;DR: However, not everything about toleration and recognition is controversial; there are fixed points from which students can grapple with the issues presented by both as discussed by the authors, and tolerance can also seem condescending; should we therefore replace it with recognition?
Abstract: Generally we think it good to tolerate and to accord recognition. Yet both are complex phenomena and our teaching must acknowledge and cope with that complexity. We tolerate only what we object to, so our message to students cannot be simply, ‘promote the good and prevent the bad’. Much advocacy of toleration is not what it pretends to be. Nor is it entirely clear what sort of conduct should count as intolerant. Sometimes people are at fault for tolerating what they should not, or for tolerating what they should find unexceptionable. So virtue does not always lie with toleration. Tolerance can also seem condescending; should we therefore replace it with recognition? But recognition may not be able to coexist with the disapproval that makes toleration necessary. However, not everything about toleration and recognition is controversial; there are fixed points from which students can grapple with the issues presented by both.
20 citations
TL;DR: The formal structure of the concept of futility is examined, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society, and for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life.
Abstract: In this essay I examine the formal structure of the concept of futility, enabling identification of the appropriate roles played by patient, professional, and society. I argue that the concept of futility does not justify unilateral decisions to forego life-sustaining medical treatment over patient or legitimate surrogate objection, even when futility is determined by a process or subject to ethics committee review. Furthermore, I argue for a limited positive ethical obligation on the part of health care professionals to assist patients in achieving certain restricted goals, including the preservation of life, even in circumstances in which most would agree that that life is of no benefit to the patient. Finally, I address the objection that professional integrity overrides this limited obligation and find the objection unconvincing. In short, my aim in this essay is to see the concept of futility finally buried, once and for all.
20 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that Sen's comparative approach can best be understood as a kind of realism, which is the underlying concern behind the work of both Sen and Geuss, and which, although it is not the only concern behind Sen's approach, is the same as the one of Geuss' and their own.
Abstract: Broadly speaking, the form that contemporary Anglo-American political theory has taken since the 1970s, with its reinvigoration in the seminal work of John Rawls, can largely be described as Platonic and Kantian, focusing on the formulation, comparison, and evaluation of abstract principles of justice, and only subsequently looking to their application in the real world. Concerned about this, a number of critics of the contemporary paradigm in political theory have emerged to offer their own alternatives. This article will discuss two of them: Raymond Geuss and Amartya Sen. This article does three things. Its first section lays out the realist approach to political theory advocated by Raymond Geuss and the comparative approach advocated by Amartya Sen, respectively. Here I argue that Sen's comparative approach can best be understood as a kind of realism. In the second section of this article, I explore what I take to be an underlying concern behind the work of both Sen and Geuss, and which, although it is...
20 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the model that Haidt suggests for understanding the plurality of moralities does not help to overcome conflicts and that pervasive moral conflicts should be dealt with on the level of politics.
Abstract: In this article I examine whether Moral Foundations Theory can fulfil the promises that Haidt claims for the theory: that it will help in developing new approaches to moral education and to the moral conflicts that divide our diverse society. I argue that, first, the model that Haidt suggests for understanding the plurality of moralities—a shared foundation underlying diverse moralities—does not help to overcome conflicts. A better understanding of the nature and background of moral conflicts can lead to a more respectful attitude towards people with conflicting views, but need not contribute to ending conflicts. Second, I show that pervasive moral conflicts should be dealt with on the level of politics. They require a morality of compromising. Third, I examine why this approach does not seem to work in the USA.
20 citations