

A Comparative Cost/Security Analysis of Fault Attack Countermeasures

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Outline

- Introduction
- Error detection codes
- Repetition/duplication
- Conclusion




Introduction

- Countermeasures against fault attacks
 - HW, SW
 - Active, passive
 - Examples:
 - Bus encryption, sensors, randomizations, ...
 - Error detection techniques
- ⇒ Comparative analysis (block ciphers)




Error detection techniques using space redundancies

- Block cipher without protection:



A first proposal

Single bit
parity check:



e.g. [Karri et al. 2003]



A first proposal

- Mainly costs an additional Boolean function for the substitution box
- Any modification of the parity will be detected at the round's output

>< Faults of even order will *not* be detected

- OK for integrated circuits
- probably not for malicious adversaries



A first proposal

Fact 1: Probability of errors in integrated circuits

1-bit: 85%, 2-bit: 10%, 3-bit: 3%, 4-bit: 1%

[Moshanin *et al.* 98]

Fact 2: Numbers of faults required to defeat, e.g.

the AES Rijndael: 2 [Piret *et al.* 04]

Fact 3: Malicious adversaries: possibly enhanced
with space and time localization



Possible improvements

- Weaknesses of the first proposal:
 - Only one parity bit is used
 - Parity codes are linear
 - (Only one checker per round)



Multiple bit parity codes



- *e.g.* [Bertoni *et al.* 03]: one parity bit per byte for the AES Rijndael
- HW penalty: the parities are now affected by the diffusion layer
- Security improvement:
P[double faults affecting the same byte]~12%



Non-linear robust codes #1

- [Karpovsky *et al.* 04]:
 - non-linear code for the S-box
 - check only a few bits
 - linear code for the rest:
(8-bit parity code per column):


⇒ Contrasted security



Non-linear robust codes #2

- [Karpovsky *et al.* 04]:

Addition of cubic networks to the previous linear scheme:



HW cost of the different solutions

- Based on the original author's estimations

Method	Sin. fault detection	Mul. fault detection	Area overhead	Delay overhead	Thr. overhead	Thr./Area overhead
single parity bit	yes	no	+7.4%	+6.4%	-	-
multiple parity bits ($n = 16$)	yes	double faults masked with $P \propto \frac{2}{n+1}$	+20%	-	-	-
linear + non-linear codes	weak	good	+35%*	-	-	-
non-linear r -bit codes ($r = 28$)	good, missed with $P \propto 2^{-2r}$	good, missed with $P \propto 2^{-2r}$	+77%	+15%	-13%	-51%



Observations


- In general, the HW overhead increases with the fault detection capabilities
- The overhead obviously depends on the cost of the original primitive (because estimated in %)

⇒ Security vs. efficiency tradeoff



Other proposals

- Concurrent error detection for involution ciphers




[Joshi *et al.* 2004]



Other proposals

- What is the real cost of the proposal?
- A similar proposal would be:



⇒ Repetition code


⇒ Throughput divided by 2

⇒ No permanent faults detected



Feedback modes?


- Pipeline cannot be used for efficiency...
... but can be used for fault detection



Feedback modes?

⇒ There exist contexts where fault detection can be obtained “for free”

Similar example:
[Karri *et al.* 2002]
(repetition/duplication)



Conclusions

S. Mitra, E.J. McCluskey, “*Which Concurrent Error Detection Scheme to Choose?*”,
International Test Conference 2000

⇒ Most efficient concurrent error detection schemes exceed the cost of duplication



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- When can this be improved?

Theoretically two possibilities:

- restrict the fault model (e.g. multiplicities)
- detect with lower probabilities

Both solutions are not convenient for crypto



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- Or **practically**... in certain specific contexts:
 - Encryption in feedback modes
 - Encryption/decryption available



⇒ Purely theoretical solutions (e.g. algorithmic tamper proofness) are probably not completely unrealistic

? Efficiency improvements of non-linear robust codes

