

A COMPARISON OF MASS ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE WELFARE STATE IN DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL REGIMES, 1985-1990

Clive Bean and Elim Papadakis

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the validity of predominant assumptions about popular support for the welfare state. These presuppositions include the notion that support for the welfare state varies in different types of regimes (be they 'liberal' or 'social democratic' or 'conservative'), the idea that different social groups (for example, the middle and working classes and the unemployed) have different interests with respect to the welfare state, and the view that political alignments have a strong influence on attitudes to welfare. To investigate these issues we analyze the 1990 International Social Survey Programme Role of Government Survey and compare it to the findings of an analysis we conducted on the 1985 survey. The aim therefore is to examine the relationship between mass attitudes and specific types of welfare state regime and the social and other correlates of mass opinion.

Research into mass opinion about the welfare state has reflected the concerns of particular social contexts. Until the late 1970s, most writers were confident about the future of the welfare state and of popular support for it. The welfare state and mass opinion had apparently developed along the path set by social reformers shortly after the Second World War. In *Commitment to Welfare*, Richard Titmuss (1968) expressed the hopes of reformers that the welfare state would serve the purpose of social integration, that the middle and upper classes would share in both the costs and benefits of the welfare state and that they would give their whole-hearted support to the bold social experiments.

Reviews of opinion polls conducted since the 1940s showed that on the major issues, like health care and age pensions, there was strong support for statutory intervention. The welfare state was described as a 'permanent fixture of modern society' and 'virtually irreversible' (Coughlin 1979, pp. 15-16; see also Flora and Heidenheimer 1981). Among writers who focused on the prevalence of collectivism, some did draw attention to the 'ambivalence' in attitudes, for instance, to the underlying currents of concern about possible abuses of the

welfare system (Coughlin 1979, p. 25), whilst others had argued that the 'welfare backlash' and 'tax revolts' of the early 1970s were directly associated with the visibility of taxes in some countries (Wilensky 1975). The welfare backlash in the 1970s manifested itself in the rise of the parties opposed to taxation and big bureaucratic government, such as the Progress Party led by Mogens Glistrup in Denmark; popular opposition to taxes articulated by politicians from mainstream parties, as in the opposition to property taxes in the United States (notably the success of Proposition 13 in California); and a concern about big, wasteful and ineffective government as revealed in some opinion polls (see Wolfe 1977).

Opinion polls showed that even in countries like Sweden and Denmark there was a growing resistance to government control over industry and private enterprise (Coughlin 1980, pp. 27–8). There was also speculation about the decline of public confidence in the welfare state (O'Connor 1973, Brittan 1975) and signs that the political agenda was about to be changed, for instance, when views of politicians like Ronald Reagan on government spending, which had previously been dismissed as too radical, became 'the conventional wisdom of the Republican leadership in the 1970s' (Coughlin 1980, p. 128).

Until the late 1970s most of these speculations and subtle shifts in the political agenda were not widely regarded as a fundamental threat to the welfare state. Rather, since the nineteenth century, the welfare state had grown both in size and in its influence over people's lives. Average government spending as a percentage of GDP in developed nations was 8 percent in 1870; by 1960 it had risen to around 28 percent, by 1980 to 43 percent and by 1996 to 46 percent (*The Economist*, September 20, 1997, 11). The full impact of these trends and speculations about them was only felt in the 1980s following the election of neoconservative governments that were committed to radical reforms in social policy. The question of a decline in support for the welfare state and of the ambivalent character of welfare attitudes began to dominate the agenda for social research (see Taylor-Gooby 1985). Moreover, writers like Esping-Andersen and Korpi argued that there was a close connection between 'welfare backlash' or 'tax revolts' and the institutional character of the welfare state. Institutional characteristics include, for example, whether or not a particular regime provided universal transfers or was based primarily on means-tested benefits (Korpi 1983, Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984, Esping-Andersen 1990).

Only a few writers had, since the 1950s and 1960s, focused mainly on the underlying support for private (as opposed to collective) welfare (see Harris and Seldon 1987). Harris and Seldon anticipated the concerns of the 1980s—notably the possibility that people might want to exit from the welfare state and choose between various private options. Their data complemented other surveys which show a rise in support for tax cuts and for less expenditure on

social services, health, and education in the United Kingdom between the 1960s and the 1980s (see Papadakis 1992, p. 32).

Paradoxically, the dominance of the Thatcher government in the 1980s was accompanied by a reversal of this trend. People were more likely than in the past to favor an increase in taxes and spending (Rose 1989, p. 107). Even neoconservative governments were reluctant to carry out the threat of reducing public expenditure (De Swaan 1988, Rose 1989). Though public opinion was not the only factor weighing on governments, it was an important source of resistance to radical proposals for dismantling the welfare state. As Taylor-Gooby has pointed out, public opinion in many of the countries we are reviewing in this paper appears to be opposed to 'rolling back the state'. Public opinion is also opposed, in many areas, to high levels of state intervention (Taylor-Gooby 1989, p. 51). Overall, however, from the 1970s through to the 1990s, opinions about state intervention in European countries, have remained fairly stable—at least at the aggregate level (Kaase and Newton 1995, ch. 4).

THEORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Our paper presents evidence from a period when there was great concern about the retrenchment of the welfare state, on the relationships between:

- the character of institutional regimes of social policy and the level of support for the welfare state; and
- attitudes to welfare and political and social cleavages.

In other words, our approach is guided by an interest in whether or not different kinds of institutional regimes (particularly regimes which provide various types and levels of welfare benefits and social protection) are likely to lead to distinct levels of popular consent to welfare programs; and to be associated with particular kinds of class and political cleavages. These expectations have been generated especially by the literature on the 'decommodification' and 'stratification' of welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990).

'Decommodification' (the provision of welfare services as a right and the decrease in reliance by individuals on the market for their livelihood) is measured by an index of age pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits. Another measure, called 'stratification', includes expenditures on public and private pensions, private health care, and various statutory services and benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990, Table 3.1). This leads to a trichotomous division between 'liberal', 'conservative', and 'socialist' regimes (see Esping-Andersen 1990, Table 3.3). Liberal regimes are said to be the most strongly oriented towards the market, socialist regimes towards the state.

On the basis of a decommodification score, Esping-Andersen splits the

eighteen countries in his sample into three groups. Of the six countries examined in this paper, Australia and the United States are firmly in the group with the lowest score. The United Kingdom just makes it into this group. The middle group includes Italy and Germany. Norway falls into the group comprising mainly Scandinavian countries with the highest scores.

The trichotomous division into regimes based on stratification has the United Kingdom with a low score on conservatism but an average score on both liberalism and socialism. Australia and the United States score high on 'degree of liberalism', though Australia also receives an average score for 'degree of socialism'. Italy and Germany score high on conservatism. Finally, Norway falls squarely into the socialist camp with other Scandinavian countries (see also Papadakis and Bean 1993, pp. 230–2).

In sum, comparative analyses of welfare state regimes have been influenced by notions of a backlash in public opinion against social provision of services. Some regimes (notably the Scandinavian countries) are identified as models of the universalistic welfare state, whereas others (like the United States and Australia, and, to some extent, the United Kingdom) are labeled residual or liberal because they lay far greater emphasis on means-testing benefits. Support for the welfare state is said to vary considerably among institutional regimes and there is, apparently, a distinctive relationship between social class and support for the welfare state.

We focus on three influential approaches which attempt to identify the major social and political determinants of support for the welfare state including:

- 'class politics';
- social location and the 'self-interested' predispositions of the middle-classes; and
- the interests of the so-called 'transfer classes'.

The 'class politics' approach is valuable in explaining the long-term impact of decisions on social policy made at critical historical junctures by political coalitions (comprising of groups claiming to represent different classes) (Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984, Esping-Andersen 1990). Castles (1985) presents a convincing account of the Australian welfare state by adopting this approach. The second and third approaches have, respectively, focused on the middle classes (Goodin *et al.* 1987, Baldwin 1990) and the transfer classes (the unemployed and aged pensioners who are more directly dependent than others on the welfare state) in determining popular attitudes (Lepsius 1979, Alber 1984, see also Wilensky 1976 on the potential conflict between these two groups). The value of these two approaches is derived from their focus on rational actors that pursue particular interests in all types of welfare regime.

All three approaches emphasize social location as a crucial measure of support

for the welfare state, but there is an important difference between the class politics and the other approaches. Whereas the latter make a direct connection between support for the welfare state and class location (with the social and economic circumstances of individuals or groups of individuals), the class politics approach arises from an interest in the institutional articulation of 'class interests', in other words, in *the politics of class*. Accordingly, the class politics approach should not be confused with approaches that emphasize objective social location. Class politics refers to the *politics of institutional influences* and of the organizations that claim to represent particular groups and of the coalitions between them.

Some of the main implications of these approaches, of relevance to our focus on public opinion, can be summarized in the form of three hypotheses. First, support for the welfare state should be lower in the so-called 'liberal' regimes than in the more universalistic regimes, second indicators representing the class politics approach should be consistently influential in shaping support for social welfare and third, the impact of social location should be more prominent in the liberal regimes than in the more highly decommodified social democratic regimes.

THE CONTEXT FOR WELFARE POLICIES

There is another important consideration in examining mass attitudes, and this pertains to changes in policy or ideology in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, particularly the countries discussed in this paper. Overall, throughout the OECD there has been an emphasis on balanced budgets, an increased commitment to financial deregulation, the encouragement of reductions in trade barriers, the establishment of employment growth as an overarching goal of social and economic policy and, as a corollary to this, the push towards more flexible, mobile, and efficient labor markets (see OECD 1993).

Interestingly, despite the enormous pressure to curb public expenditure across the OECD, government spending as a proportion of GDP rose from 42.6 percent in 1980 to 44.8 percent in 1990 (*The Economist*, September 20, 1997, 11). However, there were some variations between the countries analyzed in this paper. If we focus solely on social security transfers we find that in several countries (Australia and the United States) the difference between 1985 and 1990 was very small (9.5 percent and 9.8 percent, and 10.9 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively) or small (as in West Germany, with figures of 16.2 percent and 15.2 percent, and Italy, 17.2 percent and 18.2 percent). The more significant changes were in the United Kingdom (a decrease from 13.5 percent to 11.6

percent) and in Norway (an increase from 14.8 percent to 19.5 percent) (see OECD 1996).

In Australia during the 1980s there was a rise both in income inequalities and in unemployment rates. Australian governments persisted with the targeting of benefits to particular groups, and the most needy recipients of social security were those who experienced real increases in benefits. In the United States there has been a strong focus on reducing dependence on the welfare state. The aim has consistently been for employment growth, and expenditures in areas like child care and health care have risen in order to try and match this commitment to creating jobs. Unemployment levels remained fairly steady and this partly reflects the absence of any increase in real wages for many people.

The Federal Republic of Germany retained, during the 1980s, its distinctive emphasis on direct transfers and relatively low levels of expenditure on social services. The system retained the strong commitment to work-related social insurance schemes, funded by employer and employee contributions. Family and private organizations also continued to play a pivotal role in welfare. Both prior to and especially since German unification there has been significant pressure on the traditions of the 'social state'. In contrast to Germany (and Britain), Italy has lagged in the development of many aspects of the welfare state. Hence the development of a universal health care system in the 1970s emerged at a time when other countries were trying to curb their expenditure in this domain. In the 1980s the problem of unemployment contributed to significant rises in taxation. Despite efforts to alleviate some of the consequences of unemployment there were marked increases in inequalities between the better off and the poor during the 1980s, with strong rises in the number of people categorized as poor.

As regards the countries which experienced significant changes in social expenditure as a proportion of GDP, reforms in Britain reflected the strong stance adopted by the Conservative government on challenging the social security system established after the Second World War. Efforts were made to restrict access to unemployment benefits. Expenditure on education remained low by international standards. There was a push to privatize housing and aspects of health care. Overall, there was an increase in the gap between the rich and poor. By contrast, Norway retained its strong commitment to a universalistic welfare state, to a model that attempts to alleviate the worst effects of capitalism and avoids the excessive reliance on centralized bureaucratic power in communist regimes. The remarkable increase in social benefits was rendered possible by the successful exploitation of resources like offshore oil and gas, though during the 1990s there has been a reaction against some of the problems associated with a rising national debt. Norway, like other OECD countries, has had to reflect on the imperatives of achieving a balanced budget.

Still, despite some important shifts in direction at the governmental level, this paper shows that most citizens continue to support many of the traditions of the welfare state as it has evolved in their particular countries. People are not ready to abandon their commitment to a collective welfare state, though the pressure for change will of course remain.

ATTITUDES AND THEIR ORIGINS

DATA AND RESEARCH STRATEGY

This paper presents new evidence both of the degree and the sources of resistance to any attempts to challenge statutory intervention and government spending in the area of social policy. The data come from the 1985–86 and 1990 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 'Role of Government' surveys.¹ Since our purpose is to test the assumptions of welfare state theorists like Esping-Andersen, we focus on those countries in our sample from which these assumptions are normally derived. The 1985–86 ISSP survey included six countries, all of which form part of this group. However, one (Austria) did not participate in 1990. Although the 1990 survey included a number of additional countries, only one (Norway) is suitable for our purposes, as well as having the full range of data available. Our 1990 sample of countries is thus Australia (sample size 2,398), the United States (1,217), Great Britain (1,197), West Germany (2,812) and Italy (983), all of which were also surveyed in 1985, plus Norway (1,517).² Whereas our analysis of the 1985 data lacked a social democratic Scandinavian country with a highly decommodified structure, the 1990 sample compensates for this with the inclusion of Norway. Still, much of the analysis in this paper concentrates on assessing change between 1985 and 1990 and on how far the results of the 1990 survey confirm or lead us to question the earlier findings.

The analysis is presented in two stages. First, in looking at individual items measuring attitudes to different aspects of the welfare state, we consider means from simple frequency distributions. Then we conduct a multivariate analysis to isolate the net impact of different social and political factors on attitudes to welfare.

¹ The data were documented and made available by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung at the University of Cologne and distributed to the authors through the Social Science Data Archives at the Australian National University. The data were collected by independent institutions in each participating country. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the data archives bear any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here. We nonetheless acknowledge our debt to the collectors and the archives for making the data available for secondary analysis.

² Different methods of sampling and data collection are used in the different countries, although the ISSP module is usually conducted by way of a self-completion questionnaire. Details can be found in Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (1985; 1990; see also Davis and Jowell 1989, for a more general introduction to the ISSP).

THE POPULARITY OF WELFARE PROVISIONS IN DIFFERENT REGIMES

In this paper we take one step further our analysis of the relationship between the institutional character of welfare state regimes and support for social welfare policies. Our previous research showed that public opinion data only partially confirmed the expectations raised by writers like Esping-Andersen and Korpi that 'liberal' regimes such as Australia and the United States would lag behind other countries in terms of popular support for the welfare state (Papadakis 1993, Papadakis and Bean 1993).

Table 1 allows us to compare both the previous data from the 1985 survey and evidence from the 1990 survey. As in 1985, there is still overwhelming support in 1990 in liberal and other regimes for statutory intervention in the areas of health care for the sick and providing for the old. Although there has been a decline in support for intervention in both these areas in Australia (by 7 and 9 points on the 0–100 scale, respectively), the figures are still very high. Moreover, there has been no decline in support in the United States (rather, a significant increase by 4 percentage points in support of providing for the sick). On the issues of unemployment and providing jobs, the United States and Australia still lag behind the other countries surveyed in 1985. However, over time, the slight decline in support among Australians is more or less matched by the increase in support among citizens of the United States.

We should remember that the data for Australia, the United States and other countries are likely to be sensitive to recent shifts in policy, as discussed above. For example, the overall decline in support in Australia may represent a reaction to the dominance of the Australian Labor Party, which introduced a more universal health care scheme as well as landmark reforms in social security provision. Moreover, the level of unemployment, at least until 1990 had diminished as an issue of major importance.

Turning to Britain, West Germany and Italy, we find that support for the traditionally less popular measures (for jobs and for assisting the unemployed) has declined significantly in all three countries. It is interesting to note that the decline in Britain is greater than in Australia, while the figures for West Germany are similar to those in the 'liberal' Australian regime. It would seem that we are dealing here with short-term responses to particular economic developments and policies rather than trends that can be attached to particular types of regime. The decline in support for the unemployed in West Germany may be closely associated with the new responsibilities taken on by West Germany in incorporating East Germany into its economy. The unification of Germany has led to major concerns about how to retrain and provide employment for workers from East Germany. Italy, which (like West Germany) scores high on the conservatism scale devised by Esping-Andersen, has also experienced a

similar decline to Australia in support for intervention for jobs and for the unemployed. Overall, the only country to experience a consistent rise in support for statutory intervention is the United States. As a result, the patterns for the United States and Australia have become almost identical, and Italy and Britain appear to be moving in the same direction.

Surprisingly perhaps, the trends in Table 1 are not matched by those in Table 2. Whereas there has been a slight decline in support for government intervention, support for spending has grown in most cases. The weakest showing is in Australia where the figures for 1990 are almost identical to those recorded in 1985. Of all the areas considered, support for the unemployed has remained largely static. West Germany and the United States lead Italy and Britain (where the shifts are not statistically significant) in increased support for more spending. In West Germany, for example, the biggest changes are for spending on health (10 points) and education (8 points).

Overall, popular support for the welfare state remained strong between 1985 and 1990. Observable changes in the level of support in different countries are in almost all cases modest. Furthermore, there is no obvious division between regime types and support for the major services like health care, education and age pensions and the main area in which one can differentiate between regime type and patterns of mass opinion relates to the unemployed.

The data from the 1990 survey are of particular value to our analysis since they enable us for the first time to draw direct comparisons between liberal and conservative regimes and a Scandinavian social democratic regime, namely Norway. Assumptions about social democratic universal regimes appear to be validated to the extent that Norway scores higher than the other countries on providing jobs for everyone who wants one. Norway is also ahead on support for the unemployed. However, the margin between Norway and Italy is not great in terms of providing jobs. Norway is among the leaders (with Italy and Britain) in terms of strong support for health care and provision for the old.

Despite these important findings regarding Norway, the most striking impression is one of strong support for the welfare state in all countries, including liberal, conservative and universal social democratic regimes. In all countries support is high for the government providing health care for the sick and a decent standard of living for the aged, even if Australia and the United States lag behind somewhat. Providing jobs and helping the unemployed are generally less popular roles for government.

In every country except the United States there is more overall support for statutory intervention measures than for government spending. In particular, Norway, our representative of the 'social democratic' welfare regime, ranks high on statutory intervention, but relatively low on support for government spending, down with 'conservative' West Germany and 'liberal' United States. As we

TABLE 1 Cross-national attitudes towards statutory intervention in social welfare, 1985–1990 (means)^a

		Australia	United States	Great Britain	West Germany	Italy	Norway
<i>Should it be the government's responsibility to^b...</i>							
Provide a job for everyone who wants one	1985	52	39	66	71	79	—
	1990	47	46	57	66	73	77
	Change	-5*	+7*	-9*	-5*	-6*	—
Provide health care for the sick	1985	84	72	95	84	95	—
	1990	77	76	95	84	96	94
	Change	-7*	+4*	0	0	+1	—
Provide a decent standard of living for the old	1985	86	75	92	84	94	—
	1990	77	75	93	83	93	95
	Change	-9*	0	+1	-1	-1	—
Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	1985	55	50	75	69	73	—
	1990	51	51	69	64	68	77
	Change	-4*	+1	-6*	-5*	-5*	—

^a The variables are rescaled to run from a low of 0 (least in favor of government intervention) to a high of 100 (most in favor of government intervention).

^b The exact question wording is: 'On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to...'. Answer categories are: 'definitely should be', 'probably should be', 'probably should not be', 'definitely should not be'.

* Change from 1985 to 1990 significant at $p < .05$.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Surveys, 1985 and 1990.

TABLE 2 Cross-national attitudes towards government spending on social welfare, 1985–1990 (means)^a

		<i>Australia</i>	<i>United States</i>	<i>Great Britain</i>	<i>West Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Norway</i>
<i>More or less government spending on^b...</i>							
Health	1985	69	65	81	66	76	—
	1990	69	72	81	76	80	77
	Change	0	+7*	0	+10*	+4*	—
Education	1985	70	70	74	60	69	—
	1990	71	74	76	68	71	66
	Change	+1	+4*	+2	+8*	+2	—
Old age pensions	1985	67	60	75	63	73	—
	1990	65	62	77	67	76	72
	Change	-2	+2	+2	+4*	+3*	—
Unemployment benefits	1985	36	51	57	57	62	—
	1990	34	52	56	58	61	48
	Change	-2	+1	-1	+1	-1	—

^a The variables are rescaled to run from a low of 0 (least in favor of government spending) to a high of 100 (most in favor of government spending).

^b The exact question wording is: 'Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it...' Answer categories are: 'spend much more', 'spend more', 'spend the same as now', 'spend less', 'spend much less'.

* Change from 1985 to 1990 significant at $p < .05$.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Surveys, 1985 and 1990.

noted earlier, with reference to Sweden and Denmark, there has for decades been some resistance to further expansion of government control in the advanced social democratic welfare states. Recent studies have also shown that even in social democratic regimes there are clear limits as to how far people are prepared to accept further taxes and spending (see Hadenius 1986).

In the scenario of popular support for the welfare state we have just described, Norway looks relatively similar to 'conservative' Italy and to 'liberal' Britain. There are strong similarities between Britain and Italy, and between the United States and Australia. Germany falls somewhere in between these two sets of countries, on some issues resembling the first pair, on others the second pair and on others neither. These data suggest that there is no simple pattern linking general levels of support and the degree of decommodification on the index developed by Esping-Andersen, a claim that is sustained by the multivariate analysis which follows.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF WELFARE STATE POPULARITY

Next, we attempt to estimate the impact of various social and political factors on attitudes to the welfare state. To construct the dependent variable, we combine the individual items in Tables 1 and 2 into a summary scale (see Appendix).³ The independent variables are derived from the three approaches referred to above, namely theories about class politics, about the self-interested middle classes and about transfer classes (see Papadakis and Bean 1993). The class politics variables are represented by the respondent's general political party affiliation, as well as trade union membership and also by attitudes towards trade unions, which takes account of the likelihood that union membership will not coincide absolutely with support for the trade union movement. These variables reflect the preoccupation in the class politics approach with political orientations and with organizations that apparently represent class interests.

Arguments about the role of the self-interested middle classes and conflicts between different class groupings are tested by creating measures based on occupation, divided into four categories (upper middle class, lower middle class, upper working class, and lower working class) in order to be able to examine claims made about conflicts between different class groups; education, in three broad divisions (tertiary, completed secondary, and lower secondary or less); and subjective social class location (middle or working).

Arguments about the role of transfer classes are tested by measures based on

³ Separate scales of attitudes towards statutory intervention and attitudes towards government spending on welfare were also constructed. Analyses using these separate scales show some differences but are broadly similar to the analyses of the single combined scale. The results are available from the authors on request.

income, with low-income earners pitted against the rest, employment status (full-time workers versus part-time workers, the unemployed, and those not in the formal workforce) and old age pensioners, as a category of transfer classes. In addition, since gender and age have obvious associations with some of the above variables they are included as controls. Further details are given in the Appendix.

The equations in Tables 3 and 4 are estimated using ordinary least squares regression, with pairwise deletion of missing data.⁴ Table 3 shows the results for 1990, while results from parallel analyses for 1985, originally presented in Papadakis and Bean (1993), are shown in Table 4. Summary results for both years are shown in Table 5. Notwithstanding some variations, in broad terms the 1990 results reinforce those from 1985. The major finding is that, though none of the variables emerge as extremely strong predictors of attitudes towards social welfare, variables representing the class politics approach receive a good deal of support, and have consistently significant and substantial effects across most of the countries.

Taking all countries together, there is a good deal of similarity in the patterns of association across all the different countries and between the results for 1985 and 1990, in the relevant cases. In particular, the three main Anglo-American 'liberal' regimes (Australia, the United States and Britain) have much in common and so, interestingly, does the 'social democratic' Norway with these three, as to a lesser extent does West Germany. The analyses also suggest that there are weaker social cleavages and less intra-national variation on attitudes to welfare in the 'conservative' regimes (Italy and West Germany) than in 'liberal' or 'social democratic' regimes.⁵

Turning to the detailed results for particular countries, we find that for Australia, the patterns for 1985 and 1990 are very similar. Class politics remains strong. Despite the changes in the means observed in Tables 1 and 2, the effects remain broadly similar, implying a small shift in attitudes to welfare (towards less support) across the population as a whole rather than among particular groups. The effect of class location rises slightly while subjective class declines to a somewhat greater degree. In 1990 Australia was the only country in the sample in which the lower working class was distinctly more pro-welfare than all the other occupational groups.

In the United States the overall variation explained has declined somewhat

⁴ The tables show both unstandardized partial regression coefficients (bs) and standardized coefficients (betas), the former being the more appropriate for comparing the effects of variables across countries and the latter for comparing the relative importance of different variables within countries. For ease of interpretation of the unstandardized coefficients, all variables are scored between zero and one and presented so as to maximize the likelihood that they will return positive coefficients.

⁵ Another interesting feature is the consistent gender gap in Australia, the United States, Britain and Norway (with women more pro-welfare than men), which is more uniform than was the case in 1985.

TABLE 3 Multiple regression analyses of effects on attitudes towards statutory intervention and government spending on social welfare, 1990

	<i>Australia</i>		<i>United States</i>		<i>Great Britain</i>		<i>West Germany</i>		<i>Italy</i>		<i>Norway</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>
<i>Class politics</i>												
Trade union membership	.01	.03	-.00	-.01	.02	.06	.02	.05*	.02	.06	.01	.07
Pro-union attitude	.05	.17***	.03	.10**	.04	.15***	.02	.07**	.01	.05	.05	.22***
Left party identification	.05	.20***	.05	.17***	.07	.27***	.04	.16***	.02	.06	.04	.17***
<i>Class location</i>												
<i>Occupation</i>												
Reference:												
Upper middle class	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lower middle class	-.00	-.01	.02	.06	-.00	-.01	-.00	-.01	-.01	-.03	.00	.00
Upper working class	.01	.02	.07	.19***	.03	.10*	-.00	-.00	-.02	-.05	.03	.12**
Lower working class	.04	.12***	.05	.12**	.02	.06	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00	.03	.11**
<i>Education</i>												
Reference: Tertiary												
Completed secondary	-.01	-.04	-.00	-.00	-.00	.01	-.00	-.01	-.01	-.02	.01	.04
Lower secondary or less	.01	.05	.06	.15***	.01	.05	.01	.05	.01	.02	.01	.05
Subjective working class	.02	.08***	.01	.04	na	na	.03	.11***	.00	.01	.02	.10**
<i>Transfer classes</i>												
Low income	.02	.08***	.03	.08*	.02	.06	.01	.02	.04	.13**	-.01	-.04

continued

TABLE 3—continued

	Australia		United States		Great Britain		West Germany		Italy		Norway	
	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta	b	beta
Employment status												
Reference:												
Employed full-time	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.00	-.01	.03	.08**	-.02	-.03	-.00	-.01
Employed part-time	.07	.08***	.05	.04	.07	.11***	.08	.08***	.08	.11**	.02	.04
Unemployed	.00	.01	-.00	-.00	.03	.12**	.01	.02	.02	.07	.01	.05
Not in labor force	.00	.01	.02	.05	.00	.00	.01	.02	-.02	-.06	.02	.06
Old age pensioner												
Controls												
Female	.03	.11***	.03	.11**	.03	.10**	.01	.05	.10	.05	.03	.13***
Age group												
Reference: Under 35												
35-54	-.01	-.05	-.01	-.02	-.00	-.01	-.02	-.07*	.02	.09*	.00	.02
55 and over	.02	.05	-.02	-.07	-.00	-.01	-.02	-.05	.02	.09	-.01	-.02
R ²	0.20		0.17		0.21		0.09		0.06		0.23	

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
na = Variable not available.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Survey, 1990.

TABLE 4 Multiple regression analyses of effects on attitudes towards statutory intervention and government spending on social welfare, 1985

	<i>Australia</i>		<i>United States</i>		<i>Great Britain</i>		<i>Austria</i>		<i>West Germany</i>		<i>Italy</i>	
	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>
<i>Class politics</i>												
Trade union membership	.01	.03	.04	.06*	.02	.06*	.02	.09	-.00	-.01	.02	.05
Pro-union attitude	.04	.10***	.06	.17***	.06	.21***	.02	.07	.05	.20***	.04	.15***
Left party identification	.07	.22***	.06	.17***	.06	.23***	.02	.08	.05	.19***	na	na
<i>Social location</i>												
Occupation												
Reference:												
Upper middle class	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lower middle class	-.01	-.02	.01	.03	.02	.06	-.01	-.03	.01	.04	.02	.06
Upper working class	.01	.03	.04	.10	.04	.13***	.01	.05	.02	.08	.01	.03
Lower working class	.03	.08*	.02	.05	.03	.09*	.00	.00	.05	.16**	.01	.02
Education												
Reference: Tertiary												
Completed secondary	-.01	-.03	.00	.01	-.00	-.01	.03	.12*	.01	-.03	.02	.06
Lower secondary or less	-.01	-.03	.07	.17**	.01	.05	.05	.18**	.01	.04	.03	.13*
Subjective working class	.06	.19***	.05	.14***	.03	.09**	-.01	-.04	.01	.02	.02	.06
<i>Transfer classes</i>												
Low income	.00	.01	.04	.09*	.01	.02	.03	.09*	.03	.09*	-.01	-.03

continued

TABLE 4—continued

	Australia		United States		Great Britain		Austria		West Germany		Italy	
	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>beta</i>
Employment status												
Reference:	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Employed full-time	.02	.04	-.01	-.01	.02	.05	.02	.04	.00	.00	na	na
Unemployed	.07	.07**	.06	.05	.08	.16***	.10	.12**	.03	.04	.04	.05
Not in labor force	.04	.11**	.01	.03	.06	.20***	.04	.15**	.00	.00	.02	.08*
Old age pensioner	-.02	-.05	.02	.04	-.03	-.07*	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00	.00	.00
Controls												
Female	.03	.09**	.04	.12**	.01	.02	-.01	-.05	.10	.04	.01	.05
Age group												
Reference: Under 35	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
35-54	-.03	-.01	-.03	-.09	.00	.01	.01	.04	.01	.04	-.01	-.05
55 and over	.02	.06	-.03	-.07	.01	.03	.02	.06	.04	.15**	.01	.04
R ²	0.20		0.25		0.28		0.10		0.16		0.07	

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

na = Variable not available.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Survey, 1985.

in comparison to 1985. Class politics is still a fairly strong predictor. The occupational class cleavage (working class versus middle class) is more prominent in 1990. On the other hand, the subjective class effect has declined markedly. The education effect (low levels versus the two higher levels) has remained quite strong. As in 1985, transfer class effects remained weak (apart from income).

Overall the impact of the dependent variables on attitudes to welfare has weakened in Britain (a decline not likely to be accounted for by the absence of a measure of subjective class in 1990, since in 1985 it only explained about 1 percent of variance). Class politics remains strong. The effects of the objective measures of occupational class have declined (despite subjective class being absent). The effects of transfer classes have also declined slightly, especially the variables that represent non-involvement in the labour force and age pensioners (and, to a lesser degree, the unemployed).

In Germany the influence of social and other cleavages has declined overall since 1985. Belonging to the lower working class has moved from having a strong effect in 1985 to zero in 1990. By contrast, subjective class has shifted from zero to a moderate effect. Class politics, though still important, has a weaker effect, particularly when measured by pro-union attitudes. The decline in the impact of class politics in West Germany serves to draw our attention to the social and political changes that occurred during this period including the impact on public opinion of a new nationalism arising from the unification of Germany, of the social and economic costs and benefits of reunification and the enduring influence of a government led by the Christian Democrats after a long period of dominance by the Social Democrats. We are not, however, in a position to assess the precise mechanisms that brought about the change in the influence of class politics on attitudes. Moreover, although the decline is more salient there, Germany is not the only country in our sample in which class politics has become a weaker predictor of welfare attitudes between 1985 and 1990, suggesting that more general processes are also afoot.

The overall impact of the independent variables in Italy is similar to 1985, but this disguises some significant variations. Pro-union attitudes have declined significantly in their impact. Class location is now very weak. The effect of education has vanished. With respect to transfer classes, there has been a rise in the effects of unemployment and of low income.

With the inclusion of Norway in the 1990 ISSP, we now have an opportunity to test in a more direct way the associations between a social democratic universal regime and class politics. Relatively speaking, the overall variance explained in Norway is moderate to high. Class politics is strong (as in Australia, Britain, and, to a lesser extent, the United States), especially in terms of attitudes to trade unions. Class location has a moderate effect in terms of

occupational class divisions between the working and middle class and there is a moderate effect for subjective class, but none for education. Transfer classes are generally weak, except that non-involvement in the labour force has an impact on attitudes to government spending. Overall, Norway tends to resemble the Anglo-American liberal regimes, an impression reinforced by the effect of gender.⁶

Table 5 summarizes the results for the three groups of explanatory variables by way of standardized sheaf coefficients.⁷ These data help in assessing the relative impact of class politics, class location and transfer classes overall, and changes therein between 1985 and 1990. Table 5 helps reinforce and refine the detailed analyses in Tables 3 and 4. The effects of the three groups of variables in Australia, for example, remained remarkably similar between the two surveys, as they did also in Britain, apart from a decline in the relative influence of class location (which may be partly due to the absence of a measure of subjective class in 1990). In the United States class politics has become relatively less influential as it has also in West Germany and Italy. It remains the strongest group of predictors cross-nationally, however. In the United States and West Germany, the decline in the effect of class politics has not been matched by a corresponding increase in either of the other two groups of variables. In Italy, however, the impact of transfer classes has increased apparently at the expense of both class location and class politics. Interestingly, in terms of the summary results the two nations that look most similar are Norway and Australia.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The context for our analysis has been assumptions about the political and social bases of the welfare state and characterizations of different types of welfare regime. Our findings have now been developed to take into account patterns over time as well as a cross-national context and, as noted above, our analysis of the 1990 sample has been enhanced by the inclusion of a Scandinavian social democratic country, namely Norway.

Our analysis demonstrates that the argument about the variation in mass support for services in different types of welfare regime is weak. The time-series and cross-national data show that even in liberal regimes there is not an overwhelming body of opinion against supporting the poor and disadvantaged.

⁶ Note that the welfare attitude scale is not particularly strong for Norway (see Table A1).

⁷ A sheaf coefficient is 'a single measure of multiple effects' (Heise 1972, p. 157), obtained from an index which combines all variables in the specified group, taking account of their respective effects on the dependent variable. Since the resulting variable has no natural metric, the sheaf coefficient is shown only in standardized form.

TABLE 5 Summary of effects on attitudes to social welfare, 1985-1990^a

	<i>Australia</i>		<i>United States</i>		<i>Great Britain</i> ^b		<i>West Germany</i>		<i>Italy</i> ^c		<i>Norway</i>	
	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990
Class politics	.29	.31	.29	.22	.40	.38	.33	.17	.17	.12	—	.35
Class location	.22	.20	.28	.29	.19	.13	.17	.16	.15	.06ns	—	.21
Transfer classes	.10	.12	.12	.10	.20	.18	.09	.11	.05ns	.19	—	.12

^a Standardized sheaf coefficients: see text for explanation.

^b Subjective class is missing from the class location sheaf for Britain in 1990.

^c Party identification is missing from the class politics sheaf and part-time employment is missing from the transfer classes sheaf for Italy in 1985.

ns = Not significantly different from zero at $p < .05$; all other coefficients are significant at $p < .05$ or better.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Surveys, 1985 and 1990.

These findings tend to reinforce our contention that the classification of welfare states as regimes experiencing varying levels of commodification is easily open to challenge. Our argument is that the class politics approach represents a fairly blunt instrument for trying to identify the influence of politics on opinion. Any attempt to do this would be enriched by an understanding of the decreasing influence of class on political partisanship and the dealignment of voters from major parties (Dalton *et al.* 1984). An alternative approach would also take on board the historical evidence presented by writers like Baldwin (1990) on how social democratic parties actually came to develop universalist social policies. This can be linked to the argument that support for the welfare state as for many other policies is often a consequence of a deliberate and innovative attempt by political and other elites to mobilize public opinion.

The marginal effects of social location and the strong support for welfare services across all countries in both 1985–86 and 1990 lead us to reflect on how the middle classes remain morally committed to the welfare state. This commitment overshadows both many attempts to mobilize self-interest and arguments about the significance of self-interest in determining preferences. Although political elites in many countries had been emphasizing the difficulties of meeting growing expectations and hence of financing the welfare state and despite arguments about efforts to roll back the state and replace it with an organization driven by the logic of markets (see, for example, Pusey 1991), most people do not appear to have been unduly influenced by ‘the market experience’. Perhaps this confirms the doubts raised by writers like Lane (1991) about some of the premises of market economics and the arguments by Titmuss (1971) about the importance of moral commitments to public services (see also Rose 1989, ch. 6).

Attempts to link support for the welfare state with transfer classes once again failed to bring out any consistent pattern among different regimes. Apart from serving to reinforce arguments about moral commitment, this finding is a reminder of the significance of institutional mechanisms, of the policies and practices that have evolved in particular regimes which may have a far greater impact on support for welfare services than the social location of an individual.

Finally, we have suggested that although support for welfare services is sensitive to shifts in circumstances and in policy, it has remained high. The overall impression is that even though many voters continued to support governments that were committed to reducing public expenditure, this did not diminish support for the welfare state. Governments may have promised to curb public expenditure but, as noted earlier, they did not necessarily succeed in doing this. People have remained selective as to which policies they support. They believe in the maintenance of minimum social and economic standards. They support taxation which sustains these interventions. The legitimacy of

the welfare state appears to have remained intact, despite the turbulence reported by many writers in the 1970s and 1980s.

APPENDIX

The first part of Table A1 shows factor loadings (for each country and for both 1985 and 1990 where appropriate) of the individual welfare items on the first unrotated factor, from a principal components analysis. Virtually without exception, all items have substantial positive loadings in each nation, showing the data to be consistent with a unidimensional conception of attitudes to social welfare. In addition, the Cronbach's alpha reliability scores confirm the appropriateness of combining all eight individual items into a single analytic scale. When the factor matrix was rotated, different patterns emerged in different countries and thus the strategy we have employed of creating a single scale based on the first unrotated factor is the only way of making our comparative analysis coherent. To use the country-by-country rotated factor pattern would lead to a set of analyses that were country-specific and not comparable across nations.

The scale is a simple additive index, rescored to run from a low of zero (representing a least pro-welfare stance) to a high of one (representing a most pro-welfare stance). The means and standard deviations are shown at the bottom of Table A1. For ease of presentation in Tables 1 and 2, the decimal point is moved two places to the right, so that the range becomes zero to 100.

In the multivariate analyses, all independent variables are dummy variables, scored zero or one, with the category scored one shown in the tables. Most variables are thus self-explanatory, but a few require some extra detail. The item we use to measure attitudes to trade unions reads: 'Do you think that trade unions in this country have too much power or too little power? 1. Far too much power 2. Too much power 3. About the right amount of power 4. Too little power 5. Far too little power.' For the analysis, respondents are classified as either anti-union (the first two answer choices) or pro-union (the last three options). This is because very few respondents in most nations in the sample answer that unions either have too little or far too little power and the variable is thus essentially a divide between those who believe trade unions have too much power and those who believe they have about the right amount of power.

Occupation is the occupation of the respondent, except where the respondent's occupation is not given, in which case the occupation of the respondent's spouse is substituted if available. In broad terms the respective occupational categories contain the following groupings of occupations: upper middle class—professional, managerial, semi-professional occupations; lower middle class—

TABLE A1 Factor loadings, reliability scores, means and standard deviations for welfare attitude scale

	<i>Australia</i>		<i>United States</i>		<i>Great Britain</i>		<i>West Germany</i>		<i>Italy</i>		<i>Norway</i>		
	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990	
<i>Factor loadings^a</i>													
Government's responsibility to:													
1	Provide a job for everyone who wants one	.62	.60	.63	.66	.61	.57	.62	.64	.57	.64	—	.63
2	Provide health care for the sick	.68	.74	.76	.75	.56	.54	.62	.69	.55	.52	—	.62
3	Provide a decent standard of living for the old	.69	.72	.74	.74	.65	.64	.68	.69	.55	.54	—	.63
4	Provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed	.65	.63	.72	.71	.70	.68	.67	.65	.66	.70	—	.68
Government spending on:													
5	Health	.58	.64	.64	.62	.65	.66	.58	.61	.55	.51	—	.57
6	Education	.45	.46	.53	.42	.54	.53	.49	.36	.48	.39	—	.16
7	Old age pensions	.64	.62	.68	.62	.61	.63	.64	.60	.64	.59	—	.54
8	Unemployment benefits	.57	.53	.69	.62	.67	.65	.62	.61	.70	.69	—	.57
	Scale reliability score ^b	.75	.77	.83	.80	.76	.74	.77	.76	.72	.71	—	.67
	Scale mean	.65	.61*	.60	.63*	.77	.76	.69	.71	.78	.77	—	.76
	Standard Deviation	(.15)	(.13)	(.18)	(.16)	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)	—	(.11)

^a From the first unrotated factor of a principal components analysis.

^b Cronbach's alpha.

* Change from 1985 to 1990 significant at $p < .05$.

Source: International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government Surveys, 1985 and 1990.

routine non-manual occupations; upper working class—skilled and semi-skilled manual occupations; lower working class—unskilled manual occupations.

Income is the gross income of the respondent, except where the respondent's income is not given, in which case gross family income is substituted if available. Income is then coded so that those with a low income (defined as around the bottom 25 percent of incomes) are set against all other income earners.

Inevitably, there are minor inconsistencies across countries on some variables. For example, the definition of part-time work varies somewhat, but usually refers to working for less than 30 hours per week. More significant is that no measure of subjective social class is available for Great Britain; and occupation is coded in much less detail in Italy than in the other countries and so the allocation of occupations to the categories used in the analysis is necessarily less precise.

REFERENCES

- Alber, J. (1984): 'Versorgungsklassen im Wohlfahrtsstaat', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 36, 225–51.
- Baldwin, P. (1990): *The Politics of Social Solidarity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Brittan, S. (1975): 'The economic contradictions of democracy', *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, 129–59.
- Castles, F. G. (1985): *The Working Class and Welfare*, Sydney, Allen and Unwin.
- Coughlin, R. (1979): 'Social policy and ideology: public opinion in eight rich nations', *Comparative Social Research*, 2, 3–40.
- Coughlin, R. M. (1980): *Ideology, Public Opinion and Welfare Policy*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- Dalton, R., Flanagan, S. and Beck, P. (eds.) (1984): *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Davis, J. A. and Jowell, R. (1989): 'Measuring national differences: an introduction to the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)'. In Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S., and Brook, L. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes: Special International Report*, Aldershot, Gower, pp. 1–13.
- De Swaan, A. (1988): *In Care of the State*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990): *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. and Korpi, W. (1984): 'Social policy as class politics in post-war capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany'. In J. H. Goldthorpe (ed.) *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 179–208.
- Flora, P. and Heidenheimer, A. J. (eds.) (1981): *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America*, New Brunswick, Transaction Books.
- Goodin, R. and Le Grand, J. et al. (1987): *Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State*, London, Allen and Unwin.

- Hadenius, A. (1986): *A Crisis of the Welfare State? Opinions about Taxes and Welfare Expenditure in Sweden*, Minimedia.
- Harris, R. and Seldon, A. (1987): *Welfare without the State*, London, Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Heise, D. R. (1972): 'Employing nominal variables, induced variables, and block variables in path analyses', *Sociological Methods and Research*, 1, 147-73.
- Kaase, M. and Newton, K. (1995): *Beliefs in Government, Volume 5*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Korpi, W. (1983): *The Democratic Class Struggle*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Lane, R. E. (1991): *The Market Experience*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Lepsius, M. R. (1979): 'Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland'. In H. U. Wehler (ed.) *Klassen in der Europäischen Sozialgeschichte*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
- O'Connor, J. (1973): *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- OECD (1993): *Issues 1993: The OECD Response*, Paris, OECD.
- OECD (1996): *Historical Statistics 1960-1994*, Paris, OECD.
- Papadakis, E. (1992): 'Public opinion, public policy and the welfare state', *Political Studies*, 40, 21-37.
- Papadakis, E. (1993): 'Class interests, class politics and welfare state regime', *British Journal of Sociology*, 44, 249-70.
- Papadakis, E. and Bean, C. (1993): 'Popular support for the welfare state: a comparison between institutional regimes', *Journal of Public Policy*, 13, 227-54.
- Pusey, M. (1991): *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, R. (1989): *Ordinary People in Public Policy*, Beverly Hills and London, Sage.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (1985): *Public Opinion, Ideology and State Welfare*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (1989): 'The role of the State'. In: Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S., and Brook, L. (eds.) *British Social Attitudes. Special International Report*, Aldershot, Gower, pp. 35-58.
- Titmuss, R. M. (1968): *Commitment to Welfare*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- Titmuss, R. M. (1971): *The Gift Relationship*, London, Allen & Unwin.
- Wilensky, H. (1975): *The Welfare State and Equality*, Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Wilensky, H. (1976): *The New Corporatism. Centralization and the Welfare State*, Beverly Hills, Sage.
- Wolfe, A. (1977) *The Limits of Legitimacy*, New York, Free Press.
- Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (1985): *International Social Survey Programme Role of Government—1985: Codebook ZA-No. 1490*, Köln, Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung.
- Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (1990): *Machine Readable Codebook, ZA Study 1950: ISSP 1990 Role of Government II*, Köln, Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Clive Bean is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Science at Queensland University of Technology. His research interests revolve mainly around the analysis of social and political attitudes and behaviour.

Elim Papadakis is Professor of Modern European Studies at the Australian National University. His main research interests are in the areas of public opinion, as well as in environmental politics, policy, and values.

Correspondence should be addressed to Clive Bean, School of Social Science, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia.